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Abstract:
The manner in which western audiences consume and engage with news has 
dramatically changed within the last decade. The introduction of the video sharing 
platform YouTube in 2005 combined with improving internet speeds, provided a new 
platform from which a wide variety of content could be easily consumed. Habermas’ 
concept of the public sphere provides a conceptual framework to analyse how YouTube 
may be contributing towards a healthy democracy. By examining how various aspects of 
videos on YouTube uploaded to the channels of the news organisations CNN, Fox News, 
BBC News, Al Jazeera English and The Young Turks, this thesis aims to examine what 
role YouTube may play in contributing to Habermas’ concept of the public sphere.
The study’s sample comprises a total of 1239 videos uploaded by the five news 
organisations over two separate weeks. A mixed methodological approach was taken 
where a content analysis and an automated sentiment analysis was conducted. The 
content analysis was used to determine what links if any there were across several of the 
variable recorded in the data collection. The automated sentiment analysis used the 
software SentiStrength to determine the levels of positive and negative language used in 
the titles of the videos. Additionally a number of case studies regarding the types of user 
comments were discussed in order to explore the potential contribution they could be 
making towards the public sphere.
The findings of this study were that the topic of the news videos did seem to play a role 
in the levels of user engagement with the videos. Similarly, the sentiment of the language 
used in the titles of the videos also had an impact, with negatively sentimented titles 
generated more user engagement. The exploration of user comments found that they 
were emblematic of similar trends found in communications research.
The findings in this thesis go some way to answering the extent to which YouTube can 
be seen as contributing towards Habermas’ notion of the public sphere. However, due to 
the aspect of emotionality that is present in the data analysed, this thesis suggests that 
due to the ongoing process of media hybridization, a new conceptual framework of the 
public sphere that acknowledges how both thoughtful discussions as well as ones which 
express feelings in an overt way needs to be developed.
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1Introduction:
The manner in which news has been consumed by the public has shifted over time with 
the introduction of new technologies. In the age of the internet and online video 
streaming, this is no more evident than on the platform of YouTube where there are now 
over 1 billion users, consuming over 1 billion hours of video a day (YouTube, 2018).
Since YouTube’s introduction into the media landscape in 2005 where it was home to 
videos such as trips to the zoo (Kosoff, 2015), it has grown and flourished to become 
the second most visited website on the internet (Collins, 2018). Over the course of its 
life so far, the platform has introduced localization, premium subscription services, 
traditional TV streaming services and a range of other built in features that have 
contributed towards its dominance in the online video marketplace. With a majority of 
young people in western societies claiming that their main source of news is from the 
internet (Caumont, 2013) and 47% of the American public in general seeing news on 
their social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter (Pew Research Center, 
2012) it is increasingly important to research how news is being presented to this 
audience on these and other digital platforms.
Early research on YouTube focussed predominantly on how particular areas of culture 
were being represented (Lowood, 2006) or approaching it as a new technological 
development (Pence, 2007). However, as the platform has developed in both size and 
sophistication, scholars have begun to broaden the areas and methods of research on 
YouTube by drawing upon existing research on other platforms such as TV and print 
and applying those ideas to the content on YouTube. A key concept that can be used to 
help understand the role that a platform plays in a society is Habermas’ theory of the 
public sphere (1989). By considering this theory, in conjunction with the concepts of 
media hybridization proposed by Chadwick (2013) and news values by Harcup & O’Neill 
(2001) this thesis aims to explore the extent to which YouTube can be said to positively 
contribute towards a democratic society.
2Due to the growing number of people consuming news online and YouTube being the 
largest online video hosting website with the ability for instant audience interaction it is 
important to consider, through the concept of media hybridization how news 
organisations have adapted to this platform due to the constantly evolving relationships 
between older and news media logics (Chadwick, Dennis & Smith, 2016: 10). Media 
logics are to be understood as a process through which organizations institutionalize 
their guidelines to such an extent that they become “taken for granted and serve as 
interpretive schema” (Tsuriel et al, 2019: 2). In using this concept, one can also look at 
whether due to the different features of the platform whether different news values such 
as those proposed by Harcup & O’Neill (2001), McGregor (2002) or Shoemaker et al 
(1991) can be seen to be being elevated by the news organisations in this study.
To generate understanding across these areas, this research intends to collect data on 
various metrics of YouTube videos posted on the YouTube channels of news 
organisations.
To accomplish this goal, a sample of 1239 videos was sourced from 5 news 
organisations that had a large presence on YouTube. The five organisations that were 
chosen for the sample were Fox News, CNN, BBC News, Al Jazeera English and The 
Young Turks. The rationale for selecting these organisations stems from several 
reasons. Firstly, combined, each of these networks represent a range of the types of 
online news video content that western audiences may be subjected to. Four of the 
networks are well established organisations that despite having a more western focus of 
their news coverage, are nonetheless international news brands. The Young Turks 
however is a relatively new, solely YouTube based news network. Due to the structural 
differences and lack of traditional restraints which will be discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 6, TYT is an important inclusion in this research as it will provide a direct 
comparison between old media logics that have arisen from the platform of television as 
well new media logics that may have developed from digitally native organisations like 
TYT.
3Many of the elements recorded for each video were simple in nature, such as the raw 
number of views a video had received or the length of the video. However, others such 
as the topic being discussed or the format of the discussion required the development of 
a coding guide to ensure that the sample was recorded as accurately as possible. Given 
one of the requirements of content analysis is its need for reliability (Krippendorf, 1986; 
Weber, 1990b) a second coder was used to ensure the coding framework that was 
deployed had a reasonably high level of reliability so that the validity of the arguments 
made in the study would be strengthened
One of the metrics which this study wanted to pay particular attention to was the titles of 
the YouTube videos and extent to which the language used in them influenced the 
levels of user engagement. To explore this idea, all 1239 videos in the sample were put 
through the software SentiStrength which analysed each title and gave it a sentiment 
score based on the positive and negative language used. Whilst analysing or measuring 
language in a numerical way is nothing new (Schofield, 1995), such a manner of 
analysis attempts to limit the amount of subjective interpretation required by the 
researcher. This does not lead to a completely unbiased analysis of the data due to the 
inherent biases that are programmed into all sentiment analysis systems (Kiritchenko & 
Mohammad, 2018). Despite this caveat, using such a computational tool should 
generate as unbiased interpretation of the data set as is possible, beyond running the 
data through multiple sentiment analysis tools to try and minimize the bias programmed 
into each piece of software. The use of SentiStrength should produce a unique insight 
into the overall positivity or negativity of the language used on the video titles.
Scholars agree that journalism is a key component in the thriving of any democracy 
(Franklin, 2004; Hackett, 2005; Schudson, 2008) and as such, it is important to 
investigate new areas where journalism is being produced and consumed. By engaging 
with the concept of the public sphere, this research aims to explore how YouTube 
potentially contributes to a democratic society.
4The key findings in this research can be summarised in two separate areas, content and 
user engagement. The findings around the nature of news content on YouTube show 
that much like other traditional media platforms, YouTube appears to be similar in terms 
of range of topics presented as well as the manner in which they are framed, namely in 
a negative way. The greater use of negative framing alongside the prevalence of stories 
pertaining to crime, reinforces existing research by the likes of Vettehen et al (2005) and 
Gans (2004) that not only is news becoming more sensationalised through the use of 
language to frame stories, but also research by Tenenboim & Cohen (2013) and Stroud 
et al (2016), that stories which can be sensationalized are covered more often. The 
findings pertaining to user engagement detail how factors such as a news stories topic 
as well as the manner in which it is framed, have some impact on the amount of user 
engagement a news video on YouTube receives. This is evidenced by videos pertaining 
to the topic of terrorism receiving the most amount of user engagement. Another finding 
within the area of user engagement was that news videos that used a round table 
discussion format were on average the most engaged with by users. This finding lends 
support to the theory of parasocial interactions between audiences and on screen 
personas (Horton & Wohl, 1956) in that a more conversational style of presenting the 
news encourages audiences to join in with that conversation.
The key contribution the findings from this research make is towards the ongoing 
discussion within academic discourse around whether Habermas’ original conception of 
the public sphere may no longer be an appropriate framework in evaluating the 
democratizing effects of a public space. By considering the increasing value that the 
role of emotions has in journalism (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019) alongside trends of 
audiences being drawn to negatively framed stories (Trussler & Soroka, 2014) leading 
to more negatively framed content on YouTube, this study seeks to make the case that 
future studies in this area should seek a conceptual framework where an emphasis is 
placed on the value of contextualisation and emotional engagement rather than relying 
upon Habermas’ criteria of rationality in determining the value of a public space. The 
consequence of this in practical terms is that future research and discussions should 
5force newsrooms to question their existing media logics and re-evaluate the ways in 
which their journalism can best serve the public and the democratic society they exist in.  
Structure and approach to the research:
The structure of this research will be split into 8 distinct chapters each dealing with a 
specific overarching idea or particular aspects of the analysed data.
The first chapter of this thesis aims to explore Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, 
the limitations and criticisms of the theory and how aspects of it can be linked to some 
of the existing academic work surrounding the broad concepts of the core roles of 
journalism, the notions of objectivity and bias, as well as the distinction between hard 
and soft news. These areas of communications research will then be grounded in a 
discussion around the concept of news values, first exploring Galtung & Ruge’s initially 
proposed model (1965), before moving on to a more contemporary model such as 
Harcup & O’Neill’s (2001). From here, the concept of audience attention will be 
discussed and linked to the aforementioned news values. The purpose of discussing
these issues in the context of this research is that it is important to show how well 
established norms within journalism studies are just as relevant to the platform of 
YouTube as they are to more traditional forms of news media. On top of this, 
highlighting the types of news content that exists and how they can be defined plays a 
crucial role in helping to understand later discussions about how various news topics 
are presented on YouTube. Finally, by raising the notions of objectivity and the roles of 
journalism, this chapter aims to situate the role that news videos on YouTube can play 
in maintaining a well-informed public sphere.
Chapter 2 focuses around the topic of emotions, namely the debates around whether 
they exist in journalism and if they do, should they and what functions do they play in 
the journalistic process? The chapter will also explore the concept of framing and how
emotions through the employment of language with particular news frames have the 
potential to impact an audience's perception of a news story. The reason why particular 
6attention is given to the concept of framing in this chapter is due in part to the 
widespread agreement amongst researchers that media frames exert at least some 
influence over audiences (Constantinescu & Tedesco, 2007) and hence, the public 
sphere.
Chapter 3 is the final literature review chapter which will begin by outlining trends in 
news consumption before then discussing Chadwick’s (2013) concept of media 
hybridization along with Jenkins (2004) concept of media convergence. Given the 
context provided by the explanation of news consumption trends, the use of these two 
concepts will help situate the context of this research, by enabling a more theoretically 
grounded discussion around YouTube’s role and impact in the current media 
ecosystem. Part of its role will be explored through one of the platform’s unique 
features, that being the ability for users to directly interact with the content they are 
consuming in the form of user comments. The final part of this literature review chapter 
will look at existing academic work that has been conducted on American cable news 
media, particularly with reference to the concept of media bias. The purpose of this 
discussion is to situate the rationale provided in the methodology as to why the 
particular news organisations were chosen for this study.
The methodology of this study will be detailed in chapter 4. The chapter will begin by 
presenting the three main research questions for this study. This will be followed by a 
rationale as to why a mixed methods approach, using both content analysis and 
sentiment analysis was deemed the most effective means of answering the proposed 
research questions. A content analysis was used in order to determine what variables 
on YouTube news videos may impact the different types of user engagement found on 
YouTube. A sentiment analysis was conducted on the titles of each of the videos in the 
data sample to help explore the role that emotion plays in the user engagement with 
news videos on YouTube. Finally, an explanation will be provided as to how and why 
case studies of user comments will be used to help consider whether or not such 
comments accurately reflect Habermas’s notion of the public sphere.
7The analysis of the data gathered will be presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The analysis 
conducted in chapter 5 will focus on the larger trends found across the entire data set 
by looking for trends between the variables collected. If trends are able to be 
established, this would demonstrate that as a news platform, YouTube may share many 
of the similar trends that are seen across other news mediums such as particular topics 
being covered more than others, or certain topics generate more user engagement than 
others. 
Chapter 6 will narrow the scope of the analysis to look at the trends and patterns found 
within each of the individual network’s videos. This will be done by drawing upon the 
notion of branding and the already established characteristics of networks, some of 
which are highlighted in chapter 3. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. Firstly by 
analysing each networks separately, the ability to establish whether digitally native news 
organisations such as The Young Turks may exhibit different news values to 
established news organisations like CNN. Secondly, by being able to identify trends and 
characteristics within each network, one hopes to generate new discussions around 
what news networks can be doing on YouTube to help the public sphere.
The final analysis chapter, chapter 7, further narrows the scope of discussion  by 
shifting towards a more qualitative approach to user engagement, by looking in greater 
detail at a handful of particular videos, with special attention being paid towards the user 
comments that have been written on them. This will be done to provide greater insight 
towards how the public react to news on YouTube. With much scholarly work already 
being done on how the public utilises social media platforms and native news websites 
to comments on news stories, this chapter aims to look at the type of comments being 
left on YouTube videos. This will be done with consideration with the ideas of the impact 
these comments have as well as if the types of comments being left can be deemed as 
successful regarding their positive contribution to the public sphere.
Finally, chapter 8 will summarise the findings presented in the previous chapters and 
attempt to directly address all three of the proposed research questions in this study. 
8These discussions will be used to acknowledge the potency of some of the theories laid 
out within the literature review chapters of this study. In doing so the chapter aims to 
contextualise how YouTube’s role in a democratic society can be perceived and thus, 
whether the platform contributes towards Habermas’ notion of the public sphere or 
whether a reformulation of this concept is required. This chapter will also acknowledge 
some of the limitations of this study by recognising both it’s practical limitations as well 
as some of the underlying assumptions that have been made during its discussions.
9CHAPTER 1: The public sphere and the role of journalism
Throughout this chapter the concepts of objectivity, bias, ethics, news values and hard 
and soft news are explored in relation to how they function and interact within the theory 
of the public sphere. All of these concepts and their associated ideas have informed 
how previous academic exploration of the public sphere has been pursued. In order to 
understand and evaluate the public sphere, it is crucial for these other concepts to be 
understood as well. By discussing these concepts in conjunction with one another, not 
only should this chapter show how each concept compliments each other but also 
provide a contextual framework within which YouTube can be viewed as a news 
platform and ergo, the extent to which YouTube can contribute towards the public 
sphere like more traditional news platforms are perceived to do.
1.1: The public sphere
At the core of this study is the concept of the role that YouTube plays within a 
democratic society. Any discussion focused on the intersection between citizenship and 
the media will be heavily influenced by the works of Habermas and his concept of the 
public sphere. Habermas first saw the emergence of the public sphere in the coffee 
houses of the 18th century Europe (1989: 31). According to Habermas the existence of 
these places were only able to come about due to legal or constitutional frameworks 
present in the state such as freedom of speech and freedom of assembly (1989: 83). As 
such, he conceptualizes the public sphere as: 
“The realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can 
be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere 
comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to 
form a public body…. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an 
unrestricted fashion, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and freedom to 
express and publish their opinions about matters of general interest.” (1964: 49)  
10
This concept is important within the field of journalism studies as, as Wahl-Jorgensen 
(2007) and Dahlgreen (2009) point out, it highlights how central a role the news media 
plays within a democratic society.
The public sphere as Habermas initially conceived it was egalitarian in nature in that as 
noted in the quote from Habermas above, one of the key aspects of the public sphere is 
its exclusivity to all citizens. By having everyone being able to contribute towards the 
debate, “participants are transformed from self-seeking private individuals to a public 
spirited collectivity, capable of acting together in the common interest” (Fraser, 1992: 
137). This idealised version of the public sphere is not something that lasted however. 
Those who enabled the debate in the coffee houses, namely the publishers of news 
literature at the time, began to become less concerned with what was in the public 
interest and instead shifted focus towards what interested the public. Habermas notes 
this degeneration of the public sphere stems from the rise of commercialisation within 
the news industry. (1989: 184). The creeping commercialisation of the news media had 
a number of effects on the content being produced, such as the trivialisation of news 
content (Franklin, 1997), as well as the way in which the public began to no longer be 
treated as active citizens, but rather as passive consumers (Dahlgren & Sparks, 1997; 
Street 2001). These two changes are central to the argument in this study that YouTube 
as a platform helps facilitate the public sphere.
Even before the influence of commercial interests began to impact the public sphere, 
there were still problems and limitations with how Habermas conceptualized it. During 
the 18th Century, the coffee houses in which the public sphere resided were not in fact 
egalitarian. There were barriers to entry along class lines (Baker, 1990) and gender 
(Elshtain, 1981). Given that the opinions of the lower classes as well as women were 
excluded, Habermas failed to consider how alternative public spheres may have 
formed. Fraser (1990: 61) notes that despite women being prohibited from partaking in 
the dominant public sphere, they were still able to create routes into public and political 
life, thereby suggesting the existence of alternative venues of public discussion.
11
One way to understand how multiple public spheres can exist is to consider the concept 
of the global public sphere through the use of Castells’ networked society. The notion of 
a public sphere wherein all citizens of the world are able to partake has largely grown 
out of the development of technology, most notably the internet. Manuel Castells (1996) 
proposed the notion of a networked society wherein different societies were networked 
through social, political and economic relationships. This globalized communication 
network brings with it the idea that there could be a global public sphere where the 
citizenry of the world could “behave as a public body...and publish their opinions about 
matters of general interest.” (Habermas, 1964: 49). Castells has argued that a global 
public sphere should emerge from the existence of a “global civil society...and ad hoc 
forms of global governance enacted by international, conational, and supranational 
political institutions” (2008: 80). However, given his acknowledgement that “Not 
everything or everyone is globalized” (2008: 81), in that not everyone has access to the 
internet and the existence of language and cultural barriers, perhaps one can only 
argue that the concept of a global public sphere is limited to a utopian ideal and that the 
best that new communication technologies can offer is a contribution to the “formation of 
‘cross-border publics spheres’ that bypass central authority” (Stephansen, 2019: 347). 
Regardless of how one defines a global public sphere, within these larger networks 
exist what Volkmer calls nodes that “are situated within a universe of subjective, 
personal networked structures linking individuals across world regions.” (2014: 1) and it 
is these smaller networks that people are engaging with. This means that whether we 
live in an idealized global public sphere or a world of multiple ‘cross-border publics 
spheres’ that through their interaction with one another comes to constitute a global 
public sphere (Sassen, 2006: 366), many of the issues that faced Habermas’ original 
concept still apply to today’s technologically influenced public sphere.
One of the components of Habermas’ public sphere was the requirement of rational 
discussion in order to lead to sensible decision making. As Kilby points out, citing the 
works of Dahlgreen (2009) and Wahl-Jorgensen (2007), “By over-emphasising the 
importance of rationality, Habermas ignores emotive and passionate forms of 
participation, action or rhetoric” (2014: 23). The role that emotion plays within the news 
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media specifically its role and impact, will be explored more later in this paper, however 
its relationship to the concept of the public will be further discussed here.
As outlined above the evolution of communication technology has influenced the way 
the public’s engagement with news media is conceptualised. As well as allowing the 
potential for a global public sphere, technology, specifically social media, has enabled 
the emergence of what Schimdt (2014) calls ‘personal publics’. These personalized 
networks enable citizens to select what civic debates they wish to engage with and 
which they would rather ignore. The ability to choose what civic discussion they partake 
in is linked to the role of emotion in the public sphere in two ways. The first is based on 
the idea that the presence of emotion is necessary for civic engagement as without it 
people would lack the motivation to act upon what is being discussed. Multiple scholars 
such as Gamson (1992), Eyerman (2005) and Flam & King (2005) have contended that 
emotions play an important role in social movements. The personalised networks that 
an individual chooses to engage with are likely influenced by what emotions the 
discussions within that network elicit. This notion that people will engage with news 
content that elicits emotion is something that will be explained in greater detail later, 
however, it is this notion that leads onto the second way in which the role of emotion 
impacts the public sphere.
As stated earlier, Habermas felt that part of the degradation on the public sphere 
stemmed from the entrance of commercial forces which led to the trivialisation of news 
content. The trivialisation of news content has been described in various forms by 
scholars such as ‘McJournalism’ by Franklin (2003) or ‘Newszak’ by Hallin (1999), or 
more commonly used terms such as ‘Infotainment’ or ‘Tabloidization’. All these terms in 
some form relate to how stories in the news are dramatized in some way, making them 
more sensational and entertaining (Galtung & Ruge 1965). This dumbing down of 
content has a negative impact on the public sphere because a public without sufficient 
information cannot make informed decisions about how their society is run (Barber, 
1999: 582). Habermas himself noted that reporting on politically important news is in 
decline due in part to an industry disposition towards more entertaining news topics 
13
(1989: 170). This in turn links back to the role of rational debate in the public sphere as 
the news media thus “has a tendency to present a substitute more palatable for 
consumption and more likely to give rise to an impersonal indulgence in stimulating 
relaxation than to a public use of reason.” (Ibid). The degradation of the public sphere 
through the dumbing down of content is supported by Slevin (2000) who adds that 
contemporary media systems are increasingly more commercialized and hence 
producing even more sensationalized news content. However, given that emotions play 
an important role in social mobilizations (Gamson,1992; Eyerman, 2005; Flam & King, 
2005), the presence of emotion should not be seen as a wholly negative one.
Before turning towards more broader issues with the role that journalism plays, one 
must still consider more contemporary factors that contribute towards the degradation of 
the public sphere. One of these is the increased commodification of the public sphere 
through both an increased role of advertising (Franklin, 2008) and the use of paywalls
for digital news media (McQuail, 2010: 222). In order to survive, news media requires a 
large audience which it can sell as a commodity to advertisers. Due to this, Habermas 
sees advertising as a factor in the degradation of the public sphere because the 
introduction of both private and commercial interests into the public sphere, turns the 
forum for public debate into one where profit is given priority over the substance of the 
debate (Habermas, 1989: 189-193). The expansion of digital technology within the 
newsroom has also arguably contributed towards the degradation of the public sphere. 
The 24/7 news routine and the emergence of additional platforms for news content has 
led to greater pressures on journalists, which in turn have been partly blamed for some 
of the excesses of the press (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013: 140-142). With journalists 
having to produce more content, across multiple platforms with greater time constraints, 
this has led to more infotainment which is easier to produce and as noted earlier, is 
damaging towards the public sphere (Graber, 1994).
The discussions above lead towards a more direct question around what should the
criteria be for determining whether an online space such as YouTube can be considered
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a public sphere? One approach to answering this question would be to apply Habermas’ 
original conception of what the public sphere should be.
Arguably one of Habermas’ criteria is that “access is guaranteed to all citizens.” (1964: 
49). As has already been discussed, under his original conception of the public sphere, 
the coffee houses of 18th Century England, the notion of egalitarianism was found 
lacking. However when it comes to online spaces, there is a case to be made that this 
criteria is met due to the now widespread adoption and use of internet technologies by 
most of the world. Despite the proliferation of the internet however, there are in fact new 
and different barriers that prevent it from meeting Habermas’ guaranteed access 
criteria. The first of these is that whilst the internet is widely available, this availability is 
largely skewed in favour of Western societies (Friemel, 2016). Although this would 
temper any case made for the concept of a global public sphere, it would still allow for 
national or localized public spheres. This then leads to another consideration to be 
made regarding the issue of access, namely technological literacy. Even if it were the 
case that everyone within a particular society had access to an online public sphere, 
some within that society may not have the skills required to properly engage within that 
sphere. As has been well documented (Demunter, 2005; Katz & Rice, 2002; Wei & 
Hindman, 2011), there is a “grey divide” where older members of society are less likely 
to be able to engage with certain aspects of society that have been moved online. This 
is then yet further evidence that the criteria of a public sphere having guaranteed 
access is one that online platforms such as YouTube do not meet.
Another criteria one could consider for whether an online platform is part of the public 
sphere is whether it is free of commercial and political pressures. Digital spaces are 
susceptible to the same forces that Habermas saw as corrupting the original public 
spheres (Carey, 1995). When it comes to a platform such as YouTube, it is almost 
impossible to disassociate it from commercial pressures, despite it being viewed as an 
almost monopoly when it comes to online video distribution (Lindvall, 2014; Cable, 
2018). As has been previously mentioned, it is the pressures from advertising that are
seen as being a degrading force upon a public sphere and advertising plays a large role 
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in the functioning of the platform. Due to this it could be argued that that YouTube fails 
to meet this second criteria. However, the presence of advertising on a platform like 
YouTube is slightly more complex than when Habermas was considering advertising’s
role in newspapers. Members of the public who choose to upload content onto YouTube 
can choose whether to monetize their videos or not. If they choose not to, then it is 
unlikely that the content they produce is going to be influenced directly by commercial 
pressures. On the other hand though, it can still be argued that commercial pressures 
are at play on the platform as regardless of whether an individual user monetizes their 
content, if advertisers are unhappy with that content, they could still threaten YouTube 
as a whole and ask for the content to be removed otherwise they would withdraw their 
adverts from other videos on the platform. An example of this is what has been called 
the ‘Adpocolypse’ where among algorithmic changes, several high-profile scandals on 
the platform caused advertisers to temporarily withdraw spending, forcing content 
creators to adapt to a new algorithmic paradigm (Bishop, 2020). When it comes to 
political pressures it can be argued that online platforms face a wider array than 
traditional spaces. Whereas a coffee house or newspaper may be pressured by the 
government and legislation in their country of origin, platforms like YouTube are subject 
to global scrutiny and thereby pressure from potentially multiple governments, all 
wanting to regulate the platform in different ways (Wakabayashi & Goldmacher, 2019; 
Bergen, 2020; Slefo, 2020)
The ideal of freedom of expression as a necessary component of any public sphere
(Habermas,1964) is also called into question when considering the platform of 
YouTube. The limiting of expression takes several forms on the platform, ranging from 
harmful and hateful content being taken down by YouTube itself, to channels of official
political accounts such as the White House being able to block users from commenting 
on any videos on the channel. These limitations however, should not be seen as 
diminishing the possibility of a public sphere being realized on online platforms such as 
YouTube. This is largely because the criteria of freedom of expression comes into 
conflict with the criteria of requiring rational debate. As has already been discussed, a 
strict adherence to rationality that leaves no room for emotions subsequently ignores an 
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important aspect of the point of public discourse where “anarchy, individuality, and 
disagreement, rather than rational accord, lead to true democratic emancipation.” 
(Lyotard, 1984 cited in Papacharissi, 2002: 11). As will be explored in later chapters, 
online discourse has the ability to express toxic and harmful discourses (Massanari, 
2015; Jones, Trott & Wright, 2019) and that because of this capability, a balance must 
be stuck between allowing freedom of expression and maintaining a certain level of civil 
discourse.
A final criteria to consider when evaluating online platforms as potential public spheres 
is whether these online spaces have the ability to influence and affect change in the 
public’s views and actions. Early scholars considering this issue were somewhat 
hesitant to see these new digital spaces as being able to translate talk into action. As 
Breslow (1997) put it “How should I know who is at the other end, and when the chips 
are down, will people actually strip off their electronic guises to stand and be counted?” 
(Cited in Papacharissi, 2002: 22). However, as adoption and adaption of these digital 
spaces has grown, scholars now see that engagement with these digital spaces does 
lead both to changes in public discourse (Kenix, 2008; Hestres, 2014; Mina, 2014) as 
well as democratic action (Morozov,2009; Dennis, 2016). Examples of YouTube videos 
impacting society range from the mainstreaming of K-Pop in Western society through 
Psy’s ‘Gangnam Style’ music video (Jin & Yoon, 2016), to raising awareness of societal 
issues such as LGBT or disability rights with Obama’s ‘It gets better’ video and the ALS 
Ice Bucket Challenge videos (Gal, Shifman & Kampf, 2016), as well as helping cause 
direct political action during the Arab Spring (Khamis, Gold & Vaughn, 2012).
Returning to the question of what criteria should be used to determine whether an 
online platform can be considered an online public sphere, it would appear that if one 
were to use Habermas’s original conception of what one should do, then platforms like 
YouTube fail to meet a number of these criteria. However, the expectations that one 
should have for platforms like YouTube should arguably be the same expectations we 
hold for other traditional platforms like television or newspapers. Given the issues raised 
with Habermas’ conception of the public sphere such as whether it is merely an ideal 
17
that has never really existed (Dahlgren, 1995; Schudson, 1992) in any form, or if 
Habermas was simply writing about the concept in a historical context (Dahlgren, 1995),
one should then look towards considering the news media as a concept, as it is through 
the news media that any public sphere’s existence relies on.
1.2: Core concepts of news
One way to understand the core of the concepts of news, is by looking at the ideology of 
news. The role that the notion of ideology has played in communication studies has 
shifted over time, first being dominated by critical Marxists who defined the term as “a 
body of ideas which are alleged to be erroneous and divorced from the practical realities 
of political life” (Thompson, 1990: 32). The political underpinning of the notion of 
ideology that critical Marxists pushed was challenged in the 1960s by Daniel Bell’s book 
‘The End of Ideology’ (1960). This book did not end the focus of academic study of 
ideology within communication studies but instead generated new perspectives on the 
issue such as the superstructural approach proposed by Louis Althusser. Sjøvaag 
(2010) explains Althusser’s superstructure level of society theory as one that  “consists 
of two kinds of state apparatus – where one is the Repressive State Apparatus that 
controls society through violence or the threat of violence, and the other is the 
Ideological State Apparatus that expresses the ruling ideology.” (2010: 875). Althusser 
places the media in the ideological state apparatus category as it feeds the public ideas 
regarding what it should be thinking about and how. By being subject to this apparatus, 
every action that a person takes becomes inherently ideological in that “either we follow 
the rules and are left in peace as our behaviours reproduce the dominant order, or we 
break the rules and suffer the consequences imposed by the Repressive State 
Apparatuses – the police and the law – in order to correct our behaviours” (ibid: 876). 
This is an important concept as whilst  “ideology represents the imaginary relationship 
of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1971:153) , because 
ideology and reality do not resemble one another this means that “there is no ideology 
except by the subject and for the subject” (ibid: 160). This therefore entails that all 
ideology, in the case of this research the ideology of journalists, originates from the 
journalists themselves.
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How these ideologies get promoted and promulgated is explained by Stuart Hall through 
the notion of media institutions which over time came to be viewed as things that help 
construct meaning. The media, according to Hall, were favourable to dominant groups 
as it made certain things appear as natural and immutable, thereby limiting the range of 
acceptable perceptions of reality. (Hall, 1982). The power then, to determine what topics 
or issues are settled, which are controversial and which are deemed beyond the bounds 
of discussion, lies not in relation to class or politics but by being able to dominate 
through holding positions of leadership within media institutions. If those within these 
positions of leadership can make these determinations about ideology, then the next 
step to take would be to look at what elements and factors have been promoted to 
make up the ideology of journalism.
According to Deuze (2006), ideology can be seen as an intellectual process over time 
which shapes the views and values of a group of people. The purpose of journalism as 
a profession having an ideology argues Deuze, is to legitimize it, and therein the 
journalists themselves, position in society as well as to help defend against criticisms, 
both internally and externally of the profession. 
The elements that make up the journalistic ideology according to Kovach and 
Rosenstiel (2001) can be broken down into five parts, those being objectivity, autonomy, 
immediacy, ethics and public benefit. Whilst this last element is arguably the most 
important when discussing the notion of journalism democratizing role, the other 
elements should also be discussed due to their fundamental nature.
Objectivity has been identified by both academics (Reese, 1990) and journalists (Judis, 
2013) alike as being something without which journalism would not exist. Whilst pure 
objectivity is something that may not be attainable, the degree to which it can be will be 
discussed later, it is something to which journalists can aim towards. Some journalists 
however argue pure objectivity is not possible as we perceive and process the world 
through subjective prisms (Greenwald, 2013) and hence should not be something that is 
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pursued to the detriment of the other elements of journalistic ideology. Understanding 
objectivity is an important aspect for any academic study of journalism, especially ones 
where the use of language is a concern
The very idea of objectivity and journalism being intertwined can be seen in the origins 
of journalism and its practitioners aim “to differentiate their ‘truth-seeking’ practices from 
the ‘truth-distorting’ practices of publicity agents” (Carpentier. N & Trioen. M, 2010: 
313). One commonly accepted definition of the term is provided by Schudson (2001: 
150) in which he states that:
The objectivity norm guides journalists to separate facts from values and to 
report only the facts. Objective reporting is supposed to be cool, rather than 
emotional, in tone. Objective reporting takes pains to represent fairly each 
leading side in a political controversy. According to the objectivity norm, the 
journalist’s job consists of reporting something called ‘news’ without commenting 
on it, slanting it, or shaping its formulation in any way. 
Whilst this definition can be seen as one that can be used by both practitioners and 
academics alike when dealing with the term, it does fall under heavy criticism due to the 
definition's assumptions. The main assumption that Schudson's definition makes is that 
there is an objective reality that exists and that knowledge, more importantly, unbiased 
knowledge of that reality is even possible (Hackett R, 1984). Carpentier & Trioen (2010) 
outline two arguments that are used by critics of what can be called the traditionalist 
definition of objectivity. The first is that reality cannot be broken down into a simple list 
of facts. The second is that all journalists by their very nature, interpret the world by 
converting it into news. The conclusion that can be garnered by these two points is that 
the traditional view of objective journalism being the “impersonal gathering and reporting 
of information’ (Fox and Park, 2006: 38), cannot be accepted. Carpentier & Trioen also 
note that this conclusion is often followed by a less obvious, yet still commonly argued 
for conclusion in that there is a call for the jettisoning of the idea of objectivity as 
something that is both attainable and as something to be pursued. Whilst these are 
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legitimate criticisms in their own right, they conceptualise the notion of objectivity as an 
absolute standard which fundamentally fails to see the separation between the 
“conditions of possibility of the objectivity norm within journalistic ideology on the one 
hand, and a more concrete exploration of objectivity as embedded in journalistic 
practices on the other.” (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010: 314). This argument for separation 
can be summed up by saying that the notion of objectivity should be regarded in two 
different ways. The first is as “a theoretical imperative underpinning reporting” and the 
second as a “strategic ritual enabling the defence of the practice as a profession” 
(Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003: 216).
The importance of objectivity is often stressed by both academics and practitioners as 
being the most important of the elements that constitute journalism. Since objectivity is 
the one pervasive element that has allowed objective journalism to be used as a 
synonym for good journalism (Rogers, 2013), it should be seen as a more important. As 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 112) say, it is a nodal point, one which holds a special role as 
it acts as a stabilizer, in that it stabilizes the meaning of the concept in any given 
context. With objectivity being arguably the key signifier in terms of what makes good 
journalism in theory, can this be transferred across to when one is considering 
journalism as a practice? Despite the ubiquitous nature of the 'objectivity norm', it 
cannot be “disconnected from the particular journalistic practices that together constitute 
its meaning within journalism.” (Carpentier & Trioen, 2010: 316). What this means is 
that the definition we give objectivity within the field of journalism is established within a 
context through a distinct articulation whilst at the same time requiring it to be translated 
into normal working journalistic practices which also help determine its definition. 
The aim of objectivity as an ideological construct is to manage the way in which specific 
journalistic practices can be used to support the “claim of objectivity” (Tumber & 
Prentoulis, 2003: 216) and help place said practices into the categories of good and bad 
in relation to journalism. A problem arises here in that because giving an account is 
fundamental to capturing reality but never relates to the 'real', it is impossible for the 
ideological construct to entirely grasp these practices. There is also a further problem to 
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be noted which stems from the idea that there is a tension between the concept of 
objectivity and the concrete realizations in journalistic practice. The problem as outlined 
by Carpentier & Trioen is that whilst the practice of journalism requires the existence of 
complete objectivity as it provides journalists an identity with which there is a level of 
coherence that can be used as a frame of reference, the actual meaning of objectivity 
doesn't correspond with said practices. This problem means that every practice in the 
field of journalism is flawed as it automatically fails in its claim to reach objectivity and 
therefore, all journalists are left to deal with the problem of what they “want to do on the 
one side and what they actually do on the other.” (2010: 317).
According Carpentier and Trioen then, the notion of objectivity whilst being useful when 
used in theoretical discussion, when it is used when dealing with the practicalities of 
journalism is something that is not achievable. However, before linking how this 
unachievable goal has potential ramifications for the democratizing power of journalism, 
one can still look at other important concepts that surround the notion of objectivity as 
these can help explain the perceived role that journalism has in society.
1.3: Defining objectivity
One of these important concepts is that of detachment. Walter Lippmann wrote that “to 
become detached from one's passions and to understand them consciously, is to render 
them disinterested. A disinterested mind is harmonious with itself and with reality.” 
(Lippmann, 1982: 220). What is being alluded to here is the idea that a journalist is 
more likely to report on reality, that is to say the facts that have occurred, if they 
emotionally distance themselves from the story that they are reporting on. If one works 
under the assumption that there is a reality with objective 'facts' that we can learn, then 
what Lippmann is trying to argue for is that journalists as individuals must be aware of 
the filtering process that goes on as they try to perceive the world. Cultural norms, 
preconceptions, education and peer opinion all shape the way we perceive the world by 
adding filters to the objective reality we are in. An example used by Taflinger (1996) 
would be of several witnesses of a car crash. Whilst all the witnesses see the same 
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objective event, each person filters the information in a different way. A chauvinist may 
blame the crash on the female driver, a religious person may see the will of God at work 
by preventing any deaths from the crash and an environmentalist will see the event as a 
case for reducing the number of cars on the road. Each individual interprets the reality 
of the event differently due to their own individual traits. Stephen Ward makes the point 
that all forms of journalism require “some degree of interpretation” and that “evaluation 
haunts even our basic attempts to report an event” (1991: 3). The notion that journalists 
should try their best to remain as detached as possible is arguably being challenged by 
the emergence of social media. Two cases of evidence from this come from what 
younger people say about the issue and also what content is becoming successful in 
terms of viewing figures. For the latter case and example of this comes from Channel 4 
news presenter Jon Snow gave a heartfelt monologue regarding suffering that the 
children of Gaza were undergoing. The video became a YouTube hit and whilst there 
was criticism of the perceived one sided bias (Beckett, 2014). This idea of more 
emotional storytelling is something that will be discussed in the following chapter. The 
second case of evidence comes from a study by Marchi (2012) which examines the 
behaviours and attitudes of teenagers towards the news. Marchi found that teens 
tended to be “skeptical of official news” (2012, 257) gravitated towards more 
opinionated current affairs TV shows because of the perceived more substantive 
discussion that is had on them. The challenges that new media platforms present to the 
notion of objectivity will be presented in greater detail later in the research. However, in 
relation to the idea that those that are constructing news stories must, according to 
traditional concepts of what is considered ideologically pure journalism, filter their 
emotional response to events so as be as objective as possible. This then leads to the 
question of if we are all burdened with this process of filtering reality, how can anyone 
let alone journalists be objective?
To answer that question, one should consider the other concepts that surround 
objectivity. Mindich (1998) offers five key concepts to define objectivity. One of them as 
mentioned above is detachment with the others being balance, non-partisanship, 
facticity and an inverted pyramid style of writing. 
23
When discussing the term balance in relation to journalism it is often seen as a virtue. 
On a rudimentary definition, balance is simply giving all sides to a story equal weight. 
This however is a fundamentally dishonest way of thinking about balance in terms of 
journalism. A common example given is that of climate change reporting, in which one 
may say that under a rudimentary definition of balance, that so long as both sides have 
had equal say in a discussion, that the report or TV segment has been balanced. This is 
not the case due to the fact that on one side of the climate change debate there are 
97% of experts and the other side only has 3% (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009). To try and 
say that a report that gives both sides equal credence is balanced, is fundamentally 
wrong. Kovatch and Rosenstiel (2001: 77) back up this point when they say that:
If an overwhelming percentage of scientists, as an example, believe that
global warming is a scientific fact, or that some medical treatment is
clearly the safest, it is a disservice to citizens and truthfulness to create the
impression that the scientific debate is equally split. Unfortunately, all too
often journalistic balance is misconstrued to have this kind of almost
mathematical meaning, as if a good story is one that has an equal number
of quotes from two sides. As journalists know, often there are more than
two sides to a story. And sometimes balancing them equally is not a true
reflection of reality. 
Two key points can be taken away from this quote. The first is that balance is not an 
impossibility. So long as a journalist or producer is aware of the context of the story, 
then some sense of balance in reporting it can be achieved. The second is that a 
misplaced sense of balance in a journalist’s mind can be a “disservice to citizens”. This 
point highlights the need to understand the concept of objectivity in any study 
concerning journalism and democratization as what constitutes as objective reporting is 
fundamental to how a society is informed about the world.
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One of the other key concepts of objectivity as defined by Mindich is non-partisanship. 
The term non-partisanship, also known as impartiality is used in the field of journalism to 
distinguish between those who may report with a bias either in favour or against a 
certain group or cause. This is important in terms of objectivity as a partisan journalist 
will likely when reporting on the topic to which they are partisan, report a biased account 
of the facts. One of the ways which this bias can manifest itself is through the language 
that is used. What is meant by this is that certain words are connotative and as 
connotations are not fixed in their definition, their use often presents a problem when it 
comes to describing events accurately. An example to illustrate this point is provided by 
Boudana, in which the use of the word 'carnage' when describing the aftermath of a 
tsunami does not necessarily have a fixed definition. In a report, a journalist may have 
provided factual points such as the number of houses destroyed or the number of 
people killed, but by using the word 'carnage' to describe these factual points they have 
implicitly given a definition to the readers as to what 'carnage' means (Boudana, 2011). 
A contemporary example of this is highlighted by Sampaio-Dias & Dennis (2017), in 
which the coverage of the UK 2017 election by BuzzFeed used a “particular digital 
vernacular to connect with its audience” through the use of memes, animal pictures and 
other forms of humour. With humour being a subjective thing, the fact it was being used 
to good effect by a news website to engage with the audience, once again indicates that 
new, non-traditional or established news organisations are eschewing previously 
rigorously held notions of non-partisanship and thereby objectivity.
One of the aims of this chapter was to outline the ideas that surround the notion of 
whether or not the concept of objectivity is achievable. From the debates mentioned, a 
case can be made that any sense of pure objective reporting by which is meant 
reporting that is bereft of bias, achieves perfect balance in use of sources and so on 
from the five elements outlined by Mindich, is not attainable in any practical sense. 
Whilst Laclau himself thinks that there are “limits of objectivity” (Marchart. O, 2012: 314) 
as noted earlier, objectivity is still a useful idea to hold onto even if it only serves a 
purpose in theoretical discussion. 
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1.4: The roles of journalism and the public sphere
Habermas’ public sphere, as discussed earlier, plays a vital role in having a healthy 
democratic society. How then, does journalism help contribute towards the public 
sphere? An answer to this could be through what McNair (2011) calls the minimal 
functions of the media which are, to inform citizens of events occurring in the world, to 
educate them as to the meaning and significance of those events, to provide a platform 
for ideas to be discussed and to act as a watchdog over governments and political 
institutions. If the media can be seen to be conducting each of these functions then it 
can be said to be contributing towards the public sphere and hence, helping society.  
These minimal functions are similar to those of Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) who 
suggest that there are several functions which they believe to be critical to purpose of 
journalism. At arguably its most basic level, journalists are to act as witness bearers for 
events that are currently or have just happened. With it being impossible for a journalist 
to be on every street corner in the world, journalists must identify and prioritize those 
things which are crucial for the perpetuation of society.
A second role of journalism is that of empowerment. The term empowerment can be 
taken in two ways here, the first is that journalism empowers people as it disseminates 
knowledge and knowledge empowers people to make better informed decisions. The 
second way is empowerment through enabling people to take part in process and 
dialogue of society via citizen journalism (Berger, 2011). As just stated, by 
disseminating information to the public, journalists empower the public to make better 
informed decisions and this links back to the ideology of journalism in which an element 
of it was to benefit the public. Kovach and Rosenstiel point out the empowerment flows 
in both directions as the public can help inform journalists and act as sources of 
information, which the journalists can then disseminate to other members of the public. 
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Another role of journalism is to act as a forum in a society by allowing members of the 
public to voice their view and opinions. By wanting to stimulate informed debate, it is a 
germane step to want to help organise and provide a platform or medium through which 
the debate can take place.
Although there is a wide breadth of literature looking at how various acts, types and 
mediums of journalism fulfil these functions (Gaynor & O’Brien, 2017; Gripsrud, 2007; 
Rauchfleisch & Kovic, 2016), most in some way touch upon at least one of the minimal 
functions outlined by McNair or Kovach & Rosenstiel.
The overarching role of journalism can be roughly summed up by the idea that it is there 
to hold to account those in power by disseminating the truth about the goings on in 
society in a manner which makes sense to the public and by providing a forum on which 
the goings on can be discussed and debated (see Monck. A, 2008 and Schudson. M, 
2008). Another way to sum up the purpose of journalism is provided by the American 
Press Institute which says that journalism exists “to provide citizens with the information 
they need to make the best possible decisions about their lives, their communities, their 
societies, and their governments.” (2014). 
With this in mind, does pursuing objectivity as a signifier of good journalism, help 
achieve the goals of journalism?
Oren Soffer (2009) argues that seeking objectivity does not help achieve them. The 
reason for this is that he believes that there has been a shift from a monological model 
to a more dialogue based model. This monological model or as Krippendorf describes it 
a “message-driven model” (1993: 34), originated in the 1890's when the penny press 
came into popularity due to the fact that it appealed to a wide audience because it 
replaced a partisan ideological voice with a non-partisan objective voice (Soffer, 2009: 
478). In doing so, the traits that are associated with objectivity which were outlined 
earlier, were cemented together with journalism and importantly, successful journalism. 
Soffer believes that journalism objectivity became code for a set of characteristics, 
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namely those that were outlined by Mindich (1998) earlier. Ward believes that 
journalists have attached themselves to objectivity, as the values that are encompassed 
by it produce journalism that best informs the public and is hence, successful journalism 
and beneficial to the public sphere. This Ward argues leads to more “intrinsic public 
goods, such as a democratic way of life” (Ward, 1991: 7).
The problem that Soffer identifies with objectivity preventing the goals of journalism is 
that whilst objectivity aims to create a gap between the journalist and the subject, the 
goal of modern journalism is to create a dialogue by acting as a forum in society where 
the public can voice their views and opinions, which is of course one of the functions 
outlined by McNair and an element of Habermas’ public sphere.
To further the argument that objectivity does not help achieve the goals of journalism is 
that the pursuit for objectivity can actually be a source for bias. This idea is put forward 
by Bennet in which he argues that journalism is biased not in spite of the standards of 
professional objectivity but precisely because these standards are intended to prevent 
bias (1983: 76). What is meant by this is that by relying on official sources for 
information, this can actually distort the manner in which a story is perceived as it turns 
the “political polyphony into a monologue.” (Soffer, 2009: 483). The call for the 
importance of dialogue in journalism is also supported by Anderson et al. (1994) who 
believe that the interaction between people should be seen as an elemental part of 
journalism. Their line of thinking is that by treating journalism as a dialogue rather than a 
one-way flow of information, it would become easier to recognise journalism's relation to 
other forms of communication. On top of this as Pauly. J. J points out, dialogue would 
“encourage public journalism to confront issues of ownership, access and professional 
power.” (2003: 28). 
Before discussing the potential shift in news values given the evolving debate around 
the notion of objectivity, it is important to consider the concepts of bias, ethics and types 
of news stories being created as these concepts help inform discussions around 
production norms.
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1.5: Ethics, bias and objectivity
In a broad sense, ethics is “the study of the formation of moral values and of principles 
of right and wrong” (Altschull, 1990: 357). A lot of the theorizing about journalistic ethics 
has been concerned with finding universal norms that can be applied across media 
systems that reside in different cultures (Plaisance et al, 2012: 461) and whether it is 
possible to concretely lay out universal norms is a question which cannot be answered 
in the scope of this thesis. However, empirical studies on journalists by Plaisance et al 
(2012) and Kepplinger & Knirsch (2001) show that there does seem to be some general 
consensus in regards towards the rationality of actions in certain scenarios. An example 
of this comes from Kepplinger & Knirsch’s study within which a majority of those 
surveyed believed that they, as in journalists, “share the responsibility for foreseeable 
yet unintended negative consequence of their stories” (2001: 12). These general 
consensuses can be seen across many journalism organisations that have a code of 
ethics. 
Whilst Hafez (2002) points out that there is an apparent agreement when it comes to 
things such as truth and objectivity, there are also a number of other common elements 
that can be found in these guidelines. Themes such as accuracy, fairness, privacy and 
respect for the public interest appear many times in the ethics codes of numerous 
journalism organisations (Pew Research Journalism Project, 2013). These codes can 
be seen to be a framework from which a journalist within an organisation can operate 
without bringing the organisation or the practice into disrepute. It is arguable that there 
can be no single ethical framework which could be used for every journalistic 
organisation. This is solely down to the different mediums of journalism as well as the 
topics which are covered. One attempt to create such a framework is by the Poynter 
Institute which is a prominent non-profit organisation that promotes journalism and the 
business that surrounds the industry. The organisation suggests that there should be 
three guiding principles for journalists, which are to seek and report the truth, to be 
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transparent and to engage with the community as an end rather than as a means 
(Poynter, 2013). Other organisations such as the International Journalists' Network have 
proposed similar principles, but specifically single out the principle of minimizing harm to 
sources and the wider community (International Journalists' Network, 2013). 
Despite there being some apparent agreement on certain ethical concepts in journalism 
which can be seen in numerous organisations such as those listed earlier, Shoemaker 
and Rees point out that “no code of conduct can prescribe behaviour in every possible 
situation; interpretation of ethical standards and specific decisions must be made by 
individual journalists.” (1996: 94). With seemingly no universally agreed upon way on 
how a journalist should behave in every possible situation, the behaviour of journalists 
comes into constant question by both academics and the public alike (see Petley, 
2012). The ethical standards of journalists also can come into contention with the other 
values of journalism such as public decency and convention. As Breed points out 
“accurate reporting is sometimes sacrificed to these other virtues of respect, decency, 
and order, that is, the mass media have often placed more emphasis on some value 
other than truth" (1964: 183). 
Another one of these values of journalism is one of the elements of the journalistic 
ideology laid out by Kovatch and Rosentiel, which is to be of benefit to the public. This 
ties into the notion of journalistic ethics as it is an ethical decision that is made by either 
the journalist or the editor as to whether or not the reporting of a story is to the benefit of 
the public and thereby is also of benefit towards the notion of the public sphere.
When working under the assumption that an audience is paying attention to the 
information they are receiving, the reporting of news by necessity, increases a person's 
knowledge of the world they live in. The benefits of knowing news can be shown in any 
number of examples, such as knowing whether it is safe to travel to a particular country 
or not, whether your current elected representative is corrupt and hence must be ousted 
from their position, or whether you should evacuate due to an impending tornado. When 
information is withheld from the public, they are unable to make an informed decision 
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and therefore the action of withholding information can be seen as detrimental towards 
the public sphere.
However, as the notion of public benefit is something that is hard to scientifically 
measure due to its unquantifiable nature, there are some cases where a journalist must 
make an ethical decision on whether to report a certain aspect of a story or the entire 
story at all. The reporting of an imminent terrorist attack for instance may not potentially 
benefit the public as such a report may panic people to the extent that the ensuing 
chaos may cause more damage than would have happened otherwise. The point made 
with this example is relevant to the discussion about objectivity as the leaving out of 
certain aspects of a story could be seen to be decreasing the objectivity of a story as 
the journalist has not presented all of the facts that are known to them. 
This all ties back towards what Carpentier & Trioen described as the problem of what 
journalists “want to do on the one side and what they actually do on the other.” (2010: 
317). This gap, Carpentier & Trioen propose, can be potentially solved by opening up 
the profession of journalism so that it can more easily acknowledge the existence of the 
gap and the “problems that arise from its existence” (2010: 324). Of the two solutions 
that are proposed to close this gap, the first comes from Luyendijk who argues for a 
radical openness in which there not only needs to be a new “journalism about 
journalism” (2006: 175) but also a radical other form of journalism that allows its news 
coverage to integrate discussion about the problems and uncertainties that relate to the 
notion of objectivity. The hope here is that through reflection on their own practice, 
journalists will become more aware of the gap between what they want to do and what 
they actually do and in turn, act accordingly to close the gap. The second solution is put 
forward by Carpentier & Trioen themselves in which they argue that “exploring the 
possibilities and advantages of a form of journalism that does not consequently and 
necessarily exclude moral judgement and detachment” (2010: 324). The difference 
between this solution and Luyendijk's is that rather than radical openness, it is more of a 
plea for an ambivalent position that has a mixture of both the rejection of the 
professionalism and an acceptance of personal responsibility.
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1.6: Hard news and soft news
One final aspect in relation to the core concepts of news that are relevant to this thesis 
is the variance of importance between news stories. That is to say why is it that some 
topics are deemed to be more important than others. In academia a common way of 
distinguishing between stories of great importance of those of lesser importance is to 
describe news stories as either hard news or soft news.
The first differentiation between hard and soft news was put forward by Tuchman in 
1972. The idea of these two classifications, is to separate items of news that have high 
news value and those that do not. Those that have a high amount of news value are 
deemed to be hard news. These are often stories that relate to topics that are deemed 
to be of greater importance to the wider community or public sphere, such as 
economics or politics and because of the nature of these topics, are often more 
substantive in terms of the informational value. Limor and Mann (1997) reiterate this 
definition of hard news by also believing that it involves topics such as politics or social 
affairs as these are often of greater importance and of a shorter lifespan. Other scholars 
have put emphasis on the more factual nature of hard news (Whetmore, 1987), or being 
less sensationalist and connected to any ongoing trend or event in society (Patterson, 
2000). In contrast, soft news stories are often gossip or human interest stories 
(Lehman-Wilzig, 2010) that do not require immediate publication and contain little 
substantive information.
This dichotomous characterization of the news has shaped the way in which many 
academic studies have been conducted. Studies investigating the effect of soft news on 
a person’s political knowledge (Prior, 2003), or the influence that soft news can have on 
a person’s understanding of an important issue (Baum, 2003), brings forth the notion 
that academic research in the field of journalism can be focussed upon one type of 
news or the other.
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Despite the importance of these two concepts, there is in fact a multitude of varying 
definitions other than the ones mentioned above. This produces problems when one 
wishes to make comparisons between different studies on this topic as many of the 
competing definitions use a set of components rather than a single characteristic. An 
example of vast differences in the interpretations of the terms hard and soft news can 
be seen between Shoemaker (2006) and Patterson (2000). Shoemaker's definition is 
focussed around the sole characteristic of timeliness in that soft news is often 
differentiated from hard news because it does not have to be published as quickly. By 
contrast Patterson (2000: 3-4) suggests that:
Hard news refers to coverage of breaking events involving top leaders, major 
issues, or significant disruptions in the routines of daily life, such as an 
earthquake or airline disaster. Information about these events is presumably 
important to citizens’ ability to understand and respond to the world of public 
affairs. 
This when combined with his later discussion on how the news is being softened 
alludes to a more multifaceted approach to the term of hard news. One should also 
make note of the various alternative terms that are used around this topic, those being 
tabloidization and infotainment. Both terms bare relation to soft news, or the softening of 
news and also suffer from the same criticisms of “conceptual fuzziness” that those trying 
to define hard and soft news do (Reinemann et al, 2012). It is because these other 
terms bare many similar traits to that of hard and soft news and are oftentimes used as 
synonyms, this thesis will continue to use hard and soft news as the primary terms on 
this topic.
One of the criticisms of the hard news/soft news distinction is that due to, at least some 
interpretations of the terms, there is a binary nature in which one can assign an article 
of news thereby leaving no in-between area for certain pieces of news that are neither 
particularly hard or soft. Reinemann et al (2012), identified five dimensions that are 
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most commonly used when trying to define the term. These were topic, news 
production, news focus, news style and news reception. Through their work, Reinemann 
et al discovered that of the studies looking at hard and soft news, only a quarter of them 
used solely one of these dimensions whereas the most commonly used dimension was 
the topic (Ibid: 226). What this suggests is that the only real form of consensus on this 
issue is that the topic of the news story is commonly perceived in academia to be the 
most important factor when deciding whether or not a story is hard or soft news. This 
idea also links back to the notion of the public sphere in that hard news stories could be 
seen as those being the most beneficial to the public sphere as they have most 
newsworthiness. Certain topics such as politics would under most academic studies be 
deemed more beneficial to the public sphere and hence society, than any soft news 
topics. Habermas (1989: 170) did believe that hard news topics particularly ones of a 
political nature were both reported and consumed less and less due to the 
commercialisation of the news industry. 
One problem for academia is that certain stories may be hard to define as certain topics 
may fall into either the hard or soft news categories depending on their context and also 
whose definition of hard and soft news one is using. As there is no academic 
consensuses saying that topics x, y and z are hard news and a, b and c are soft, there 
have been proposals for a third category of news called 'general news' which would 
dismantle the problem of the dichotomous nature of the hard and soft news divide.
One such proposal has been put forward by Lehman-Wizlig and Seletzky (2010) in 
which they suggest a number of criteria which can be applied to a news story. They 
separate out a third category, that being general news in which such stories are not as 
substantive as those in the hard news category, but still have a higher news value than 
those in the soft news category. The criteria that they put forward are:
1 Recent economic, social or cultural news that should be published but not 
necessarily immediately;
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2 Important demographic data, academic reports, scientific discoveries or 
technological inventions that should be reported but not necessarily right away;
3 Important news that is relevant or influential, not for society in general but only 
for a specific group;
4 Important news not on the present public agenda, so that if not immediately 
reported would not readily be missed;
5 Personally useful information for the reader (‘how to’; analysis of how news can 
personally affect the reader, e.g change in tax law) that need not be reported 
right away. (2010: 47-48)
As can be seen when contrasted with the definitions given earlier by other scholars, 
there is certainly a case to be made for a third classification of news stories, for ones 
that are neither sensationalist or of national importance. The case to be made for no 
longer adhering to a binary classification of news stories is strengthened by the fact that 
for many years now, there has been a blurring of lines between hard and soft news 
(Carpini. D and Williams. B, 2001) As has been noted in separate studies by Esser 
(1999) and Sampson (1999) the gap between tabloid and broadsheet newspapers has 
slowly been diminishing since the 1980's.  Lehman-Wizlig and Seletzky argue that 
especially in today's modern era of internet communication wherein websites act as 
portals where “one finds fast-breaking ‘hard’ news, general news and sensationalist 
‘soft’ news mixed together within a larger, non-‘news’ information framework.” (2010: 
51), it is becoming increasingly difficult to be able to clearly separate out hard news 
stories from soft ones.
One criticism of the idea that there is some sort of spectrum ranging from very soft news 
to very hard news on which all news stories can be placed, which is what Lehman-
Wizlig and Seletzky seem to suggest, is that it creates greater complexity when 
attempting to analyse results from studies. It should be contended that whilst that may 
be the case, this is not a negative thing and that having to rely on a binary classification 
of news stories simply dulls the potential for more in depth analysis. 
35
The need for a more complex classification of news is matched by the increasingly 
complex field of journalism as Lehman-Wizlig and Seletzky (2010: 51) point out:
Certainly such an intermediate category is called for in the emerging research 
sub-field of e-journalism. Among other things, the internet has invented a novel 
news venue: portals. Here one finds fast-breaking 'hard' news, general news and 
sensationalist 'soft' news mixed together within a larger, non-'news' information 
framework. One cannot understand  the types of news substance and also the 
types of news venues on the internet without  adding a 'general' news category to 
the mix. 
Under the binary hard/soft classification system, especially when considering some 
definitions of hard news such as by Patterson (2000), the potential for stories being 
miscategorised could increase due to the factors pointed out in the quote above. This 
would lead it to be thrown in with celebrity gossip stories and any academic analysis 
could seem to have odd results. Allowing for a third category of general news, which the 
hypothetical story would fall into, would overcome this problem.
Overall, I believe that there is a good case to be made that there is no universally 
agreed upon definition of hard and soft news in that the application of such a definition 
to any news story would easily categorize the story as simply hard or soft news. 
Alongside the definitions detailed above where the topic of the story, the time sensitivity 
of it, the presentation of it, the issues of gradual softening of news due to commercial 
pressures and scholars even proposing a third category in between hard and soft, all 
present different ways in which studies can approach this issue. The reason why this is 
relevant to this study is that YouTube has often been perceived as a platform which 
hosts unserious content, most famously cat videos (Myrick, 2015). However, as 
traditional news organisations are utilising the platform more, the combination of a 
platform for the unserious or soft, with the sometimes serious and hard news content of 
the established news organisations forces scholars to consider the idea that the 
convergence of communication cultures, those being the unserious amateur nature of 
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YouTube with the serious professionalism of print or broadcast news may contribute 
towards the discussion around the systems of evaluation of news quality. This then  
brings into question the concept of news values as what sort of content the news 
industry decides to create has a profound impact on the public sphere and thereby 
society.
1.7: News values
So far, this chapter has discussed how the concept of the public sphere, though flawed, 
is vital to a healthy democracy and that the public sphere is only able to exist if 
journalism fulfils its role and provides news information to the citizenry. Given this, it is 
then important to consider what factors may be at play when journalists are deciding 
what stories to report on.
When deciding what is newsworthy, journalists themselves say that they rely upon “gut 
feeling” (Schultz, 2007), or that something is news “Because it just is!” (Brighton and 
Foy 2007: 147). These types of definitions are vague at best and as Harcup and O’Neill 
suggest, “obscure as much as they reveal about news selection, prompting academics 
to offer their own explanations, which can involve devising taxonomies of news values.” 
(2017: 1470). The first attempt at creating a taxonomy of news values was by Galtung & 
Ruge in 1965. They identified 12 factors that influenced the newsworthiness of a story. 
These were: Frequency, Threshold, Unambiguity, Meaningfulness, Consonance, 
Unexpectedness, Continuity, Composition, Reference to elite nations, Reference to elite 
people, Reference to persons and Reference to something negative. Despite Galtung & 
Ruge acknowledging that this was not a complete list and was open to exception (1965: 
64), it is worth reviewing each of these factors not only due to them being the foundation 
for more contemporary taxonomies of news values but also because of their relationship 
with concepts such as objectivity and bias that have already been explored in this 
chapter.
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The first factor identified by Galtung & Ruge was ‘frequency’ where “An event that 
unfolds at the same or similar frequency as the news medium (such as a murder) is 
more likely to be selected as news than is a social trend that takes place over a long 
period of time.” (1965: 65). This factor has arguably diminished in terms of its weight in 
determining the newsworthiness of a story since Galtung & Ruge’s conception of it. This 
is due to two key changes in the production of news. The first of which is that in a 24/7 
news cycle afforded by digital technologies, an event’s newsworthiness is not 
determined by its suitability to the news production cycle, namely a newspapers 
deadline. The second key change is the growth of the public relations industry where 
the newness of a story can be artificially generated in order for it to be covered by a 
news organisation. Further questions around Galtung & Ruge’s definition of frequency 
can be asked due to digital technologies now affording journalists the ability to far more 
easily track trends in society such as through the use of hashtags and other metrics 
(Brantner, Lobinger & Stehling 2020; Barnard, 2018).
The second factor identified by Galtung & Ruge was ‘threshold’ which they defined as 
“Events have to pass a threshold before being recorded at all. After that, the greater the 
intensity, the more gruesome the murder, and the more casualties in an accident - the 
greater the impact on the perception of those responsible for news selection.” (1965: 
65). One of the key issues in understanding this factor is the manner in which the line 
for the threshold is set as this is arguably a wholly subjective one. To illustrate this, in 
their review of Galtung & Ruge’s list, Harcup & O’Neill pose the question “Which is 
bigger - 20 deaths in ten road accidents or five deaths in one rail crash? (2001: 268). 
The threshold factor can also be applied to concepts outside of murder and death. The 
humour or funniness of an event must arguably cross a certain threshold before it is 
considered newsworthy. The subjective nature of determining when an event reaches a 
certain threshold to be deemed newsworthy relates back to this chapter’s earlier 
discussion around the notion of subjectivity. It was argued that objectivity was not 
attainable in any practical sense and if one is to consider some of Galtung & Ruge’s 
news values as requiring a certain level of subjective interpretation, this is then yet more 
support for the aforementioned argument. 
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To further emphasise this, one can look at the third factor on Galtung & Ruge’s list 
which is ‘unambiguity’ in which they state “The less ambiguity, the more likely the event 
is to become news. The more clearly an event can be understood, and interpreted 
without multiple meanings, the greater the chance of it being selected.” (1965: 65). 
Firstly, it must be asked whether the ambiguity lies in the event itself or in the 
journalist’s interpretation of the event, The nature of an event may be intrinsically 
unambiguous or it may be the case that the event has been interpreted by the journalist 
as such. An example to illustrate this would be military action taken by one country 
against another. Whilst the justifications for military intervention may be presented as 
necessary and therefore unambiguous in motive (Christie, 2006), the actual event itself 
may be ambiguous in nature. Secondly, the value of unambiguity is arguably ingrained 
into many newsroom media logics due to journalists being “trained to write the ‘intros’ to 
their news stories in an unambiguous way, with a clear news angle in the first couple of 
sentences” (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001: 269). Given this chapter’s earlier discussion around 
the purposes of journalism, one of which being to provide the public with the information 
they need to make the best possible decisions about their lives, then stories that are 
clear and unambiguous in nature are arguably better suited for fulfilling this purpose. 
However, once again a subjective decision is made by the journalist or news 
organisation in determining what they think is an unambiguous story and one that would 
require a lot of background knowledge and context to be fully understood.
The fourth factor on Galtung & Ruge’s list of news values, ‘meaningfulness’, is also 
victim to subjective interpretations. They say that “The culturally similar is likely to be 
selected because it fits into the news selector’s frame of reference. Thus, the 
involvement of UK citizens will make an event in a remote country more meaningful to 
the UK media. Similarly, news from the USA is seen as more relevant to the UK than is 
news from countries which are less culturally familiar.” (1965: 65). Galtung & Ruge 
interpret this news value in two distinct ways. The first is through the concept of cultural 
proximity in which a journalist and thereby the public, is more likely to pay attention to 
an event if it culturally similar or recognisable to them. The second is in terms of an 
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events relevance wherein an event may not have any cultural proximity, but it may still 
have meaning due to what the event may imply for the audience. As will be further 
explored in chapter 3, due to technologies enabling audiences to choose what sort of 
news they wish to consume and the growth of digital spaces that can cater for niche 
audiences, the news value of meaningfulness can be seen as still relevant in today’s 
journalism.
Galtung & Ruge’s fifth news value of ‘consonance’ falls under particular criticism from 
other scholars. According to Galtung & Ruge, consonance is where “The news selector 
may predict - or, indeed, want - something to happen, thus forming a mental ‘pre-image’ 
of an event which in turn increases its chances of becoming news.” (1965: 65). This 
value is problematic in that it requires scholars to guess when it has been applied in 
story selection if at all. Work by Niblock & Machin (2007) highlights how journalists have 
a clear sense of the market segments which they want their content to appeal to and 
hence choose stories that they think appeal to this segment of the public. Their work 
showed how news editors are “thinking ‘instinctively’ about choosing news to fit a 
lifestyle group” (2007: 195), in essence predicting that a story is newsworthy to their 
audience, thereby making it newsworthy.
The news value of unexpectedness wherein “The more unexpected the signal, the more 
probable that it will be recorded as worth listening to.” (Galtung & Ruge, 1965: 65) 
speaks toward the notion that rarer events have more inherent news value in them. 
Whilst this would seem self-evident, in contemporary journalism the value on 
unexpectedness has become a less frequently observed value in the content that 
newsrooms produce. This is due to the context in which journalism is now being 
produced, namely one where the expansion of the PR industry has brought with it both 
pre-arranged and pre-packaged events which newsrooms are heavily reliant upon for 
content (Lewis et al, 2008). Whilst this is also evidenced in Harcup & O’Neill’s study of 
news values (2001), given the growth of the PR industry since the conduction of their 
research, one could assume that the existence of this value being found in news stories 
today is even less so. 
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The next two news values proposed by Galtung & Ruge speak more towards the 
pragmatics of news production rather than intrinsic value of a news story itself. These 
values are ‘continuity’ and ‘composition’. Continuity is to be understood as “If one signal 
has been tuned in to the more likely it will continue to be tuned in to as worth listening 
to.” (Galtung & Ruge, 1965: 65). That is to say that a news organisation is more likely to 
cover a story if it has already covered similar stories pertaining to the same event, genre 
or people involved. The reason why this is linked to news production is that if a 
newsroom has already dedicated resources to a particular story and the event is 
ongoing, then the newsroom is likely to keep those resources in place to keep reporting 
on the story. An example of this would be having reporters embedded in warzones. The 
benefits of employing such a news value is that not only does it allow for journalists to 
develop expertise and knowledge on a particular topic, but the public’s familiarity with a 
story can help increase greater understanding of issues related to that story (Morris, 
2005). The news value of composition is described by Galtung & Ruge as “the more a
signal has been tuned in to, the more probable that a very different kind of signal will be 
recorded as worth listening to next time.” (1965: 65). This value is also concerned with 
the production of news in that it speaks towards the notion of balance. Whilst earlier in 
this chapter the concept of balance was explored regarding the balance of voices on a 
given topic, here balance is meant in terms of the overall content of newspaper or news 
broadcast. This balance can be viewed through a number of lens such as between the 
number of domestic and international based stories or between hard and soft news 
stories. A newspaper editor who sees his daily edition as having too many hard news 
domestic stories may then place greater news value on a soft international story simply 
to balance out the composition of the newspaper as a whole.
The ninth and tenth news values proposed by Galtung & Ruge are based on the news 
media’s preponderance to focus on elite nations and people. They argue that “the 
actions of the elite are, at least usually and in short-term perspective, more 
consequential than the activities of others” (1965: 68) and are thus more worthy of news 
coverage. Within contemporary journalism the concept of elite people has expanded 
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from Galtung & Ruge’s conception where royalty is used as the example, to one where 
celebrities and people of notoriety or high status are included in this category. This 
redefining of elite people by the news industry is reflected in more recent attempts in 
academia in creating a list of news values, however as Bednarek & Caple’s review of 
these lists states, the “main differences occur in the naming/labelling of this news value” 
(2017: 34) rather than in any substantive reimagining of the term ‘elite’..
The penultimate news value proposed by Galtung & Ruge relates to the issue of 
personification wherein “The more the event can be seen in personal terms, as due to 
the action of specific individuals, the more probable that it will become a news item.” 
(1965: 68). Galtung & Ruge attempt to explain this value through a number of ways 
such as it being a result of audiences needing to be able to identify with a subject matter 
and that “persons can serve more easily as objects of positive and negative 
identification” (1965:69), through the mechanisms of empathy or projection. They also 
suggest that personification is the result of the news gathering process wherein it is 
easier to take a picture of a person than it is of a societal structure. The notion of being 
able to empathise with the subject of a story is something that will be returned to in 
chapter 2 wherein the “experience of involvement” (Peters, 2011: 305), will be explored 
in more depth given the link between emotionality and journalism. The news value of 
personification has been broadly seen as one of the most common news values 
throughout the history of journalism (Parks, 2019a), often interpreted by scholars to 
mean ‘human interest’. Studies that have looked at the presence of news values in story 
selection have often used the label of ‘human interest’ rather than the label of ‘reference 
to persons’ (Yang & Cannon, 2017; Parks, 2019b; Araujo & Meer, 2020) and as will be 
touched on shortly, human interest is sometimes placed as a sub-category of a broader 
news value label
The final news value in Galtung & Ruge’s taxonomy is concerned with negativity in that 
“The more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will 
become a news item.” (1965:69). Their argument for its inclusion on their list is based 
largely upon the case that negative news often more easily satisfies several of their 
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other news values such as frequency, unambiguity and unexpectedness. Alongside 
these justifications one could also argue that one of the reasons that this news value is 
often present in news stories (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001), is that the audience is generally 
drawn to negative stories over positive ones (Stafford, 2014) and hence there are 
financial motives at play when considering story selection. A key question surrounding 
this news value is to whom may a story be negative? Whilst there may indeed be some 
unambiguously negative stories such as natural disasters, bad news stories pertaining 
to areas such as business or politics may be viewed as bad news for some people, but 
good news for others. Whether a journalist interprets an event as good or bad news is a 
critical issue in terms of understanding the production of news and this will be explored 
in chapter 2, through discussion around the concept of framing.
As has been noted, even though Galtung & Ruge accepted at the time that this list was 
not complete and was open to exception (1965: 64), their list of news values has 
remained a fundamental part in any discussion around news values, with it arguably 
being the “most influential explanation” of news values (McQuail, 2010: 270). Despite its 
influence, there are a number of problems with their theory aside from the ones raised 
for some of the individual values they proposed.
One of these problems arises from the subject matter of their study, which was on major 
international events. By only focusing on these large events and not ‘average’ day to 
day events. This meant that their criteria for newsworthiness was based upon the 
selected crises and as Turnstall (1971) points out, their list of factors made no reference 
to the role that elements outside of the written material, namely dramatic photographs, 
could have on the newsworthiness of the story. Further questions have been raised 
about Galtung & Ruge’s news values due to the context they were written in. As 
McGregor (2002) points out, the prevalence of television, let alone the internet, could 
not have been imagined by the two scholars and so the increasing commercial rationale 
of the news media along with the challenge posed to ““old” news formats by “new” news 
formats was also outside the comprehension of previous theory development about 
newsworthiness.” (Ibid). Similar points have also been put forward by Bednarek & Caple 
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who state that the limited data used by Galtung & Ruge “may thus not apply equally to 
other types of news” (2017: 31).
Due to the age of the study, there have been multiple attempts to create a new 
taxonomies of news values or refinements to existing ones. One such example of a 
contemporary list of news values is put forward by Harcup and O’Neill. They suggested 
the following 10 news values:
“1. The power elite: Stories concerning powerful individuals, organisations or 
institutions.
2. Celebrity: Stories concerning people who are already famous.
3. Entertainment: Stories concerning sex, showbusiness, human interest, 
animals, an unfolding drama, or offering opportunities for humorous treatment, 
entertaining photographs or witty headlines.
4. Surprise: Stories that have an element of surprise and/or contrast.
5. Bad news: Stories with particularly negative overtones, such as conflict or 
tragedy.
6. Good news: Stories with particularly positive overtones, such as rescues and 
cures.
7. Magnitude: Stories that are perceived as sufficiently significant either in the 
numbers of people involved or in potential impact.
8. Relevance: Stories about issues, groups and nations perceived to be relevant 
to the audience. 
9. Follow-up: Stories about subjects already in the news.
10. Newspaper agenda: Stories that set or fit the news organisation’s own 
agenda
(Harcup and O’Neill, 2001: 278–279).
Just as was the case with Galtung & Ruge’s list, Harcup and O’Neil accept that their list 
is “not as the last word on news values” (2017: 1471) and that these 10 values only 
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provide a partial explanation towards the decision making process in newsrooms. Other 
proposed news values include values such as significance; drama; surprise;
personalities; sex, scandal and crime; numbers; prominence; proximity; timeliness; 
action; novelty; human interest and humour (Hetherington 1985: 8-9; Herbert, 2000: 
318).
Given the rise of visual mediums since Galtung & Ruge, McGregor has proposed four 
additional values that are used in determining what stories are selected by journalists 
namely, “visualness, emotion, conflict and the ‘celebrification of the journalist” 
(McGregor, 2002). The addition of ‘conflict’ to any news value taxonomy is argued for by 
Phillps (2015: 18) who contends it is a separate value to Harcup and O’Neil’s ‘bad 
news’. This point raises the slightly broader argument that there is a degree of overlap 
between the proposed values as for instance, some may view Harcup and O’Neil’s 
value of ‘celebrity’ to be a subset or derivation of Galtung & Ruge’s ‘reference to elite 
people’ value.
One important part of a taxonomy of news values is identify which aspect of the news 
making process the value is applied to. For instance, the value of ‘celebrity’ or ‘surprise’ 
is more concerned with the event itself whereas values such as ‘follow-up’ or the 
‘newspaper’s agenda’ are more concerned with the coverage of the story. Caple & 
Bednarak (2013) have shown that research looking at news values focuses on the 
areas of events, stories, news agenda, commercial factors and journalistic practices. 
Across each of these types of news values, a certain level of overlap can be seen such 
as Brighton & Foy’s “external influences” (2007: 29) and O’Neill & Harcup’s (2008: 171) 
“occupational routines, budgets, the market and ideology” being news values in the 
news making process. What this example and the other synonymous values pointed out 
above suggests, is that there is an issue when it comes to labelling news values. Not 
only does this speak to the “gut feeling” that Shultz (2007) refers to in how journalists 
define what is newsworthy, but also how there is a necessary “subjective interpretation 
on the part of the researchers” (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001: 269). Determining whether an 
event is ‘surprising’ or if it is ‘bad news’ is a subjective process that scholars must be 
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mindful of both when constructing news value taxonomies and when considering the 
findings of studies using such taxonomies.
Another issue regarding the concept of news values is the importance or weight that is 
afforded to each value. When first proposing their list of 10 news values, Harcup & 
O’Neill felt that they were “not in a position to demonstrate empirically a clear hierarchy 
of news values” (2001: 275) but that “certain combinations of news values appear 
almost to guarantee coverage in the press” (Ibid). However in later work O’Neill believes 
that at least within the British quality press, that “celebrity/entertainment news values 
would appear to have risen much higher up the hierarchy of news, guaranteeing 
extensive coverage if combined with other news values such as surprise and bad news” 
(2012: 26). This notion is further expanded upon in her and her colleague’s revisiting of 
their earlier work on news values where they say given that their proposed news values 
are influenced by things such as availability of resources, ideological/cultural 
backgrounds of the journalist and the type of audience the journalist is producing the 
new for, that these news values may rise or fall in terms of importance in different 
situations (Harcup & O’Neill, 2017: 1483). Other scholars such as Hall et al (1978) have 
pointed towards the value of negativity as being the key criterion in determining the 
newsworthiness of a story. McGregor on the other hand argues that the value of 
‘visualness’ is the most prominent news value given how news is now driven “by 
pictures and their perceptual and iconic power.” (2002).
In reviewing 50 years of work regarding Galtung & Ruge’s news values, Joye et al 
(2016) consider it important to keep in mind three levels of context when discussing 
news values. The first of these is the individual level where “journalistic ethics, ritualistic 
procedures of news production, as well as the (personal and professional) socialization 
of journalists and their concepts of self-definition and identity” (2016: 15) play a role in 
how an events newsworthiness if determined. The second level of context is the 
institutional level wherein the structures within the workplace such as the organisation 
itself, its owners or its advertisers, play a role in influencing the choice of event covered. 
The third level of context that Joye et al propose is the societal level whereby “norms, 
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ideologies and the moral-political discourses” (Ibid: 16) need to be taken into account 
when studying news values. Each of these levels is important to keep in mind for the 
context of this study given the nature of the organisations and platform being studied. 
1.8: Audience attention
One of the final concepts to explore in this chapter is audience attention. This is linked 
to the concept of news values as what can be considered a news value is dependent, at 
least in part, by the target audience that the story is intended for (Caple & Bednarak, 
2013: 6). It is often assumed that news content is “intended to attract an audience 
through presenting a story to them that is newsworthy” (Bednarek and Caple 2012: 46), 
and it has even been proposed that “audience targeting” should be considered a news 
value itself (Machin & Niblock, 2006: 141). Given the role that journalism plays in the 
public sphere, it can be argued that for a democratic society to function it is important 
for journalists and news organisations to obtain the public’s attention and keep it 
focused on events deemed highly newsworthy. 
One approach to the link between news values and audience attention is given by 
Shoemaker et al (1991) who propose a news value model based on the concepts of 
‘deviance’ and ‘social significance’. The deviance value is comprised of 
“novelty/oddity/unusual (statistical deviance), prominence (normative deviance), 
sensationalism (normative or pathological deviance) and codit or controversy (normative 
deviance)” (Ibid: 783), whereas the social significance value is based on the potential 
impact or consequences of the story. Much like with other news value models, 
Shoemaker et al (1991) suggest that a high presence of their values would lead to 
greater coverage of an event. Shoemaker links this model to the concept of audience 
attention by theorizing that the public pays more attention to events that are both 
deviant and socially significant (1996). Her argument for this comes from an 
evolutionary biology perspective in that as humans, we survey our environment and try 
to detect deviations (1996: 38) and we also socialize to learn what events should be 
considered important. This means that a person’s interest in the news is “the result of 
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an interaction between these two pure models, with humans both innately interested in 
deviant events and socialized to attend to events that have some significance to their 
particular culture and society.” (Ibid: 44). 
The hypothesis that the more deviant and socially significant an event is, the more likely 
an audience will pay attention to it, is supported by Lee (2009). Lee found that the 
presence of these news values “significantly predicted audience attention when they 
were mediated by the media coverage.” (2009: 184). Further support linking the concept 
of news values with audience attention is provided by Sherwood et al (2017) who 
looked at the coverage of female sports in the Australian press and by Montgomery & 
Feng (2016) discussing the role of headlines in television news. A third study that can 
be seen to be linking news values and audience attention is by Wahl-Jorgensen et al 
which found that audiences valued user generated content in news stories as it was 
seen as “immediate and fresh, authentic, emotionally engaging” (2010: 190).
However, depending on the news value model that is being considered, it can be 
argued that the presence of some values negatively impacts the audience’s attention 
and thereby the public sphere. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the rise of 
infotainment and growing focus on soft news stories can be seen as harmful towards 
the public sphere (Graber, 1994). Nguyen argues that contrary to the claim that soft 
news helps the public sphere because it helps “keep attention-scarce publics with the 
news” (2012: 706), there is in fact little evidence to suggest a “significant effect for the 
taste for soft news on news attachment among the general public” (Ibid). If one were to 
adopt Harcup and O'Neill’s news value model, the values of ‘celebrity’ and 
‘entertainment’ would appear to be detrimental towards the public’s attention towards a 
story. Given O’Neill’s previously mentioned work, suggesting that the news value of 
‘celebrity’ has risen in prominence (2012), a conflict arises in that a story that may be 
deemed newsworthy due to its high level of celebrity or entertainment value is also 
harmful towards the public sphere as such a story would do little to keep the public’s 
attention.
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This problem can also be seen when adopting Shoemaker’s ‘deviance’ and ‘social 
significance’ model (1991). Lee (2009) highlights this problem in pointing towards 
Graber’s study (1988) which found that “the most commonly attended news events were 
about politically significant information about congress, state government, city
government, and the court system. Deviant events were not often mentioned.” and that 
Cooper & Roter’s study about health news (2000) found that deviant events “ranked as 
the least attracting events” (Lee, 2009: 185). Given that the deviance news value is 
partly associated with the notion of sensationalism (Shoemaker et al, 1991: 783) it could 
be suggested that when considering a hierarchy of news values, attention must not only 
be paid towards the impact that a value has on the newsworthiness of the story, but 
also on the impact it may have on the audience.
One final consideration regarding news values and audience attention is society that is 
producing and utilizing these values. Research by Zhang et al (2013) which applied 
Shoemaker’s news value model to American and Chinese newspaper coverage of 
terrorist attacks found that “US newspapers are more sensitive to cultural significance 
than Chinese media” (2013: 468). Cultural differences in how news values are applied 
to events is an important consideration for this study given the focus on mainly 
American and Western news media.
1.9: Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to outline some of the core concepts that are often 
discussed within journalism studies. Habermas’ public sphere concept serves as a way 
of discussing the intersection between the public and the role that the news media plays 
in a democratic society. Although the public sphere may only be a theorized ideal 
(Dahlgren, 1995) rather than anything that has actually existed, even if it does exist, it 
has been gradually degraded through the entrance of commercial forces, the dumbing 
down of content (Slevin, 2000) and other various evolutions in journalistic routines and 
practices.
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With it being established that journalism does play some role in the functioning of a 
democracy, this chapter next explored the ideology underpinning journalism and how 
the notion of an ideology is one way to understand what the core concepts are within 
journalism as it is this collective ideology of those working within the institution that 
determines what is valued and seen as indicative of good journalism. From this, it is 
argued that Kovach and Rosenstiel’s five elements of journalism are a solid 
encapsulation of what are generally held to be things that indicate good journalism. Of 
those five elements, this chapter argues that objectivity is the most important owing to 
the large number of scholars who also contend the same thing. With objectivity being 
held in high regard by both scholars and practitioners alike, this chapter examines the 
part that it plays in terms of the role journalism plays in society in relation to Habermas’ 
concept of the public sphere. 
Next this chapter details how other elements of Kovach and Rosenstiel’s theory are 
related to the public sphere and are important factors to consider regarding any study 
looking at the content that is being produced by journalists. The different styles that this 
content can take is detailed around the concepts of hard and soft news alongside the 
difficulties of having these often rigidly described categories. The concepts of hard and 
soft news also brings to light the notion that certain types of stories can be treated more 
harshly than others under the lens of objectivity.
Finally, this chapter explored the concept of news values by discussing various models 
of news values put forward by the likes of Galtung & Ruge (1965), Harcup & O’Neill 
(2001) and Shoemaker et al (1991). What is highlighted in the discussion is that any 
proposed list of news values has to acknowledge the medium of news which they are 
being applied to (McGregor, 2002), the context of the news value itself (Joye et al, 
2016) and the culture/society that is generating those values (Zhang et al, 2013).
The aim of this chapter was to present several concepts that together, highlight how 
scholars have discussed the purpose of journalism and how the concepts within 
ideology of journalism inform the role that it plays within a democratic society. These 
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ideas are relevant to this study as given the changes to news production and 
consumption within the last decade, they can be applied and used to discuss more 
contemporary of the journalism industry, namely, the use of YouTube as a platform for 
news. However, before exploring the literature relating to YouTube specifically, it is 
important to consider some of the factors that may have contributed towards changes in 
both news production and consumption, these being the use of emotions and framing.
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CHAPTER 2: The role of emotions and frames in journalism
Managing editor of PBS NewsHour and famed US journalist Judy Woodruff once said 
that to be a successful journalist “you need to care about the world around you.” 
(Woodruff, 2015). This sentiment is often shared by other journalists and scholars alike 
(de Aguiar, 2017). This poses a fundamental challenge to elements of the journalistic 
ideology discussed in the previous chapter where strict objectivity and a distancing from 
the subject are championed. For the conflict between objectivity and expression of 
passion or empathy to be resolved, or at least better understood, one must look at how 
news stories are written and how emotions play a role in that process. To do this, this 
chapter aims to unpack the notion of framing, how emotions enter into the process of 
framing and then ultimately what the impact of emotions within journalistic frames has 
on the audience. It is important to understand the role that emotions and framing have 
on an audience in relation to this particular study due to this study being in part 
concerned with the notion of user engagement and as will be discussed below, the 
invocation of emotion has the ability to stir the public to action. The reason why 
particular attention is given to the concept of framing in this chapter is due in part to the 
widespread agreement amongst researchers that media frames exert at least some 
influence over audiences (Constantinescu & Tedesco, 2007).
When any news event is put through the journalistic process, that is to say the treatment 
it is given in regards to its perceived value and the manner in which the event is 
portrayed to the public, it has had what is called the concept of framing applied to it. 
Framing has been defined as a process wherein particular aspects of a perceived reality 
are assembled in a way so that a particular interpretation of an event is presented to an 
audience (Entman, 2007: 164). A similar definition provided by Gamson is that framing 
is a “central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is 
at issue” (1989: 157). He goes on to say that facts “possess no intrinsic meaning and 
are given meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and 
gives them coherence” (1989:157). Framing comes down to what elements of a story 
are emphasised and which parts are missed out or obfuscated. 
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The importance of understanding the concept of framing is underscored by the role it 
plays in determining how individuals and the public at large perceive and interpret 
events. Depending on the medium, there are various elements that are able to be used 
as a framing device such as video, audio and graphics. However one element that is 
consistent across the vast majority of journalism is the language that is used to describe 
an event. Language is always contextual, particularly so when it comes to emotive 
language.
There are a multitude of ways in which emotions, when depicted through language, can 
be categorised and measured. This chapter aims to outline attempts by scholars to do 
this as well as discuss how emotional words or phrases can change the way in which an 
audience perceives a news story.
2.1: Emotion within journalism
In the field of psychology where the study of emotions is predominantly based, a 
contemporary description that has been used for the term is that “emotion consists of 
neural circuits (that are at least partially dedicated), response systems, and a feeling 
state/process that motivates and organizes cognition and action.” (Izard. C. E, 2010: 
367). This definition however serves little purpose to the study of the use of emotive 
words in our language. To do this, one needs to look at work done in the field of 
linguistics as well as the use of language in journalism.
The concept of emotion in relation to the field of journalism has been somewhat left 
undertheorized in favour of focus upon other areas such as objectivity and ethics. This 
has been due to the fact that as Peters describes, it has been treated with 
“commonsensical discernment” and that this has led it to be melded with journalistic 
practices such as “sensationalism, bias, commercialization and the like” (2011: 297).  
Within journalism, the employment of emotion has often been seen as a negative and a 
symbol of “flawed journalism” (Peters. C, 2011) or as a “decay in journalistic quality” 
53
(Pantti. M, 2010: 170). This is because it has been placed in direct contrast to objectivity 
which as described in the previous chapter, is perceived as one of the most important 
tenets of journalism. As outlined in the previous chapter, the importance of this tenet 
has been called into question. Also previously mentioned were the observations by both 
Carpini (2001) and Sampson (1999) that there has been a steady blurring of lines 
between information and entertainment, or broadsheet and tabloid newspapers. Despite 
the gradual meshing of news and entertainment over the last couple of decades (Jones. 
J, 2005), analysis of new forms of journalism still relies upon the supposed conflict 
between objectivity and emotion when assessing the quality of the journalism. Before 
exploring how the blurring of the lines between the news and entertainment has 
changed the practice of journalism, the notion of how emotion enters into the field of
journalism must be considered.
The term 'emotion' has a range of meanings that have included words such as 
passions, moods, motives and feelings (Dixon. T, 2003). With a concrete definition 
arguably hard to settle on, Chris Peters has suggested that the focus of scholars should 
be on the “experience of involvement” (2011: 305) and that this should help produce 
more conscientious studies that look at the impact of the presentation of the news. 
Peters argues that journalism has always attempted to “induce some sort of experience 
in its audiences” (2011: 305) and that whilst this has been done through the use of 
commonly used narrative structures such as the use of heroes and villains (Lule, 2001), 
the journalist has always been expected to show some level of distance or detachment 
from the subject matter. Whilst the desire for detachment by journalists had been the 
norm for much of the practice's existence, changes in other professions in the last few 
decades as well as trends in society could be seen to have bled across into journalism 
and has resulted in a more personal style of journalism. Papers by Du Gay (1994), 
Laster & O'Malley (1996) and Lupton (1997), all make the case that in the professions of 
business, law and medicine respectively, there has been a move away from an 
impersonal style of practice towards a more sensitive style. Richards & Brown (2001) 
have used the term 'therapeutic culture' to describe the current trend in society in which 
there is a preoccupation with feelings and relationships.
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This is not to say that rationalization has been completely rejected in these professions, 
but just that the “emotive posture of the profession has become varied” (Peters, 2011, 
305). From these trends, one could argue that the impersonal, detached style of
journalism that has often been linked with the notion of objectivity, has resulted in the 
perception of journalists who can appear uncaring or uninvolved. Whilst having 
emotional control as a journalist has often been thought of as a key skill of a journalist, 
Peters (2011: 306) believes that:
While this sort of thinking embraces that the experience of involvement – the 
moment of contact between an audience and a news text – matters, it ignores 
that assumptions underlie the crafting of news. 
What this quote suggests is that when considering emotion in journalism, one should 
look at how motives with unlimited compositions are brought into every encounter with 
journalism (Lyng, 1990) and that rather than thinking of emotion within journalism in 
terms of substance, it should instead be seen as patterns of relationship (Burkitt, 2002). 
The key point here is that emotions only have meaning when they are placed in context 
and in relation to other things such as objects or ideologies. 
The climate that we currently live in has appeared to have shifted (Barbalet, 1998) in 
recent decades, in regards to communication in that there appears to be a desire for 
more authentic emotional interactions as has been observed by Connor (2007) in which 
there has been a noticeable increase in the use of emoticons in digital interactions 
between people. With the apparent cultural trend that displays of emotion are no longer 
considered infantile, as can be seen in sports and film (see Dunning, 1999 and Elias, 
1982), then as Peters points out, it should be no surprise to see that certain parts of 
cable news have become “highly involved, personalized, hour-long shows” (2011: 307). 
If this is the case, then it could also therefore be argued that utilisation of new platforms  
such as YouTube by established newsrooms would also display these same 
characteristics.
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Another way to look at defining emotion in journalism is through what Pantti calls 
'emotionality'. This term she argues can be defined in three ways: “in terms of the 
emotional state of the news sources, emotionally engaging images and emotional topics 
and case studies.” (2010: 174). In a study by Pantti that looked at the accounts that 
journalists gave in regards to the issues of emotion in journalism, she found that 'news 
emotion' was commonly associated by the journalists, with strong emotional 
expressions such as through crying or the displaying of flowers after a tragic event. The 
purpose of emotionality in news for the journalists when it came to their sources, was 
that “it should either facilitate the understanding of a story or add an extra message to 
the story, rather than being the story itself” (2010: 174). One can extrapolate from this 
quote that emotionality forms part of the framing process as it aids in highlighting or 
emphasizing certain parts of the story
When considering emotional images, Pantti found that of the journalists interviewed, 
many shared the idea that the use of an emotional image can tell and explain more than 
just simple use of words. When it came to the subject of emotional topics, Pantti found 
that there was some uncertainty on some issues. For instance, whilst many linked 
emotional reporting with major news stories such as natural disasters, many also felt 
that the emotionality of a news story was not related to the topic. Some journalists also 
argued that emotionality was “more appropriate to some topics than to others” (2010: 
175).
Building upon this notion of emotionality is the idea that there is a strategic ritual of 
emotionality in which  “there is an institutionalized and systematic practice of journalists 
narrating and infusing their reporting with emotion, which means that journalistic story-
telling, despite its allegiance to the ideal of objectivity, is also profoundly emotional.” 
(Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013: 130). The story-telling aspect is an important one as it is 
through a narrative structure that an audience can develop empathy and identification 
with the protagonists' situation. The idea of using a narrative structure is also not a 
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recent revelation in journalism as Kitch has shown in that it has been used in instances 
of public mourning (Kitch, 2000; 2003).
When one considers both Peters’ and Pantti's look at what is emotion when looking at 
journalism, a case can be made that the term 'emotion' should be seen as some 
amalgamation of “experience of involvement” and “emotionality” (as looked at through 
the three ways Pantti describes). However, one of the original points raised by Peters in 
that emotion has been treated with a “commonsensical discernment”, is a very apt one 
as the word 'emotion' is somewhat of a malleable term that can be bent to fit the 
required purpose of any study. As Dixon points out, the word 'emotion' has had its 
criteria changed multiple times since the 1920's (Dixon, 2012). With this in mind then, 
the term 'emotion' when being considered in academic studies of journalism can be 
seen to be utilised in a very broad manner, within reason, to help said study in its 
investigation of a particular area.
2.2: What are the roles of emotion in journalism?
Before proceeding to discuss the role of emotions in journalism, a brief amount of time 
needs to be spent outlining in a broad sense the common approaches to studying the 
utilisation of emotions in academic research. The reason for this is that it will help inform 
discussions during the analysis of the collected data.
One common approach when it comes to the categorisation of emotions in academic 
research, is discrete emotion theory. This is the idea that there are between seven to 
ten main emotions within which, there are multiple related words which are synonyms 
for these main seven to ten emotions. (Beck, 2003) Whilst there are some variations on 
the theory, the most agreed upon main categories of emotions are happiness, surprise, 
sadness, anger, disgust, contempt and fear (Izard & Malatesta, 1987). It should be 
noted that the emotion of contempt is still an area of debate (see Matsumoto, 1992) and 
hence, it is Ekman's six core emotions that are most commonly used for classifying 
emotions (Ekman, 1972). Working off the notion that emotions have distinct categories, 
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Eugene Bann posited a theory that people in any given society use language as a 
means to transmit their understanding of emotions through the use of emotional 
keywords and that the more distinct language that is used the more distinct the 
perception of an audience to that emotion is (Bann & Bryson, 2013). Whilst Bann’s 
theory is applicable to everyone in society, this theory is crucial to understanding how 
the manner in which a story is written about impacts how the public and hence public 
sphere is impacted.
One question that must be asked of this theory is how can a researcher differentiate 
between the several emotions? Ekman answered this question by proposing a set of 
criteria that each of the emotions must follow but in distinct ways for each emotion. 
Among his list of characteristics he believed could be found in every basic emotion were 
“can be brief in occurrence”, “distinctive subjective experience” and “the emotion can be 
enacted in either a constructive or destructive fashion” (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011: 365). It 
is these characteristics that are likely to become salient in later discussions about the 
types of user engagement when it comes to YouTube videos.    
Within the field of journalism, emotion can be seen to perform two broad purposes. The 
first is that it helps make news stories more intelligible. The second purpose is that it 
helps shape the way in which an audience receives the news (Pantti, 2010). In regards 
to making news stories more intelligible, this is often discussed in terms of identification, 
in that the audience identifies with emotions of those within the story, such as suffering 
or grief, and then form a connection between the story and their own lives through 
empathy (Grabe & Zhou, 2003). Regarding the way in which emotion shapes how the 
audience receives the news, it can be argued that journalism is about telling stories and 
that the emotions used in certain narrative structures helps to both “trigger and maintain 
the interest of the viewers.” (Pantti, 2010: 177). Evidence for this can be seen in Wahl-
Jorgensen's study in which a large number of stories that have won Pulitzer Prizes, 
thereby being deemed good and successful pieces of journalism, have relied “heavily 
on emotional story-telling, deploying what has been referred to as the strategic ritual of 
emotionality.” (2012: 141). It can also be suggested here that the heavy utilisation of 
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emotion with award winning pieces of journalism may also be a contributing factor to the 
trend noted in the previous chapter towards an increase in stories relying less on 
objectivity and more on personalised styles of writing (Basu, 2010).
One way in which to look at how emotion operates within journalism is to see how it 
affects the main purposes of journalism itself. As briefly touched upon an earlier 
chapter, a basic but nevertheless useful definition of the purpose of journalism is to 
“provide citizens with the information they need to make the best possible decisions 
about their lives, their communities, their societies, and their governments.” (American 
Press Institute, 2014). Put another way, journalism operates so as to inform the public 
sphere. But how does emotion help make an audience make better informed decisions?
The idea of emotions being utilised by a journalist as a means to better informing the 
public can be approached by looking at the concept of framing. As stated in the 
introduction of this chapter, framing is a “central organizing idea for making sense of 
relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (Gamson, 1989: 157). An alternative 
interpretation of the term is provided by Entman (1993, 2004) who saw frames as a tool 
of communication in which decisions are made to select what information and how 
much salience is given to aspects of the information when crafting a message (Entman, 
1993, 2004). Entman describes four locations of frame, these being the communicator, 
the text, the receiver's mind and culture (1993). These four locations of frame aim to 
serve four functions: “to state problems, determine causes, make moral judgements and 
suggest remedies. A frame may serve one or all of these functions.” (Jones & 
Himelboim, 2010: 278). 
In journalism, frames are used to set the boundaries of public discussion around certain 
events through “persistent selection, emphasis and exclusion” (Gitlin, 1980: 7). Framing 
is arguably a necessary aspect in the production of news (see Akhavan-Majid and 
Ramaprasad, 1998) and its purpose is to help audiences comprehend what may 
otherwise be complex issues (Valkenburg et al, 1999). The reason for the use of 
framing from a practical standpoint is as Gan et al states, is “to simplify and give 
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meaning to events, and to maintain audience interest.” (2005: 442). There are a number 
of studies (Jones & Himelboim, 2010; Reese & Lewis, 2009; Gan et al, 2005) that 
present evidence that framing exists within newsrooms and the media in general. 
Studies on framing such as by Valkenburg et al (1999: 551) suggest that there are four 
ways in which an event can be framed:
(a) by emphasizing conflict between parties or individuals (conflict frame); (b) by 
focusing on an individual as an example or emphasizing emotions (human 
interest frame); (c) by attributing responsibility, crediting or blaming certain 
political institutions or individuals (responsibility frame); and (d) by focusing on 
the economic consequences for the audience (economic consequences frame).
The conflict frame aims to highlight divisions between parties or individuals and this is 
most notably seen during coverage of election campaigns as due to the nature of 
complex politics debates, conflict framing helps simplify the issues at hand (Patterson, 
1993). It should be noted however that use of this frame is not limited to political 
coverage and that it predominantly makes winning/losing the main concern such as can 
be seen in the language used to describe wars or the style of an individual politician 
(Jamieson, 1992). The responsibility frame aims to focus attention on a specific issue in 
a way that imputes responsibility for either causing or solving a problem to a group or 
individual. (Valkenburg et al, 1999). An example of this given by Iyengar & Kinder 
(1989) is that of the issue of poverty in the United States where a poor mother on 
welfare benefits is responsible for her fate, rather than government. The economic 
consequences frame, frames issues in terms of the financial impact it could have on an 
individual or group of people. This can take the form of either actual or potential impact 
(Nueman et al, 1992). In both these cases, the frame can be seen to attempt to make 
an issue more relevant, certainly when covering macro-economic stories, to the 
audience. The human interest frame has the potential to contain the most emotive 
language as it aims to personalise and emotionalise an issue.  As news markets 
become more competitive, outlets struggle to retain their audience’s interest (Bennett, 
1995). By personalising an issue, the hope is to have an audience empathise with the 
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story and thereby retain interest. These four frames can all be generated through the 
use of pictures, sounds and text, the latter of which this study will pay particular 
attention to.
It should be noted that there is no definitive set of framing categories (Price et al, 1997) 
and that there are several proposed categories (Jamieson. K, 1992; Patterson. T, 1993; 
Price et al, 1997) as well as the ones described by Valkenburg et al (1999). As well as 
the dominant frames suggested above one could also argue that journalists can frame 
their stories in regards to their own region (Gan et al, 2005).
Before moving on to consider the impact that the employment of emotions within news 
frames can have, the way in which these frames are developed and reinforced over 
time should be considered. The reinforcement of news frames occurs due to the 
journalistic routines that are repeated by those working within the industry (Becker & 
Vlad, 2009: 59). The idea that journalists follow particular conventions in the production 
of a news story has promoted the argument that news is in fact a socially constructed 
reality and not a pure reflection of the events that are actually happening in the world 
(2009: 59). This argument is also reflected in the work of Stuart Hall (1982) that was 
mentioned in the beginning of chapter 1, where dominant groups with media institutions 
are able to determine what particular conventions in the production of news are 
followed.
Three paradigms Becker & Vlad (2009) suggest that are the lead contributors towards a 
journalistic routine are the political economy perspective, the sociological perspective 
and the constraints imposed by cultural considerations (2009: 60). The interaction 
between how money influences the news content produced, the background and life 
experiences of those working in the newsroom, and the cultural sensitivities of where 
the news is being made all factor into the final end product that is delivered to the 
public. These interactions take place within the structured nature of a newsroom 
wherein deadlines and editorial standards are handed out by those in management 
(Sparrow, 1999). These considerations can be linked to Joye et al (2016) work 
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discussed in the previous chapter wherein there are three levels of context when 
discussing the creation of news values. Sparrow’s point above speaks to Joye et al’s 
second level of context, the institutional level, whereas Becker and Vlad’s point 
coincides with the third level of context, the societal level.
Due to their training, whether it be from university degree programmes or on the job 
internships, journalists have been deemed “professional gatekeepers, serving 
democratic society by shaping public conversations.” (Agarwal & Barthel, 2013: 378). 
This, coupled with their position within an established news organisation “confirms their 
adherence to a set of widely-recognized procedures and ethics” (2013: 378). The 
journalistic routines and practices used in newsrooms are granted legitimacy from the 
relations that they have with credible sources that provide accurate information (Becker, 
1967). A journalist’s credibility then, is upheld through the continuation of the routines 
and practices used to establish said relationships.
It should be noted, as Agarwal & Barthel (2013) point out that due to the changing 
conditions of journalism, namely the rapid growth of online journalism in recent years, 
that “the professional routines of online journalism are thought to be significantly 
different from those of traditional print journalism.” (2013: 379). Factors such as the 
increased speed of the news cycle (Deuze, 2004) and increased commercial pressures 
due to the reduction in advertising revenue (Cohen, 2002) have certainly had an impact 
on the political economy paradigm in relation to the established journalistic routines that 
had been used in traditional journalism formats such as print and TV. These are of 
course important points of consideration in regards to the research in this study as 
these factors are certainly applicable to the utilisation of YouTube as a news platform.
One must also consider how the growth of online journalism with which the debate over 
who can be considered a journalist (Lewis, 2012) has impacted on both the sociological 
perspective and cultural considerations that influence journalistic routines. However, 
regardless of what form the journalistic routines currently take, their existence and 
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thereby their role in how news stories get framed is still present in the news making 
process.
Remembering that journalism aims to help an audience make the best informed 
decisions that they can, framing takes a critical role in determining the impact of 
journalism and thereby the impact that emotions can have in journalism. This is 
because the language that is used in describing events is part of the process in creating 
a frame. The following section expatiates upon the idea that the use of language is 
integral to the notion of framing by discussing how the use of emotions within any given 
news frame can have an impact on the reception of the news story.
2.3: The impact of emotions
There are several ways in which it can be argued that the use of emotions have an 
impact within the practice of journalism. One way would be to argue that due to its well-
studied presence in the mass media in general (Schwab & Schwender, 2011) it must 
then also be present within the field of journalism. Another way would be to argue from 
an evolutionary standpoint in that there is a biological and social need to include 
emotions when trying to communicate information (ibid). However, this section intends 
to show that because emotions are utilised in the framing process, and that media 
frames have an impact on the way an audience receives a story, that therefore 
emotions ineluctably have an impact on the audience.
To show this link, one can look at past research on the various types of frame outlined 
by Valkenburg et al (1999). One such study is by Cappella & Jamieson (1996), which 
looked specifically at the use of the conflict frame. In their study, participants watched 
over 5 hours of televised news segments. One of the segments about the 1991 
Philadelphia mayoral race was edited by the researchers. There were three groups of 
participants, one saw the news segment framed around problems and proposed 
solutions for the city. Another group saw the news segment which highlighted how a 
candidate's position on an issue either provided an advantage or not in securing votes. 
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The final group of participants saw the news segment which focussed on a local story 
which was not related to the mayoral elections. Cappella & Jamieson found that the 
group which saw the news segment utilising the conflict frame reported higher levels of 
cynicism than the other two groups of participants did about the mayoral campaign.
Another study that provides evidence towards the claim that framing has an impact on 
audiences, is by Iyengar (1989). In his paper, Iyengar argued that because television 
news has covered issues in terms of individual events rather than in terms of their 
historical context, that this has led people to individual level explanations for social 
problems such as poverty. The example given in the description of the responsibility 
frame above is a case of this happening.
A third study supporting the notion that frames influence an audience’s reception of a 
story is by Price et al (1997). Rather than looking at individual frames, Price looked at 
the conflict, human interest and responsibility frames. Participants were students who 
were given a fictitious story about the funding of their own university. The students were 
randomly given different versions of the story where whilst the core information stayed 
the same, the opening and closing paragraphs differed in consonance with one of the 
three frames. After reading the story, the participants were asked to write down their 
feelings regarding the story. Price's results shows that each frame used elicited different 
responses from the participants both in terms of the focus of the topic as well as on the 
evaluation of the topic. Whilst this study provides strong evidence to the idea that 
frames influence an audience, there are some problems with the strength of the claims 
that can be made from this study. One problem is that the story that was given to the 
participants was fictional and was chosen because it was of high interest to the 
participants owing to the fact that they were all students. This raises the question of 
whether or not the study can be used for basing claims about real life stories. Another 
problem linked to the first is that the nature of the story chosen was highly relevant and 
salient to the participants. As Valkenburg et al point out, there is “still an open question 
as to whether the results can be generalised to issues of lower salience” (1999: 553).
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To build upon and also counter the problems faced with Price et al's study, Valkenburg 
et al performed a more extensive study that looked at both whether or not use of 
particular frames influenced an audience’s reception to a story, but also whether the use 
of frames affects an audience’s ability to recall information about a story. To investigate 
the first claim Valkenburg et al gave participants one story about crime and another 
about the introduction of the Euro. Both stories were framed by one of the four dominate 
frames mentioned earlier. Results showed that participants who read a story that was 
using the human interest frame “emphasized emotions and individual implications”. 
Participants who read a story that was using the conflict frame were “significantly more 
likely to express thoughts that involved conflict”. Finally, participants who read a story 
that was using the economic consequences frame “focussed on costs and financial 
implications in their thoughts significantly more often” (1999: 565). When it came to 
investigating the impact that framing had on an audience's ability to recall information, 
Valkenburg et al found that for the Euro story, there was no distinguishable differences 
in recall ability amongst the different types of frame. However, for the crime story, 
participants who read the story with a human interest frame had worse recall than those 
who read the story with any of the other frames. This suggests that news stories that 
are subjected to a human interest frame, whilst making the story “more interesting and 
compelling, can diminish rather than enhance the recollection of information” 
(Valkenburg et al, 1995: 566). This suggestion supports findings by Mundorf et al, 
(1990) in which the ability of audiences to recall information in news stories is 
diminished if said news story is shown directly after a human interest story. It should be 
noted that the results from these two studies provide evidence against the argument put 
forward by earlier studies such as by Davis & Robinson (1986) which suggest that 
arousing strong emotions in an audience could help increase learning.
Overall, it would seem that there is significant evidence to suggest that the use of 
framing in news production can have an effect on an audience's thoughts about the 
issue in a news report, as well as their ability to recall it. As framing is used as a tool by 
journalists to give meaning to certain stories and that to give meaning to an issue 
requires the use of language beyond that of just stating the bare facts of a story, that 
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therefore, emotional language through the medium of framing has an impact on 
journalism.
Another way to look at how emotion has impacted journalism is to look at the language 
that is now used in reporting. As stated in the previous chapter, the notion of objectivity 
within journalism is a contentious one. Gruenfeld (1996) has argued that the editing of 
news reports is a subjective process by its very nature as it relies upon the sensibilities 
of the editor. Every word that is used, is a choice, either conscious or unconsciously 
made by the journalist. Language provides writers/speakers a choice and it is this fact 
that is the main driving force in the study of journalistic discourse in which the 
assumption that is made is that “linguistic choices in news discourse have 
consequences for the ways news consumers come to view a certain set of historical 
conditions” (Lukin, 2013: 98). The consequences can be seen through the studies on 
framing, but one still needs to look at the way language can be employed to utilise 
emotion.
At its very basic level it is the choices of words that are used to describe events. Words 
such as those used to describe Ekman's distinct categories like 'sadness' and 'anger', 
as well as words and subsequent synonyms in Scherer's Geneva Affect Label Coder 
(2005). However, as Wahl-Jorgensen (2013) points out, “emotions may also be built into 
the narrative: even in stories that do not use emotional language, dramatic tension is 
created through a variety of narrative strategies, including detailed description, 
juxtaposition and personalized story-telling” (2013: 135). Harbers & Broersma (2014), 
have provided examples of journalism that “show how overt subjectivity is displayed in 
different manners and how this affects the persuasiveness of reporting.”(2014: 639). An 
example within the study is how the award winning reporters Robert Fisk and Arnon 
Grunberg structure their stories chronologically and that through a gradual release of 
information, with attention given to “the atmosphere and the emotional impact of 
situations, they lend their senses to their readers” (Harbers & Broersma, 2014: 645). 
This particular example gives evidence towards the claim that the manner in which 
language is used and not just the language itself, has had an impact on journalism.
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A further example highlighting how the language that is used in reporting has impacted 
journalism is the popularity of the tabloid press. Celebrity journalism, has constituted a 
large part of the tabloid press in Britain for many decades (Conboy, 2014). Within the 
tabloid newspapers, there is a sense of identity, in that there are a number of 
assumptions made about its intended audience. The language that is used to be geared 
towards such an audience has been called an exercise in audience design (Bell, 1984). 
By creating an identity, it has been argued that it is the language that is used by 
newspapers, rather than their layout, that distinguishes between the “neutral language 
of those aiming to be considered as serious newspapers or record and the 'emotionally 
charged' language of the popular tabloids” (Kitis & Milapedes, 1997: 562). Tabloid 
newspapers can be seen to have been impacted by the use of emotive language as it 
has allowed them to create an identity or brand around their outlet. It should also be
noted that the language identity formed can be viewed as a way in which to create a 
vocabulary for their imagined average reader or as Conboy puts it, as a “sort of 
vernacular ventriloquism” (2002: 162). Evidence to support the idea that there is a 
formation of this vernacular ventriloquism is provided by Molek-Kozakowska, in which 
headlines used by the Daily Mail Online, use semantic structures and narrative formulas 
to package its content for their intended audience (Molek-Kozakowska, 2013). The 
notion of using language as part of a news outlet's identity is one that will be expanded 
upon in the next chapter. Finally, it should be noted that most of the studies and other 
literature discussed above is often based or focussed upon print or traditional broadcast 
journalism. 
2.4: Conclusion
In summation, this chapter has explored how emotion as a concept within the field of 
journalism has developed from being viewed as something that was antithetical to the 
practice of journalism due to its contrast with the assumed ideal of objectivity, towards 
something that can be seen as a vital element within various areas of journalism. A 
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clear way in which emotions can be seen to enter into a news story is through the 
manner in which they are framed. 
This chapter attempts to highlight how frames such as the conflict frame or human 
interest frame develop as part of the journalistic process and that the routines 
commonly adhered to by journalists, due to their credibility granting nature, allow such 
frames and thereby emotions to enter into news stories.
The debate around whether the use of emotion in journalism is a good or bad thing is 
acknowledged but it is contended that that is the wrong way to phrase the issue. Pantti 
(2010) suggests that a better way of considering the issue is “whether journalism uses 
emotions to make the story more attractive or uses emotions to evoke feeling and get 
better ratings” (2010: 177). Regardless of the benefits or downsides of employing 
emotion within journalism, this chapter does argue that the presence of emotion does at 
least impact journalism and most notably in two key ways.
Firstly, it has allowed for the development of different types of journalism by enabling 
different styles of reporting as well as allowing these styles to help create a news 
outlet’s sense of identity. The notion of newsroom identities being something that will be 
explored in subsequent chapters. The second key way emotion has impacted 
journalism is that it affects how an audience interprets the news as well as their ability to 
recall the news, through the utilisation of emotional language through framing.
Overall, the literature discussed in this chapter is important to the focus of this thesis for 
several reasons. The first is that it highlights how much existing research between 
emotions and journalism has been focussed on traditional news platforms and has 
neglected newer platforms. Secondly, this chapter provides context as to why it is 
important to understand the role that emotions play in the reporting of news due to the 
impact it can have on an audience. This opens the way for discussion during the 
analysis chapters regarding whether or not the use of emotions in framing a story make 
a positive or negative contribution towards the public sphere as if the employment of 
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emotions compels members of the public to engage with the story in some way, then 
this could be seen, at least on face value, as beneficial to the public sphere.
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CHAPTER 3: The news landscape, consumption trends and clickbait
Television as a medium through which news can be delivered has been heavily studied 
through a wide range of viewpoints. Its transformative nature regarding a society’s 
culture (Fiske, 1987), its influence on people’s patterns of behaviour (Meyrowitz, 1987) 
and its gradual commoditization (Crissell, 2006), are just a small illustration of existing 
scholarly work. However, due to advances in technology, there has been a shift in the 
news consumption habits of people, particularly younger people. Given these changes, 
the purpose of this chapter is to set out how the format of news content has changed 
over time and how the evolution in the style that news is presented can play a role in 
both the production and consumption of news content. This will be done with reference 
to the concept of polarization within the media and how a shift away from some of the 
ideals of the journalistic ideology outlined in chapter 1 has benefited some within the 
media.
A second aim of this chapter is to provide greater context around the role that the 
platform YouTube plays within the media ecosystem. This will be done by discussing 
the concepts of media hybridization and media convergence. The purpose of this will be 
to explore how journalistic institutions have adapted to both changes in technology and 
in society. Finally, this chapter will outline some of the existing literature on YouTube so 
as to help better situate this study within the field of communications research.
Before proceeding with these discussions, it is prudent to first provide the cultural 
context in which these discussions are situated given the largely Western nature of the 
institutions and audiences that are under review for this study.
3.1: Changes in news consumption
As technologies have progressed, the number of ways the public can consume news 
has increased. As high speed internet has become easier to access in the last decade 
in America, more and more people are able to seek out information online. In 2013, 
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50% of the American public cited the internet as their main source for both national and 
international news (Caumont, 2013), with it having overtaken radio back in 2003 and 
newspapers in 2008. When looking at younger demographics the percentage is even 
higher. Amongst 18-29 year olds, 71% say the internet is their main source of news, 
16% higher than TV. Amongst 30-49 year olds, both the internet and TV are on 63% 
(Caumont, 2013). These two demographic groups are important as these are the ones 
most targeted by advertisers and hence, are thereby the ones most sought after when it 
comes to audiences. Social media is also playing a larger role. The percent of the public 
that ever sees news on social networking sites had increased from 29% in 2010, to 47% 
in 2012 (Pew Research Center, 2012: 10). The growth of mobile technology has also 
had an impact on the way people consume news, with 78% reporting that they have 
used their smartphone to get news within the last week (American Press Institute, 
2014). Part of the growth in smartphone usage to consume news has been argued to be 
because it exploits gaps during the daily routine of most people where it had previously 
been unfeasible to access the news (Dimmick, Feaster & Hoplamazian, 2010). In terms 
of dedicated news websites, the total traffic for the top 25 news sites increased by 7.2% 
in 2012 (Pew Research Center, 2013). Of the major cable news network's websites, 
CNN was the most used as a news source at 14% whereas Fox was at 9% and MSNBC 
6% (Pew Research Center, 2012: 19). Whilst the statistics cited above are from an 
American context, similar trends regarding news consumption and use of the internet 
has been seen across many other Western countries (see Fisher et al, 2019; OFCOM, 
2019)
Other important trends regarding online news is that of advertising. This is an important 
trend to consider given the previous discussions about how the growth of advertising 
and commercialisation has been seen as detrimental towards the public sphere. In 2012 
digital advertising grew 17% to just over $37 billion and mobile adverts increased by 
80% (Pew Research Center, 2013). Whilst not all of this is geared towards news sites, 
native advertising, which is where an advert is designed to appear like natural content, 
increased by 56.1% in 2011 and 38.9% in 2012. News websites such as Forbes, 
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BuzzFeed and the Huffington Post have begun to more frequently use such advertising 
to boost revenue.
A further trend to note that is of particular importance to this thesis, is that of news video 
consumption online. Between 2012 and 2014, Americans have increased their total 
online video consumption from 13 minutes to 27 minutes a day (Bilton, 2014). Currently 
63% of Americans watch online video, with 36% watching news videos (Olmstead et al., 
2014). Also, when demographics are considered, the most sought after age group, 18-
29, has 48% of its group consuming online news videos. Considering the fact that most 
of the largest video hosting sites such as YouTube and Vimeo were founded in 2005 
and 2004 respectively, the growth in this method of news consumption is something to 
take note of. 
At first glance, it would appear that the numbers suggest that more and more people are 
choosing the internet as their source of news information. However, it is not just a 
simple case of people leaving traditional news sources in favour of more modern ones. 
Ahler (2006) has made the claim that the internet is not acting as a substitute, but rather 
as a compliment to other news sources. From his study, he concluded that the 
“migration of consumers from the traditional news media to the online news media has 
not happened. At least it has not happened to a magnitude that could be characterized 
as the collapsing of the traditional news media” (2006: 48). However, this study was 
conducted in 2006 and due to the fast paced evolution of technology and other factors, 
this study's claim could now be deemed in question. In 2013, 31% of Americans said 
that they have abandoned a particular news outlet because it no longer provided what 
they were looking for (Edna & Mitchell, 2013). 
One of the theorized ideas behind this shift towards more digital consumption is that 
online, there is more of an ability to personalize the news content that one receives. 
Personalization as defined by Thurman is “a form of user-to-system interactivity that 
uses a set of technological features to adapt the content, delivery and arrangement of a 
communication to individual users' explicitly registered and/or implicitly determined 
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preferences” (2011: 397). This takes the form of being able to subscribe to different 
channels on sites such as YouTube, or being able to choose a geographically relevant 
edition of a news website such as the Huffington Post. With news providers giving more 
ways to personalize an individual's news intake (Thurman, 2011), this links back to the 
idea that people will seek out news that reinforces their own beliefs (Bennett & Iyengar, 
2008; 2010). The ability for audiences to choose what sort of news they wish to 
consume can be seen as linking with the concept of news values discussed in chapter 
1, particularly in regards to Harcup & O’Neill’s value of ‘relevance’ which suggested that 
stories about issues, groups and nations  were deemed to be of more value relevant to 
the audience. (2001: 278–279).
A further point to make about shifting news consumption habits is how it affects the 
industry. With newspapers seeing a continuing fall in revenues and the overall 
workforce declining (Edmonds et al., 2013), more resources and journalists are being 
shifted into native digital news organizations. Websites such as BuzzFeed have 
increased their editorial employees from a handful to now over 170 (Jurkowitz, 2014). 
Local TV news websites have begun to embrace online video technology, with the 
majority of them having videos on their homepage and the ability to live stream their 
own YouTube channel (Olmstead et al., 2014). Whilst greater diversity and choice in the 
ways in which news can be consumed, as well as the outlets from which to consume 
from is on face value a good thing, there are some problems that the current trends can 
cause. Newspaper newsrooms are also changing with the number of editors saying that 
their duties in regards to videography and web-only editing increasing by 63% and 57% 
respectively in 2008 (Pew Research Center, 2008). Before discussing what the adoption 
of digital platforms has meant in regards to the academic approach to communication 
studies, it is first important to note how there are some unique aspects to digital media. 
Ones which afford journalistic institutions more issue to consider in the news making 
process as well as new lines of enquiry for researchers to pursue.
The growth of online media has allowed a new level of information when it comes to 
measuring how people consume their news. Metrics such as the total number of 
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individual people who visit a site, what articles or videos that they choose to look at and 
how long they spend on them can now all be measured (Deuze, 2003; Domingo, 2008). 
This is a noteworthy concept as previously in the age of just print and broadcast news, 
the ways in which news organisations could measure how the public use their product 
was limited to very obtuse ways such as the total number of newspapers sold or people 
watching a particular TV broadcast. Without the employment of researchers, news 
organisations had limited knowledge regarding how long a consumer spent on each 
individual article or whether they watched the entire broadcast or just the first 5 minutes. 
However, online media allows for far greater depth in understanding regarding trends in 
news consumption for news organisations. With the consumption of online news 
becoming ever more important (Newman, Dutton & Blank, 2012) due to its reach, the 
way these metrics are used can become of great importance. The reason being is that 
news outlets and their editors may begin to focus on articles or videos that will improve 
the metrics of their site, rather than focus on articles or videos that are more 
newsworthy. This shift is in essence a shift towards the news value of “audience 
targeting” that is proposed by Machin & Niblock (2006: 141), discussed in chapter 1.
Shoemaker & Vos make the point that “hard data about what readers want to read butts 
up against the social responsibility canon to give readers what they need to read” (2009: 
7). With metrics being an indicator of a successful article or video, at least in terms of 
financial value, there is an arguable incentive for news sites to follow the audience and 
give them more of what they want (Bright & Nicholls, 2014). In their study to see 
whether or not the metrics of an article influenced the likelihood of it being removed 
from a websites front page, Bright & Nicholls found that “being a most read article 
decreased the short-term likelihood of being removed from the front page by around 
25%” (2014: 170). This could have implications towards to role of online news 
audiences as those who more frequently visit a news site could influence which stories 
remain on the front page for viewers who less frequently visit a site. 
Another change to point out that has happened in the industry is the growth of clickbait. 
Clickbait is where the link to an article or video has a headline that encourages people 
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to click on it to see more by withholding crucial parts of information from the headline. 
The employment of clickbait headlines help drive traffic towards certain articles and it is 
commonly seen to be used for entertainment stories or soft news stories, rather than 
hard news stories. As mentioned above, this could be of importance as if soft news 
stories garner better metrics on a website, it may influence whether or not its visitors 
see other more newsworthy stories. Research by Ng & Zhao (2018) suggests that the 
employment of sensationalist headlines, invokes a type of human alarm system which is 
designed to make people pay attention to potentially threatening news such as natural 
disaster and thus is an effective method of getting the public to pay attention to a story. 
One metric used to measure the success of a piece of online content is the number of 
shares it gets and as Sambrook states, “sharing rewards sensation over authority, and 
encourages the clickbait online economy where it doesn’t matter if something is true or 
not, just as long as you click on it and advertisers can ride on the back of your curiosity.” 
(2017: 16). 
The relationship between the number of clicks a news article receives and the public’s 
actual interest in the story has been called into question by Kormelink & Meijer (2017). 
Through qualitative analysis of 56 participants, they contend that the term ‘interest’ is 
too crude a term to use in regards to why someone does or does not click on a news 
story link. They believe that there are a multitude of considerations ranging from 
cognitive, to affective, to pragmatic considerations that go into a users’ decision to click 
a news link (2017: 13). This is not to say that clickbait economy is therefore 
misunderstood. As Kormelink & Meijer state, their “argument is not that clicks are 
meaningless, they just capture a limited range of users’ interests or preferences.” (2017: 
14). They go on to suggest that whilst clicks are limited in their ability to capture of 
sense of users’ preference, other metrics that measure forms of user engagement may 
be more useful to academics and newsrooms alike as “they capture a broader array of 
digital user practices than only clicking.” (2017: 14).
Given all of the changes to the media ecosystem outlined thus far, one can now 
consider the question as to how the media has adapted and, in some instances, 
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enhanced these changes. One way of approaching this question is by discussing the 
concepts of media hybridization and convergence.
3.2 Media hybridization and convergence.
Chadwick, Dennis & Smith (2016: 10) defined a hybrid media system as one where 
interactions between: 
“Older and newer media logics—where logics are defined as bundles of 
technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational forms—in the 
reflexively connected social fields of media and politics. Actors in this system are 
articulated by complex and ever-evolving relationships based upon adaptation 
and interdependence and concentrations and diffusions of power. Actors create, 
tap, or steer information flows in ways that suit their goals and in ways that” 
modify, enable, or disable others’ agency, across and between a range of older 
and newer media settings.”
It can be said that today’s society has a hybrid media system as the interactions 
between old media logics and new media logics and be clearly seen. However, whilst it 
may be easier to spot the hybridization of media in the digital age, with examples such 
as how both CNN and YouTube jointly hosted a presidential debate in 2008, given by 
Chadwick et al (2016), the actual process is one that Chadwick argues began in the 
15th Century (Chadwick, 2013).
The concept of ‘new media’ has always been presented as an improvement on the 
existing method of delivering information. Chadwick gives the example of how the 
Gutenberg press, “made use of the conventions of the handwritten manuscript, but 
improved the handling of ink to enhance the legibility of texts” (2013: 24). Similar points 
can be made regarding the introduction of technologies like radio, television and the 
internet. However, it is not the case that there is a clear leap from one new media to the 
next. Fidler (cited in Chadwick, 2013: 24) uses the term ‘mediamorphosis’ wherein there 
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is a “continuum of transformations and adaptations…brought about by the complex 
interplay of perceived needs, competitive and political pressures, and social and 
technological innovations”. This is a key point as it illustrates how new media 
technologies are influenced by older media and thus, how these new media are used by 
both news producers and consumers. An example of how older media influences newer 
media can be seen in the close resemblance that news websites have to traditional print 
media. The positioning of elements such as the headline and by-line on news websites, 
along with how the genre of stories are segmented into their own categories such as 
‘sports’ can be seen to have been influenced by how traditional print media conducted 
its work.
One of the factors at play in the hybridization of the media is the gradual legitimization 
of the new media. Whilst Chadwick (2013) gives historical examples such as the use of 
electronic media during the early part of the 20th Century being legitimized by their use 
from professional elites in society, contemporary examples such as the legitimization of 
platforms like Twitter through their use by politicians (Karlsen. & Enjolras, 2016) shows 
that the hybridization of the media has been an ongoing process.
Whilst the media system is under continuous evolution, with new platforms and news 
organisations being created, one of the key aspects of this process is how existing, 
established organisations and individuals navigate this process. Chadwick (2013: 53), 
suggests that established organisations, both in print and television, have maintained 
their dominance within the media ecosystem, at least in the context of domestic election 
campaign news. Based on data from Pew Research (cited in Chadwick, 2013: 54) he 
contends that “first, older media in general have adapted and are now powerful players 
in online news; and second, American citizens increasingly use digital media to engage 
with campaign content that has originated in some way with television.” This second 
point is particularly relevant to this study and raises the of cross pollination in regards to 
how in the digital age, content on one platform is often repurposed for another.
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This term ‘cross pollination’ was coined by Jain et al (2013) and was directed towards 
the idea that content on one social media platform would inevitably be shared on other 
social media platforms. In their study they looked at how content from social media 
platforms, YouTube being one of them, diffused onto Twitter. They found that the 
popularity of content on one platform, did not dictate that it would also be popular on 
Twitter. Nonetheless, it could be argued that there is in fact cross pollination between 
social media platforms and traditional media platforms like TV. This is exemplified by TV 
news networks posting their TV content on social media platforms such as YouTube 
and also further exemplifies the hybridization of our media systems. Whilst some of the 
reasons for TV networks to do this are obvious, such as increased potential audience 
and increased potential revenue streams, another less obvious reasons lies in the idea 
of brand loyalty and trust in news organisations.
This combination of old and new media raises the concept of media convergence. 
According to Jenkins (2004), convergence is a process where there is an alteration of 
“the relationship between existing technologies, industries, markets, genres and 
audiences.” (Ibid: 34). What is important to note is that media convergence is not merely 
a shift in how technologies are used in the production of news, but is also concerned 
with changes in cultural consumption (Garcia Canclini, 2008). Jenkins gives the 
example of mobile phones which are now not simply just communication devices but 
“allow us to play games, download information from the internet and receive and send 
photographs or text messages.” (2004: 34), whereas Maxwell & Miller state that since 
the 1940s Hollywood has “produced actors and audiences alike accustomed to media 
convergence. Both groups routinely moved between radio, cinema and television, 
respectively leaving and deducing intertextual traces as they did so” (2011: 591-592). 
What these two examples illustrate, is that the process of media convergence is 
occurring on multiple levels within the media ecosystem.
The driving force behind media convergence can be seen to be happening at both the 
production and consumption ends of the media system. As Jenkins puts it, 
“Convergence is both a top-down corporate-driven process and a bottom-up consumer-
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driven process.” (2004: 37). Media organisations are seeking to broaden the 
opportunities for their content to be consumed, thereby reinforcing branding and 
financial opportunities, whereas public is aiming to gain greater control over the type of 
media that they consume. An example of this in action is seen in research by Chadwick, 
O’Loughlin & Vaccari (2017) who looked at the use of dual-screening when watching 
televised political debates. The use of social media whilst watching televised content 
“can lead to positive outcomes for democratic engagement beyond those who
are political “junkies”” (Ibid: 235). Media organisations are able to engage with the same 
audience across multiple platforms whereas at the same time, audiences are able to 
exert greater levels of political agency regarding their engagement with news content. 
An important consideration when it comes to media convergence is the impact that it 
has on news production within already established newsrooms. García Avilés et al 
(2009) have proposed that there are three models as to how convergence occurs in a 
newsroom: full integration, cross-media and co-ordination of isolated platforms. Each of 
these models entail different organisational structures and different work routines for the 
journalists involved. With García Avilés et al suggesting that the isolation model is not 
“forward looking” and “economically unsustainable” (2009: 300), the full integration 
model where multi-platform production is combined in a single newsroom, and the 
cross-media model where more than one media platform is simultaneously engaged in 
creating content, are suggested to be the most likely forms of newsroom organisation. 
The result of content being produced to be used on multiple platforms leads to a worry 
put forward by Owen in that “Television sets, tele-phones, and computers (and the 
networks that bind them) are or will become the same” (1999: 16). Alongside the 
concern that more skills and work are expected of individual journalists by their 
newsrooms (Wallace, 2013), there is also a concern that media convergence can lead 
to a uniformity of content within the media industry (Bennedik, 2003; Boczkowski, 2005; 
Erdal, 2009). Whilst this concern may have not been as substantial in the late part of the 
20th Century where media convergence could be seen as being limited to the merging of 
newspapers and TV stations such as where the purchasing of the LA Times by Tribune 
Co. who owned several TV stations in 2000, enabled newspaper reporters to appear on 
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television whilst TV reporters could write stories for the newspaper (Jin 2013), the 
growth of social media and other digital platforms potentially exacerbates the uniformity 
of content concern. As Negroponte has said, “When all media is digital . . . bits 
commingle effortlessly” (1996: 18) and this would suggest why many newsrooms have 
adopted platforms such as YouTube, due to the ease of which content they were 
already producing, could repurposed to reach different audiences.
Chadwick, O’Loughlin & Vaccari’s (2017) study on the use of dual-screening also 
highlighted a point made by Jenkins in that media convergence forces news 
organisations to rethink their own assumptions about how audiences consume media 
(2004: 37). The assumptions that audiences were passive, predictable and isolated 
individuals are changing to ones where the audience is more socially connected, more 
migratory and more active in taking the media into their own hands. It is partly for these 
reasons that this study views it as important to look at how new media platforms like 
YouTube are being used by both news organisations and audiences alike.
A further reason  stems from the decline of the public’s trust in the news media over the 
past few years, which has been well documented (Pew Research Center, 2018) with 
only 21% of Americans having “a lot of trust” in national news organisations (ibid: 17). 
This combined with the shifting news consumption trends detailed earlier could lead one 
to believe that there may be some irony in the notion that more people are getting their 
news online despite the fact that online news media is seen as less credible than TV 
news media  (Blöbaum, 2014: 40). However, due to the cross pollination of content 
within the hybrid media system many people may be engaging with news content that 
they are more familiar with and find more credible. However, with the trust of TV news 
brands such as CNN scoring higher levels of trust that digital news brands 
(Kalogeropoulos & Fletcher, 2018) one could argue that whilst the platform from which 
people are consuming the news may be changing, the actual content they are 
consuming is remaining somewhat the same. In essence, whereas people used to 
watch segments of news on TV, they are now watching those same segments but on 
digital platforms like YouTube. It is for this reason why this thesis considers it important 
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to look at the content of digitally native news networks like The Young Turks, so as to 
be able to make comparisons between digitally native content and content that has 
been cross pollinated from other platforms.
3.3: YouTube’s role in the media ecosystem
As discussed in the previous section, the development of new technologies often 
coincides with the creation of new “genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational forms” 
(Chadwick, Dennis & Smith 2016: 10). The speed of these changes is dependent upon 
many factors such as the technologies availability to the public, its legitimization by its 
initial uses and how, if at all, it is adopted by existing media organisations. This has 
certainly been the case with YouTube, which since its creation in 2005 has seen its role 
within the media ecosystem evolve as the aforementioned changes have occurred.
YouTube’s perceived role within the media ecosystem is reflected in early academic 
research on the platform, which saw it as something that was taking eyeballs away from 
newspapers and news websites (Moore, 2006), a space simply for sharing content 
(Bachmair & Bazalgette, 2007) and also as a picture source for traditional news 
channels (Loyn, 2007). These early works on YouTube can be seen as a product of 
their time in that the scope, utility and power of the platform had not been fully realised. 
This is to be expected with any new media platform that after a few years after its initial 
inception, go on to become vastly popular. Both the public and academic attitude to 
mediums such as television and radio developed overtime, and this is certainly the case 
with YouTube.
One way to consider the role that YouTube plays is through its relationship with the 
concept of the public sphere. When taking Habermas’ definition of the public sphere 
(1964: 49), Burgess & Green (2009, 77) have argued that YouTube is a “cultural public
sphere” because “it is an enabler of encounters with cultural differences and the 
development of political ‘listening’ across belief systems and identities”. What is being 
argued here is could be argued as also being applicable for other media technologies 
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such as television. If it were the case that YouTube was merely duplicate form of 
television, affording all the same benefits to the public sphere as traditional TV, then not 
only would much research on YouTube be indistinguishable from traditional TV 
research, it would also suggest that the process of media hybridization is absent or 
minimal at best when it comes to the platform of YouTube. This however is not the case 
as there are many unique qualities to YouTube that by there simply presence, alter the 
way in which YouTube impacts the public sphere.
An alternative way to consider YouTube’s role in the media ecosystem is by discussing 
how the new media logic that it brings with it, influences the norms and behaviours of 
older media logics. Given that the news media want their content to reach the greatest 
audience possible, one can consider the premise that traditional news organisations 
may alter the style or format of their content so that it better suits new media platforms 
like YouTube. Bishop (2018) makes the case through the example of fashion vloggers, 
that for women on YouTube, the platform “privileges and rewards feminized content 
deeply entwined with consumption, beauty, fashion, baking, friendships and boyfriends 
in the vein of the historical bedroom culture of the teenage magazine.” (Ibid: 69). With 
news organisations wanting to expand their audience, if certain styles of presenting the 
news, or discussing a particular topic thrive on YouTube, a suggestion could be made 
that in the future there may be evidence showing that traditional media platforms like 
cable news, adopt aspects of YouTube’s media logic and alter their content in terms of 
style and format knowing that doing so will better serve the content in terms of reaching 
a larger audience. There is already some evidence to suggest that social media 
platforms have influenced the format of how news is presented by traditional news 
organisations. Research by Welbers & Opgenhaffen (2019) concluded that there is a 
“shift towards a more subjective and positive style of communication of journalists on 
social media” (Ibid: 58).
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Another one of the distinct features that YouTube has is the ability for audiences to 
engage with the news content they are consuming. As there is a desire by academia, 
government and businesses to understand the public’s opinion on a wide range of 
topics (Thelwall, 2017), it is important to explore how YouTube enables greater levels of 
understanding through its mechanisms of user engagement.
3.4: User engagement
Past scholarly work on the concepts of the media and user engagement have taken a 
number of different interpretations of these two terms. With traditional visual media 
platforms such as television, the notion of engagement is often to do with something 
external to the media platform itself. Examples of this include how television influences 
an audience's civic or political engagement in society (Hooghe, 2002), how television 
stations interact with and perceive user generated content (Collistra et al, 2016) and 
how individuals appearing on television can engage with an audience so as to hold their 
interest (Parkin, 2009). These forms of engagement can be seen as external as the 
viewer is not directly engaging with the content being presented to them. The research 
discussed in this section deals with the concept of user engagement in a manner which 
views user engagement as being a direct interaction with the platform and content at 
hand, namely YouTube videos.
The capacity for direct engagement with news content is one of the unique and defining 
features of online news, particularly with more social platforms such as YouTube. It has 
been argued that “to engage is a new value, but not really a news value. This focus on 
the quality of interaction heralds change” (MacGregor, 2007: 293). From this, an idea 
that can be posited is that the success of a news video not only lies in its journalistic 
quality or adherence to journalistic news values, but now in the social media age, also 
on its ability to engage with its audience. The reason why it is increasingly important to 
study this area is that the idea of audience engagement has steadily become an 
attractive feature to marketers and advertisers and as Ksiazek et al states “with the 
challenges facing many news organizations, the ability of journalists to offer engaging 
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content to attract, or “pull,” users would seem to be more important than ever.” (2014: 
503). This argument also contributes to the idea that digital news platforms are 
beneficial to the public sphere in that not only are they acting as disseminators of 
information so that the public can make better informed decisions about their lives, but 
also that it provides a platform on which they can discuss this information help 
themselves and others better understand the information they have been given, all of 
which being components of Habermas’s concept of the public sphere. This idea is 
supported by Boulianne’s meta-analysis of research investigating the role the internet 
has on civic life in which there is “strong evidence against the Internet having a negative 
effect on engagement.” (2009: 193).
It should be noted that direct engagement with news content does not necessarily imply 
that there are tangible benefits that can be measured in society. Simply liking or 
commenting on a video in no way means that the public sphere has been improved in 
any way. One term that encapsulates this notion is slacktivism. Morozov (2009) defines 
slacktivism as an “apt term to describe feel-good online activism that has zero political 
or social impact.”. Whilst the negative connotations of the term have spread through 
both academic and activist circles James Dennis (2016) has argued that social media 
platforms “create new opportunities for cognitive engagement, discursive participation, 
and political mobilisation” (ibid: 261). The idea that simply clicking online has no impact 
when it comes to social change is rebutted by Dennis where he suggests that “member-
led, hybrid mobilization movements use social networking sites to provide a variety of 
substantive ways in which members can both shape and take part in campaigns.” (ibid: 
265). Although one could argue that there is a nuanced difference between liking or 
commenting on a news video on YouTube and liking or commenting on a Facebook 
post of an activist/campaigning group page, one can still contend that both actions are 
at least some form of engagement with civically important affairs and thus are actions 
that contribute towards the public sphere.
Whilst the idea of direct engagement with news content may be a unique feature of 
online news platforms, engagement, or sometimes referred to as participation, in a more 
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general sense has existed for some time. The fact that Habermas’ definition of the 
public sphere invokes notions of public participation in the opinion forming process, 
shows how the interaction between news media producers and consumers is a crucial 
part of any democratic society. The ability to take an active role in the news making 
process, or acts of citizen journalism (Allan & Thorsen, 2009) have been studied a 
significant amount in recent years. Studies looking at the audience engaging with the 
news in this manner have considered the problems around maintaining objectivity 
(Blaagaard, 2013), its potential democratizing effect (Meadows, 2012) amongst many 
other issues. But whilst the academic literature on the impact of the relationship 
between audience and news production is extensive, there has not been as much focus 
on how news content may impact the way in which the audience engages with and 
feedbacks on that content, specifically when it comes to platforms such as YouTube. 
There are suggestions that “spaces like YouTube lend themselves more readily to 
‘agonistic’ models of civility, which prioritize engagement over restraint and embrace 
conflict without violence (physical or symbolic), and which account for the ludic and 
carnivalesque dimensions of new digital environments.” (Goode & McKee, 2013: 115). 
This notion of YouTube being a platform that embraces conflict could be seen as a 
result of media hybridization wherein norms and behaviours from old media logics have 
transferred across to this new media platform and then matured and cultivated further. 
The origins of this will be explored later in this chapter. 
3.5: The content of user comments
Beginning with the content of the comments themselves, there are a number of factors 
to consider when discussing studies looking at the consistency of online user 
comments. The first is scope of the study as in whether or not it is looking at comment 
sections about one particular subject or if it looks at comments written about a broad 
range of subjects. Two studies that highlight this difference are by Santana (2015) and 
Kwon & Cho (2015). Kwon & Cho’s study looked at comments written across 26 news 
websites in South Korea and examined the difference in comments between articles of 
political and nonpolitical nature. This can be seen as a broad based approach to 
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studying online comments. Santana’s study on the other hand focused on news stories 
that dealt with issues around immigration from 3 websites. The reason for highlighting 
these two types of approach to comment sections is to underscore the point that 
breadth of content being looked at in a study affects the range of conclusions that can 
be drawn. A study such as that by Madden et al. (2013), which sought to categorize the 
types of comments found on YouTube videos can be deemed as taking a broad 
approach to studying online comments as it looked at comments across a range of 
types of YouTube video and because of this Madden et al were able to posit that there 
are “ten broad categories, and 58 subcategories which reflect the wide-ranging use of 
the YouTube comments facility.” (2013: 693). This sort of finding has more general use 
from which other studies can build upon whereas narrower studies like Santana’s 
(2015) limit research wishing to build upon it by having to either focus on another 
individual issue or on the same issue but on a different platform or from different 
sources. Previous chapters looked at comments in a broad sense in that they were 
looked at in a quantitative manner such as how various factors influenced the total 
number of comments on a video. However as this chapter is focusing on a small 
number of videos the conclusions that are likely to be drawn will be more nuanced and 
narrower in nature such as those by Santana.
A second factor to consider when looking at other research conducted on online user 
comments is whether or not they look at comments in a direct communicative sense. 
What is meant by this is whether or not each comment is viewed as being simply a 
direct communication between the user and the video content, or whether it is viewed 
as being part of a larger ecosystem of comments where they interact with one another. 
A study that illustrates the direct sense approach is by Tenenboim & Cohen (2013) 
which looked at the relationship the number of clicks an article received against the 
number of user comments written on each article. Their study simply looked at the raw 
number of user comments written. A more complex theoretical framework for studying 
user comments is put forward by Ksiazek et al (2014) in which a distinction is made 
between user-content comments and user-user comments. User-content interactivity is 
defined as “a user interacting with content and producers, such as posting an initial 
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comment to a video thread” whereas user-user interactivity is seen as “interactions 
among two or more users, such as a user replying to another comment already posted 
on the video thread by a different user.” (2014: 505). From the content producer's 
standpoint these two types of comments provide two different types of feedback. The 
former can be viewed as feedback directed towards the content producers whereas the 
latter provides a representative view of the conversation or debate between the 
commenters and ties in more closely with notions around the public sphere.
A third factor to consider is the nature of the comments themselves. There is a common 
perception that online comment sections are, or have the potential to become, very toxic 
in nature (Salter, 2017; Braithwaite, 2013). Toxicity online can be interpreted in a 
number of ways but it is commonly thought of in terms of an individual being toxic 
through their use of coarse or inflammatory language. When multiple toxic individuals 
interact within the same space, whether this is on an individual article or an entire 
forum, the environment of said article or video is said to be toxic. Having a toxic 
environment is something that news organisations and media platforms wish to avoid as 
toxic environments are not welcoming or appealing to the general public and this hurts 
their brand. Trying to keep comment sections benign or constructive in nature is a goal 
that most media platforms aim to achieve. This is evidenced in a number of ways. Firstly 
many large news websites employ comment section moderators to in effect police what 
users are writing. Secondly, when the reputation of an online comment platform 
becomes toxic, the platform often tries to rectify this. An example of this is highlighted in 
Massanari’s (2015) study of Reddit.com which had become known as a hub for what 
she described as anti-feminist “toxic technocultures” such as Gamergate and The 
Fappening. Her study notes that during the research for it, Reddit.com introduced new 
policies that discouraged harassment and other toxic behaviours on its website. A final 
way that online platforms try to stem toxic environments from developing is by simply 
denying users the ability to comment. Examples of this include Reddit.com shutting 
down entire forums on the site that were deemed too toxic (Bell, 2017) and also various 
YouTube channels denying users the ability to comment on either certain, or all videos 
uploaded on a channel (Jaworski, 2014).
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Having a precise definition of what constitutes a toxic comment is difficult to pin down as 
often it is subjective in nature and open to interpretation. However, toxicity or at least 
elements of it are not always a bad thing when it comes to developing the public sphere 
or furthering discussions around a particular topic. The use of coarse language, 
particularly swearing can have positive effects. The study by Kwon & Cho (2015) 
mentioned earlier, whilst looking at comments across a broad range of news websites, 
was specifically looking at the effect swearing had on user-user comments on news 
articles. Their findings were suggestive towards “positive effects of swearing on 
increasing the public’s attention and perception toward the comments” (2015: 99) and 
that “an acceptable degree of swearing norms in online discussions vary across news 
topical arenas.” (2015: 84). One of the ways to illuminate why there are toxic 
environments online is to consider who is actually writing the toxic comments in the first 
place and why.
3.6: Who writes the comments and why?
Commenting on online content is one of the most popular ways in which the public can 
participate and interact with the news. However, questions arise around who is actually 
writing the comments under news articles and YouTube videos and what is prompting 
them to do so. Wu & Atkin (2016) studied the personality traits of individuals to see what 
sort of person is more likely to comment on online news. They found that those who had 
more agreeable and narcissistic personalities were more motivated to write online 
comments. The motivations for commenting ranged from “informing, getting feedback 
and exhibitionism” (2016: 61). As well as personal factors that cause a person to 
comment, there are also factors that can be attributed to the content that the comments 
are being written about. Weber’s (2013) study hypothesized that the news factors, these 
being one based on Galtung & Ruge’s theory of newsworthiness, would influence the 
amount of participation in regards to comments on a news story. He found that “news 
factors contribute to explaining the number of readers who post at least one comment 
and to explaining the average number of comments posted per commentator.” (2013: 
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952). The 4 factors Weber highlights as contributing towards the likelihood of a user 
commenting on a story were proximity, impact, continuity and facticity. The factor of 
facticity is worth highlighting for this study’s purpose due to the nature of content that is 
being looked at. Many of the YouTube videos in the data sample, most notably those 
from TYT, contain as Weber puts it, “analysis and journalistic appraisals of a news 
event (and thereby being low in facticity)” (2013: 952). The dialogic nature of a video 
would according to Weber, increase the likelihood of a user writing a comment.
Whilst not everyone who uses the internet as a news source will write a comment, 
studies suggest around 30% of users do (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 2013; 
Goodier, 2012). A key note to these studies is that they are several years old and with 
the consistent rise of mobile internet technology, websites like Reddit.com and 
traditional news organisations adopting online comment section policies to encourage 
engagement, the proportion of people commenting on news stories has likely increased. 
Surveys have shown that men are more likely to comment on news stories than women 
(Meyer & Carey, 2015) and this does link back to Massanari’s study mentioned earlier 
where anti-feminism tends to be one of the more prominent toxic subcultures in 
comment forums. Trying to research precise demographics when it comes to who writes 
comments on news articles often comes across one main problem. Many news 
websites and social media platforms allow a large degree of anonymity.
Within academia there is an ongoing debate around whether anonymity is an overall net 
positive when it comes to online communication. The assumption that is often held is 
that a platform that allows users to remain anonymous helps promote toxic behaviours 
such as aggression and violence due to the perceived lack of consequences. Whilst 
there is research that supports this claim (Zimbardo, 1969; Suler, 2005), there is also 
other work that goes some way to countering it such as by Rost, Stahel & Frey (2016), 
which found that users who were open about their identity were more likely to be 
aggressive online than their anonymous counterparts. The benefits of anonymity have 
also been well documented in scholarly research. As well as potentially promoting 
positive behaviours such as intimacy and openness, (Peddinti et al., 2014; Zhang & 
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Kizilcec, 2014), anonymity allows for identity exploration (Graafland, 2018) as well as 
encouraging participation (Kasakowskij et al., 2018). This final benefit is a critical one 
given the context of news content on a platform like YouTube. Kasakowskij et al’s study 
makes the distinction between anonymous and non-anonymous platforms wherein the 
latter has users that “are clearly identifiable by their real name or pseudonym” (2018: 
27), which YouTube would fall under. The study goes on to suggest that anonymity 
plays a far greater role depending on the type of user participation, with users being 
more willing to write and respond to comments when they are anonymous, but with 
anonymity having little impact when it came to users simply ‘liking’ something on the 
platform. As they explain it, this is to be expected “since posts are considered much 
more personal statements than reviews in the form of likes or votes” (2018: 34). As 
YouTube is a non-anonymous platform that allows for both types of user participation, 
one would expect to see a similar pattern in terms of the levels of user engagement 
across these different types. It should of course be noted that despite YouTube 
requiring some sort of identification before a comment is made by a user, there is 
nothing stopping them from setting up a false account with a pseudonym so that they 
can still make comments ‘anonymously’ (Holmes, 2017).
Before proceeding to discuss what impact user comments may have on journalism it is 
first worth considering why members of the public write comments online. Whilst it has 
already been mentioned that there are personality traits that may explain why some 
people are more likely to comment than others (Wu & Atkin, 2016), one can look 
beyond these and consider the broader motivations of online commenters. Research by 
Blumler & McQuail (1969) and Ruggiero (2000) suggest that there is a strong 
correlation between media use and gratification and as Ancu & Cozma (2009) note, 
online media is particularly well suited for this due to its interactive features such as 
control over content and communication tools. Although limited to the social networking 
site MySpace, Ancu & Cozma’s research found that these online spaces “mainly gratify 
visitors’ need for social interaction” as well as “information-seeking and entertainment 
needs.” (2009: 578) being secondary motives. By having the capability to allow social 
interaction as well as provide important information, YouTube acts as an ideal platform 
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to meet the user’s perception that their online behaviour “is an effective means of 
communicating information to others” (Hoffman et al., 2013: 2256).
3.7: What impact do user comments have?
There are a number of ways in which user comments impact the journalism industry. 
One such way is the impact they have on a news outlets credibility. This is certainly an 
important area of impact due to recent trends of increasing distrust in the news media 
as a whole as discussed in previous chapters. Conlin & Roberts (2017) asked the 
question of whether the presence of comments and the amount of which are read by a 
user, affect their perceptions of the credibility of the messenger (i.e. news outlet). They 
found that “news that is presented in a way that is more associated with traditional news 
outlets—news without comments directly next to the story—is perceived as more 
credible.” (2017: 373). This conclusion also factored in variables such as the type of 
commenting system being used as well as the type of moderation the news outlet was 
employing. Whilst there were some limitations with the study such as the age of the 
participants and it being set in experimental conditions, the conclusion that the mere 
presence of other users comments, regardless of what those comments are, has a 
negative impact on how news credibility is perceived is a note of concern. Conlin & 
Roberts’ (2017) conclusion is supported by the work of Houston et al (2011) which 
looked at the influence of user comments on perceptions of media bias. Whilst their 
study was limited to looking at stories about presidential candidates in America, their 
data did suggest that “user comments accompanying online content can influence 
perceptions of that content.” (2011: 88). In conjunction, these two studies highlight that 
the impact of user comments can be viewed both from the news outlets side as well as 
from the audience’s side.
As well as having an impact on how the audience perceives a news outlet or story, the 
presence of user comments also has an impact directly on the journalists themselves. A 
study by Santana (2011) found that nearly 70% of the journalists he interviewed felt that 
user comments had in some way changed their thinking about the newsworthiness of a 
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topic. Santana also found that user comments altered the way journalists do their job in 
some way such as including more sources, more facts or being more cognisant of their 
word choice. When this is combined with the fact that “more than 98 percent of 
reporters who responded said they read the online comments at their newspapers at 
some level” (Santana, 2011: 73), this means that user comments are having a profound 
role in the news content the public receives. These numbers are made more interesting 
by Santana’s other finding that only 15% of journalists either agreed or strongly agreed 
that user comments promoted thoughtful discussion. So whilst the majority of journalists 
find user comments unhelpful in having a civil dialogue with their audience, something 
that also links back to the earlier discussion around toxic comments, they still find them 
useful when it comes to story ideas or shaping the content they put in their stories. The 
findings by Santana somewhat reflects the views of journalists that were found in 
research conducted by Nielsen (2012) in which journalists expressed “support for 
readers' ability to comment on articles” (2012: 96).
Despite user comments being perceived as a way of seeking attention, being vulgar in 
nature or as a method of harassment, the consensus among journalists appears to be 
that they would rather put up with the negative aspects that come with comment 
sections than do without them at all. Research by Santana (2011), Nielsen (2012), 
Tenenboim & Cohen (2013), Almgren & Olsson (2015) and Krebs & Lischka (2017) all 
indicate that news outlets and journalists are aware of both the negative and positive 
impacts of user comments and overall see them as at worst being “neither directly 
beneficial nor harmful for online news brands” (Krebs & Lischka, 2017: 1) and at best a 
way to “improve reader-journalist interaction, which would - as this research has shown 
- improve the quality of journalism.” (Santana, 2011: 78).
3.8: YouTube metrics
With the news industry being as competitive as ever, news organisations are keen to 
understand what the public wants in terms of the news content they receive. One way in 
which they can begin to understand these wants, is to look at the direct engagement 
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and feedback their content receives, and this is far easier to do on platforms such as 
YouTube. With the type of user engagement detailed above being one of the unique 
aspects of YouTube as a news platform, it is important to consider the role that the 
quantifiable nature that the engagement takes form of has, regarding both consumers 
and content producers standpoint.
On YouTube, there are four key metrics that are publicly available for each video. The 
number of people who have viewed the video, the number of people who have clicked 
either the like or dislike button on the video and the number of comments that have 
been written by viewers on the video. Whilst views, likes, dislikes and comments all can 
be deemed as measures of user engagement it is important to highlight the differences 
between them. Whilst they are all in some way, a way to measure the extent to which a 
video has been engaged with, the metric or act of ‘viewing’ can be seen as being the 
most passive form of engagement as it requires the least amount of effort on the part of 
the audience. The act of ‘liking’ or commenting on a video can be seen as a more active 
form of engagement given the extra effort required on the part of the audience for these 
metrics to register. The existing body of work around the use of comment sections 
online (Nagar, 2011; Larsson, 2011) demonstrates that active engagement is a metric to 
be valued by academics just as much as other measurements of engagement. One 
notable study that deals with these concepts of passive and active engagement as 
described above is by Tenenboim & Cohen (2013) in which they examined the 
relationship between the number of comments and number of clicks on over 15,000 
online written articles over 5 years. Their study found that the most clicked articles 
tended to have the most sensational content whereas the more political or controversial 
articles had more comments on them. The argument that more controversial news 
content garners more comments is supported by Weber (2013) and also by the trend in 
communications research where many studies focusing on comment sections analyse 
controversial topics such as science (Secko et al, 2011) and politics (Stroud et al, 
2016). 
93
As well as considering how the metric of a video on YouTube may help inform content 
producers as to what types of content is getting the most audience attention, it is also 
important to discuss the role these metrics play in determining what content the public 
actually receives. Unlike traditional media platforms where content producers have a 
great degree of control over what content the audience sees/hears, (For example when 
the public watches CNN, CNN controls what is seen on their channel), on YouTube, 
news media organisations have far less control over what the public is subjected to. 
This is due to YouTube’s algorithm that plays a central role in what sort of videos are 
promoted towards its users.
The precise nature of YouTube’s algorithm is protected and hidden by Google which 
has led content creators to “develop their own theories about how things work, and 
academics are left attempting to imitate and recreate these systems from the outside.” 
(Lewis, cited in Stokel-Walker, 2019). Prior to 2012, YouTube ranked videos simply 
based on the number of views that they had received, before transitioning in 2012, to 
using both view duration and time spent on the platform as a means of determining 
which videos would get promoted (Cooper, 2019). Over subsequent years, YouTube 
has gradually changed its algorithm in response to various factors such as its perceived 
promotion of radical right-wing content (Lewis, 2019) and trying to raise more 
authoritative voices (YouTube, 2019). The opaque nature of YouTube’s algorithm, 
coupled with possibility it can change on a regular basis, has forced content creators to 
experiment with ways in how best to ‘game’ the system into promoting their content over 
others. One manner in which this has taken form is by leaning upon old media norms 
found in print media by utilizing sensationalist video titles in the hopes of gaining the 
attention of the public (Ng & Zhao, 2018) and thereby increasing the metrics of their 
video which will subsequently be further promoted by the algorithm. There is evidence 
to suggest that by adopting old media logics such as the use of clickbait, can be 
effective and increasing a videos popularity as YouTube’s recommendations algorithm 
is susceptible to these tactics (Zannettou et al, 2018) Although it would seem that the 
amount of comments digital content receives is an important metric in determining the 
success of the content, at least from a content producers standpoint, research by 
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Pendersen (2019) which focused on hobbyist YouTubers, indicates otherwise. By 
interviewing YouTubers who were actively producing content and had fewer than 1 
million subscribers, she found out of 13 possible algorithmic features on YouTube, 
comments were deemed only the 10th most important factor in determining the success 
of a video (Ibid: 20).
Another way content creators can influence the algorithm is through the use of effective 
thumbnails for their videos. A video thumbnail is an image used for a video that is 
supposed to represent the type of content within the video (Hurst et al, 2011). These 
can be automatically generated by YouTube itself or content creators can make their 
own custom thumbnails. Although the style of image used on platforms like YouTube 
may differ from traditional platforms, such as by being intentionally ugly (Douglas, 
2014), once again this is an illustration of old media logics being used on new media 
platforms as the use of images to attract an audience’s attention has been well 
researched (see Knox. 2009; Miller & Roberts, 2010; Lockyer & Attwood, 2009). The 
impact that thumbnails have on YouTube’s algorithm and subsequently the level of user 
engagement is hard to determine given the little systematic empirical research on this 
precise issue. Whilst comparisons could potentially be drawn from similar but broader 
areas such as the effectiveness of types of images in getting an audience’s attention 
(Mortensen, 2015), research by Heusner et al (2019) that looked specifically at the use 
of typography within YouTube thumbnails, found that “typography does not have a 
direct correlation with number of views or subscribers” (Ibid: 12). This finding does 
however contrast somewhat with the work of Pendersen (2019) who through her 
interviews found that a YouTube video’s thumbnail was seen as the second most 
important factor in determining the success of a video.
In sum, it is incredibly hard to predict what level of importance should be afforded to 
each metric that is analysed by YouTube’s algorithm. As well as some of the elements 
raised above, Covington (2016: 15) points out that elements such as ‘freshness’, this 
being the balancing of new content with well-established videos, as well as the historical 
95
behaviour of users on the platform are difficult factors for both content creators and 
researchers to predict. 
3.9: Cable News Landscape
Many of the studies discussed in this chapter so far, deal with the notion of engagement 
in terms of how the public interacts with digital content, often on their own networks 
native website. However, given the domination that certain media organisations already 
have on existing platforms, combined with YouTube’s recent push to prioritize 
authoritative voices, including news sources like CNN and Fox News (YouTube, 2019), 
it is important to understand where a lot of news content on YouTube is originating from.
The passage of the Cable Franchise Policy and Communications Act of 1984 in 
America had a twofold effect on TV news environment. The first was that it allowed the 
emergence of new, dedicated 24-hour news channels. The second effect was that these 
new channels diminished the power of the three large broadcast networks, namely 
ABC, CBS and NBC (Morris, 2009). This increase in competition within the TV news 
landscape can be seen as taking place in three main phases, the first occurring with the 
introduction of CNN in 1980 followed by a race for “transnational reach and influence” 
(Cushion, 2010: 19) and finally a “regionalization of 24-hour news channels on a global 
scale” (2010: 24), which is the third phase that we are currently in. 
The success of CNN in America during this first phase, through the reporting of events 
such as the Challenger space shuttle disaster paved the way for other 24-hour news 
networks to enter the American news market (Rai & Cottle, 2007), most notably, 
MSNBC and Fox News. These three were and still remain the dominant 24-hour news 
networks on cable TV in America as is seen by their viewing figures (Pew Research 
Center, 2014a). It is important to note that whilst there are now hundreds of news 
channels across the world, only a minority of these are global in reach whereas the rest 
deal with only regional or national matters (Rai & Cottle, 2007). 
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The advantages of having 24-hour rolling news are clear to be seen when certain global 
events happen. These advantages can be seen both in terms of the public sphere 
whereby a constant stream of information helps better inform the public and in terms of 
the organisations themselves regarding the economic opportunities that are opened up. 
The attack on the Twin Towers in 2001 or Indonesian tsunami in 2004 highlighted the 
networks ability to break news as well as showcased the usefulness of constant news 
coverage (Fertig et al, 2005). However, whilst big news leads to big audiences, (Shaw, 
2003) there is often not a natural disaster or other globally significant event happening 
and so as a 24-hour news channel, that time must be filled with something else. This is 
something that other TV networks in that market such as NBC or ABC do not have to 
deal with as whilst they do have news programming on their schedule, it is not all day 
long as they also air entertainment or sports programs as well. 
Due to increased competition, both from other networks as well as from external 
sources such as the internet, the demand for profit to be made from the main three 
cable news networks is becoming an ever increasing challenge (Gunther, 1999). The 
predominate two ways in which the networks make money is through cable 
subscriptions and advertising (Weprin, 2010) and so the most important thing for these 
networks, financially speaking, is their viewing figures, which is to say how many people 
are tuning in and watching their channel. For any TV channel or show to gain viewers, it 
must appeal towards a certain demographic within society. Whilst certain news topics 
may not be inherently appealing in and of themselves, the angle and delivery of the 
topic may appeal more to some than to others.
There have been many arguments made both for and against the notion that people 
seek out news sources that reinforce their already existing beliefs and views when it 
comes to political topics (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, 2010; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; 
Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010) and this is for all mediums, not just in TV news. 
However, despite online news growing as the main source of news for people, TV is still 
the main source for most people (Bialik & Matsa, 2017) and as discussed earlier in 
relation to cross pollination of content, a lot of TV content makes its way onto other 
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platforms such as YouTube. Due to this possibility, it is important the environment in 
which this content is created, is explored. The reason for the focus on the US landscape 
in particular is due to the fact it is considered one of the most polarized media 
environments in the world (Edkins, 2017).
With a purportedly diverse range of media outlets (Holbert, Hmielowski & Weeks, 2012), 
people are able to consume the type of news that they want. The steady rise in 
viewership for CNN, MSNBC and Fox News, combined with a drop in figures for the 
other three major broadcast networks in America, has led scholars to suggest that 
audiences are now preferring more ideologically oriented news (Bennett & Iyengar, 
2008; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). To understand how the current landscape of the 
American cable news networks came to be, one must understand the political 
landscape first.
Historically, America has always been a two party system with the Democrats 
representing one side of the aisle and Republicans the other. Often in two party 
systems, one is considered the social party, in which it supports labour movements and 
government spending on education whereas the other is more focussed on issues of 
defence (Lane, 1955). In America, the former is the Democratic Party and the latter is 
the Republican Party. Whilst both parties have changed significantly since their 
conception in the late 18th Century, they both still hold opposing views on many topics. 
Issues such as taxes, regulation, separation of church and state, welfare and gun 
control often divide people down party lines when polled (See Pew Research Center, 
2011b; Saad, 2014). Many Americans however often do not wish to label themselves as 
simply belonging to either one party or the other, and studies show that when it comes 
to ideology, there are sub-categories under each umbrella label of each party (Pew 
Research Center, 2011a). Not only do politicians have to be mindful of these 
subcategories of ideologies when running for office, but arguably news networks must 
be as well when seeking viewers.
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The reason for the networks needing to be mindful of these various categories of 
ideologies is that their viewing figures can be seen to be dependent upon it. There are 
numerous empirical studies that show that when given a choice, people tend to 
consume information that supports their own views and beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & 
Meng, 2009; Mutz, 2006; Stroud, 2007, 2008). Whilst these studies suggest that people 
“prefer information that reflects their pre-existing political beliefs” (Holbert, Hmielowski & 
Weeks, 2012: 197), it does not suggest that people actively avoid information that is 
counter to their beliefs. Studies by Garret (2009a, 2009b) show that people who are 
able to control the information that they receive do not reduce the amount of information 
that would challenge their already held views and nor do they completely disregard 
opinion challenging stories. A study by Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng found that 
“selection of counterattitudinal articles was more likely among participants with greater 
interest in politics, conservative party preference, stronger party preference, more 
accessible attitudes and higher attitude importance” (2009: 426). If it is the case then, 
that people are drawn towards information that is either in support of their views, or 
directly counter to it, then it would lend some support towards the reasoning behind why 
the cable news networks have become more polarized in their presentation of 
information. This then begs the question as to whether or not the cable news networks 
have become more polarized since their creation. In the context of American politics, 
polarization is the term used to describe the acute division between opposing groups on 
any given topic. Bennett & Iyengar (2010) have argued that polarization has become 
more prevalent in news content in recent years as well as that it has caused the public's 
attitude towards politics to change as well (Holbert et al, 2010). 
3.10: Polarization
It has been strongly argued that politics in America has become polarized, largely in 
part to the two party system that dominates the country (Wang, 2014). Polarization 
across party lines can be seen most clearly when it comes to voting within and for the 
House of Representatives (Born, 2007; Jones, 2001). Both within academic research 
and by commentators, it has been noted that whilst polarization has always existed in 
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some form, it has increased in the last decade both amongst politicians and the public 
(Hetherington, 2001; Jacobson, 2004, 2005; Layman et al, 2010, Desilver, 2014). One 
way to illustrate how the public has become more ideologically polarized is to look at the 
shift away from the ideological political centre. Abramowitz (2010) found that from 
around the mid-1980s the percentage of people who were in the ideological centre
decreased from 41% to currently 28%. Pew Research Center (2014b) has also found 
that there has been a decrease in the overlap of ideologies between both parties, with 
Democrats shifting to the left and Republicans shifting to the right. The degree to which 
the public has become polarized is still in dispute (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008), however 
the fact that there is at least some polarization still remains. Work by Davis & Dunaway 
(2016) as well as Bennett (2012), suggests that trends in the decline of group loyalties, 
growing party polarization and the fragmentation of the media all contribute towards the 
nature of the media content that is produced, at least in a Westernised setting. Given 
this, two questions to consider are how and why the media has contributed towards the 
current environment.
One way in which polarization could be looked at is the extremity of language being 
used by the media to create this polarization. Some evidence suggests that popular 
news media formats use a large amount of inflammatory language, insults and negative 
exaggerations (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011) and create multiples instance of outrage per 
hour (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). However, research by Prior indicates that “evidence 
for a causal link between more partisan messages and changing attitudes or behaviors 
is mixed at best.” (2013: 101). Prior goes on to suggest that strong partisan messaging 
by news organisations is likely only going to effect a small segment of the public as 
“perhaps 10–15% of Americans watch a considerable amount of cable news. A majority 
of these “news junkies” appears to specialize in one of the three cable news channels 
and select mostly ideologically matching content on other media.” (ibid: 122). If it is the 
case that these “news junkies” are seeking out ideological affirming news content which 
may be laced with intentionally polarising messaging, it could be suggested that these 
people would also be doing so on other platforms outside of cable news, namely, places 
such as YouTube.  
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It should be noted that polarization can occur across many lines and most scholarly 
attention has been given to the conservative/liberal divide in America when looking at 
news content (see Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005). However, a 
recent study by McCluskey & Kim (2012), sought to answer the question of whether or 
not news content, specifically in print media, favoured polarized political views over 
more moderate ones. Through their analysis of interviews with advocacy groups and 
over 4000 newspaper articles, they found that there was “more evidence of polarization 
than moderatism in the representation of advocacy groups’ ideology in news” and that 
“in analyses of presence and tone, polarized groups had favourable treatment more 
often than moderates” (2012: 574). When this is factored in along with Kuklinski & 
Sigelman's (1992) study in which senators that had more extreme views received 
greater air time on TV news networks than more moderate senators, an argument can 
be made that there appears to be, at least in part, some effort within the media when 
covering politics, to favour more polarizing views. If this is indeed the case then it also 
needs to be looked at whether this is also true on non-traditional news platforms like 
YouTube.
A counter argument to this can be made by looking at studies by Schiffer (2002) and 
Croteau & Hoynes (1994) in which both found that the Washington Post and TV 
commentary program Nightline respectively, favoured people and topics that 
represented moderate and centrist political positions. As Schiffer noted “the norm of 
moderation helps journalists set the ideological boundaries, outside of which a senator 
ventures at the expense of issue association.” (2002: 18). From existing academic 
research on the question of whether or not the media favours representing extreme or 
moderate political positions, the evidence remains inconclusive due to the small number 
of specific studies, their contradictory data and the difficulty in defining what moderate 
political positions are in an ever changing politically engaged society. However, the 
inconclusive answer to this question does not mean that the news media in America has 
not become polarized in other ways, such as directly across party lines.
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With the ever lowering costs and new technologies, a more diverse media landscape 
has been able to develop. Bennet & Iyengar (2008) have suggested that due to this, 
people are now able to choose the type of news that most closely reflects their own 
beliefs. As mentioned earlier, whilst this is not necessarily true (see Knobloch-
Westerwick & Meng, 2009), there is still an economic incentive for the news media to 
cater for a polarized public. If the news media has not according to current research 
polarized along moderate/extreme lines, has it done so across party lines? A different 
way of phrasing this question, is whether or not different news content providers have 
chosen to support either of the two main political parties in America? Whilst similar 
questions could be asked of other countries, a focus on America is prudent in relation to 
this thesis for two reasons. The first is that as detailed above, America is seen as 
having one of the most polarized media landscapes in the world (Edkins, 2017) and 
hence any trends or relationships may be clearer to see. Secondly, it is because this 
thesis intends to look at networks whose main audience is based in America and who 
cover American affairs.
3.11: Media Bias
There is a widespread notion in American politics that the mainstream media is slanted 
in favour towards centre-left ideologies. During the 2012 election, a national poll found 
that 59% of voters believed that Obama had received better treatment by the media 
compared with just 18% thinking that his opponent Romney had received better media 
treatment (Rassmusen Reports, 2012). This perceived notion of 'liberal bias' has been 
illustrated by Entman who showed that a search in the academic newspaper database 
Lexis-Nexis, for the term 'liberal media' returned “2825 items over the three years from 1 
January 2006 to 31 December 2008” (2010: 390). However, a search for 'conservative 
media' over the same time period returned only 755 items. Entman also found that 
“searching directly for liberal or conservative ‘bias’ yields an even greater chasm, with 
almost eight claims of left-leaning bias for every one of rightward bias” (2010: 390). 
Similarly the perception of the media being liberally biased is supported by Watts et al 
(1999) who show that this perception is not a new phenomenon . All this shows 
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however, is that within the media, or at least newspapers in Entman’s case, that there is 
a perceived bias towards liberal ideas. It is not evidence for actual bias.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, framing forms an important part of journalism and 
it is through the process of framing that biases may come about. However, before 
linking framing to bias, a distinction should be made between the use of the terms bias 
and slant. This distinction is important as often times those in the media will label 
something biased when they in fact mean slant. A slanted news report is one in which 
emphasis is placed upon one side's favoured frame whilst ignoring or disparaging the 
other side in a political conflict (Entman, 2010). The slanting of a report prompts the 
audience to give greater attention towards the favoured side of the conflict. 
Bias itself is a slightly different concept, one that can be broken down into two separate 
terms, content bias and decision-making bias. Content bias, as defined by Entman is 
the “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication that promote the 
influence of one side in conflicts over the use of government power” (2007: 166). It is 
the consistent slanting of news in favour of one side that creates the bias and so to be 
able to show the existence of bias within the media, one must find evidence of this 
consistent slant. Decision-making bias is where there is “the influence of journalists’ 
belief systems on the texts they produce” (Entman, 2010: 393). What this entails is that 
the beliefs and ideologies of those who work at news networks, shapes the way in 
which they make decisions about stories such as whether or not to include them. This 
concept links back to the previous chapter’s discussion around the concept of 
journalistic routines and the role they play in the news making process.
To establish if content bias exists, one would have to provide evidence that there is a 
pattern in which the content is regularly slanted to one side or another. Given an 
American political context, this slanting is most likely to occur either in favour of the 
Democrats or the Republicans (Bennet, 1990; Entman, 2004).
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One study that suggests that there is little evidence for news media bias is by David 
Niven (2003), which looked at newspaper coverage of congressional party switchers. 
Niven found that despite their being “countless others who believe in a pro-liberal, pro-
Democratic media bias” (2003: 322) there was in fact very little evidence that national 
newspapers favoured one party or the other when it came to the issue of Congressmen 
who switch from one party to the other. However, when it comes to news networks in 
general rather than on a specific issue, there is much greater support for the notion of 
media content-bias. Groseclose & Milyo (2005) did a comprehensive study across 
multiple news outlets and found that aside from Fox News' Special Report and the 
Washington Times, all other outlets scored either the same or to the left of the average 
member of Congress. In order to measure the size of the slant, Groseclose & Milyo 
looked at the times each media outlet cited various think tanks and advocacy groups 
and then compared that with the number of times members of Congress cite the same 
groups. This study's findings point towards the notion that there is in fact an overall 
liberal bias when it comes to the news media. This combined with the fact Washington 
correspondents are generally more left-leaning voters (Povich, 1996; Lichter, Rothman, 
& Lichter, 1986), further cements the 'liberal-media' idea. These last two studies 
however should not be given any great persuasive weight on this issue as pointed out in 
a previous chapter, studies have shown that if anything, journalists may 
overcompensate any self-perceived bias they may have in their reporting (Drew, 1975). 
Further support for the notion of a liberally biased media is through Hamilton's (2004) 
analysis of Pew Center surveys. Whilst on its surface it seems that those of a 
conservative disposition perceive a liberal bias in the media and those of a liberal 
disposition see a conservative bias, Hamilton points out that people are more inclined to 
perceive a bias in the media when the further slant of the news is to their own 
ideological position. As the Pew Center surveys that Hamilton looked at showed that 
those of a conservative disposition saw a bias in the media more so than liberals, this 
also suggests that there is evidence of a liberal bias.
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Even more evidence of bias in the media is provided by studies by Lott & Hassett 
(2004), which shows how nine of the ten newspapers they examined were more likely to 
give negative headlines regarding economic news if the President is Republican, and 
also a study by Weatherly et al. (2007) which looked at the headlines of CNN and Fox 
News website articles during 2 months of the 2004 presidential campaign. Again, this 
study found that overall “CNN tilted more to the left than did Fox News” and that “the 
headlines from Fox News were rated slightly on the liberal side of neutral” (2007: 97). 
Another study looking specifically at the potential biases between CNN and Fox News 
by Morris & Francia (2010), found that Fox News was more biased in favour of the 
Republicans and that CNN's coverage was more impartial.
All evidence seems to suggest that there is indeed some level of bias within the major 
news media networks, particularly CNN and Fox News which this thesis also intends to 
look at, at least when it comes to party politics. There are also cases to be made in 
regards to bias towards pro-establishment positions (Bennet, 1996) and promotion of 
moderation and centrist conformity (Gerbner et al., 1982). A meta-analysis by D'Alessio 
& Allen (2006) of 59 studies that focussed on media bias in presidential campaigns 
since 1948 shows that overall, there was at least some small measurable level of media 
bias. Considering the discussions in earlier chapters regarding objectivity and the idea 
that journalists try to, or at least should try to shy away from subjectivity and bias, the 
apparent existence of bias within the media leads to the discussion as to why it is 
allowed to exist.
3.11: The success of bias
Bias in the news media can be seen to have a number of sources and factors that 
contribute towards its existence. David Baron (2004) suggests that these factors can be 
split into two categories, demand-side and supply-side explanations. The former is 
where the demand for the bias comes from the public that consumes the news media, 
the latter is where “the availability of potential journalists who are willing to work for 
lower wages in positions in which they can advance their careers or influence the public 
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by exercising the discretion granted by a news organization” (2004: 2), generates a 
bias. One of the interesting results established by Baron's paper is that “with 
competition between two like-oriented news organizations the one with the greater bias 
has a lower price but can have higher profits” (2004: 24). This idea is interesting as it 
would provide reason as to the current landscape of the cable news networks in 
America. As shown earlier, people tend to seek out news sources that reinforce their 
existing beliefs. If this is the case, and considering Baron's results, it would provide 
some explanation as to why Fox News has been perceived to have become more 
biased towards conservative politics and why MSNBC has become more biased 
towards liberal politics.
One of the most successful news networks in America is Fox News. Having started in 
1996, being available to around 17 million cable subscribers, as of August 2013, the 
network has grown to approximately reach just under 100 million households (Seidman, 
2013) and in 2012 made 985.6 million dollars (Holcomb & Mitchell, 2013). Both 
academics and commentators have criticized Fox for its slanted approach to news 
(Monica, 2009; Barr, 2009; Jones, 2012; Smith. & Searles, 2013; Pew Research Center, 
2009). Despite push back from those within Fox News (Memmott, 2004), the majority of 
people agree that Fox News is not, as its slogan until recently was, fair and balanced. 
Evidence of this bias can be seen in the tone of coverage for presidential candidates in 
the 2012 election. On Fox News, almost half of its Obama coverage was negative in 
tone whereas its coverage of Romney was twice as likely to be positive than negative 
(Holcomb, 2014). With the idea that media is generally liberally biased and that people 
seek out news that reinforces their own beliefs, it would explain why Fox News has 
been seen to have given biased reporting that is slanted towards conservative ideology 
and in part why the network has become so successful as with no other major news 
outlets providing a conservative bias,  Fox News has found a niche within the market 
and capitalized on it. 
By having a network that produced news that was geared towards speaking to the right 
side of the political spectrum, Fox News' successful business model has been copied by 
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MSNBC. With Fox News becoming successful both financially and in terms of ratings, 
MSNBC has arguably attempted to copy Fox, but in the politically opposite direction. 
With Baron's point that with two like-oriented news organisations, the more biased one 
will win out, it stands to reason that MSNBC has slanted towards the liberal side of 
American politics, knowing that it would struggle to out-slant Fox on the conservative 
side of politics. To give credence to Baron's point, in 2002/3 MSNBC did experiment 
with going right-wing but found that their experiment caused their rating to fall by 23% 
(Dana, 2013). With Fox News already having the largest share of the cable news 
audience, MSNBC has tried to play catch up and this can be seen in its emphasis being 
placed on opinion and commentary rather than factual reporting. Pew Research found 
that in 2012, 85% of MSNBC's news coverage was opinion based, compared with the 
55% of Fox News and 46% of CNN (Jurkowitz et al., 2013). It should be noted that this 
data was gathered from 3 days in late 2012 and so due to the time of year, just after a 
national election, there is a chance that opinion driven news may be more likely. To 
further highlight the shift away from fact based news reporting, in an interview with the 
New Republic, the president of MSNBC Phil Griffin said that it is “a mistake for us to 
limit ourselves to news” (Dana, 2013). This shift towards analysis and opinion is 
important as it unburdens those working within the relevant newsrooms from ideals of 
objectivity and fact based reporting which in turn influences the decision making 
process of the production of news content.
The case of CNN also promotes the notion that bias in the media creates success. Out 
of the three major cable news networks, CNN is perceived to be the least ideological, 
with 33% of the public saying that is either mostly conservative or mostly liberal (Pew 
Research Center, 2009). Whilst it may be least ideological, it is still seen as having a 
liberal bias (An et al., 2012; Weatherly et al., 2007). Somewhat echoing the sentiments 
of MSNBC's president, CNN's president Jeff Zucker has said in a memo to CNN staff 
that one of his goals was “broadening the definition of news” at CNN and to have “more 
shows and less newscasts (Fung, 2014). It can be argued that this goal is merely an 
extension of what has already been achieved, not just at CNN but at the other networks 
as well. In their study of cable news coverage of public opinion and the 2004 party 
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conventions, Morris & Francia (2010: 846) have as part of their conclusion that “cable 
news has adopted a talk-show style format in which opinionated news analysts filter 
what they deem to be the important information”. 
This shift in the type of content being produced has often been described as the rise of 
infotainment which as described in chapter 1 is a synonym for soft news and thus, 
damaging towards the public sphere. This infotainment can either be dealing with soft 
news topics such as celebrity gossip, or it can be hard news topics like politics that have 
been made to be more entertaining or easier to understand. The rise of this type of 
content is a response to the increased levels of competition in the media landscape and 
the fight to keep audiences interested (Franklin, 2003). This new type of content is what 
Franklin calls “McJournalism” which McChesney (2004) sees as being sensationalist 
due to its focus on topics such as sex and crime which are attention grabbing topics. 
Despite the previously discussed purposes of journalism, namely to provide information 
to the public so that they can make better informed decisions, the rise of infotainment is 
most noteworthy in the realm of political journalism where the content has shifted away 
from stories on policies (Oates, 2008: 94) towards more entertaining political stories 
such as personal scandals or the horse-race coverage of political campaigns (Dahlgren 
& Sparks, 1997: 12)
With the pursuit of ratings through the creation of more infotainment content by TV news 
channels (Thussu, 2007) , the cable TV networks in America are arguably failing to live 
up to one of their key roles in society, helping create a well-informed public. However, 
before any blame should be laid at the feet of these networks, consideration must be 
given to the previously discussed idea that they are merely responding to the demands 
of the audience. One final consideration that must be had here is that emerging news 
platforms such as YouTube are often not taken that seriously by executives (Kietzmann 
et al, 2011) and content already on the platform is sometimes seen as “frivolous” (Naim, 
2009). The view of these executives is emblematic of the problem of legitimization that 
new platforms and technologies face with leaders in society often being slower to adopt 
them than the rest of the public (Karlsen. & Enjolras, 2016).
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3.12: Conclusion
Since its creation in 2005, YouTube has become the largest online video sharing 
platform. Due to its size, ease of access and proliferation through many other websites 
and organisations, it has been used in a multitude of ways for various purposes. Broadly 
speaking, YouTube has been studied by academia as another media platform from 
which to analyse any particular area of interest that could have previously been 
analysed via other mediums of communication such as TV or newspapers. Studies that 
broach the topics of public outrage regarding scandals by governments (Toepfl, 2011) 
or prejudice against certain communities such as the LGBT community (Rattan & 
Ambady, 2014) for example, could be done via other mediums, but YouTube has 
provided an additional platform from which these topics can be examined. Being a 
relatively new online platform has also meant that YouTube has created brand new 
areas of research, such as in the field of law, particularly in regards to copyright and 
intellectual property laws (Lee, 2007). This was most clearly seen when Viacom forced 
Google, who had recently purchased YouTube to remove over 100,000 videos from the 
site, many of which used copyrighted music.
Due to YouTubes growth within the media ecosystem, it has undoubtedly influenced 
other elements with the system. The way this influence has developed can be seen 
through the concept of media hybridization where the logics of old media, particularly 
television, have come up against the logics of new media platforms. The result of this 
clash is twofold. Firstly, media convergence has meant that existing genres, industries 
and audiences have combined with newer ones created by developments in technology. 
The consumption habits of audiences has changed due to their newly acquired ability to 
be hyper-selected with the content they choose to consume. This fragmentation of the 
audience has in turn forced content producers to adapt to this new type of audience. 
However, as pointed out in the chapter, the process of convergence is not just driven by 
the audience but also by the content producers themselves, whose drive to explore new 
financial opportunities and reach new audiences also facilitates the process.
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The second result of the clash of media logics is found in the role that YouTube plays 
within the media ecosystem. The change in consumption habits as well as market 
forces, has compelled news organisations to change the type of content that 
newsrooms produce. Not only are more resources in newsrooms being dedicated 
towards digital and online video content, but stories are made in a more polarized 
fashion and they have become more entertaining at the cost of better informing the 
public. YouTube’s role in the media ecosystem can also been seen in the greater focus 
paid towards the concept of user engagement. Due to Habermas’ concept of the public 
sphere requiring public participation in the opinion forming process, the fact that 
YouTube enables greater participation, further validates the argument that the platform 
serves an important role within a healthy democratic society. The concept of media 
hybridization can thus be seen with the new logics of YouTube pushing old media 
organisations to place greater emphasis on user engagement whilst at the same time 
the old logics of cable television push new media platforms like YouTube place a 
greater focus on polarising or sensationalist content.
In sum, the development of new technologies and the increased access to digital 
platforms has led to a significant change in how the public consumes news media. 
YouTube is at the forefront of these changes due to it being the largest video website on 
the internet, it has influenced both audience consumption habits as well as how news 
organisations approach producing content. Given this, it is important to consider how 
the public sphere is potentially altered by the growing use of YouTube as a news 
platform by both audiences and news organisations alike.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
4.1: Introduction
The intention of this chapter is to layout the aims and methodological approaches that 
will be used to study how the various elements of news videos on YouTube play a role 
in the types of levels of user engagement. The chapter will be divided into several parts. 
The first section will outline and explain the proposed research questions. The second 
section will discuss the mixed methods approach taken by this study by explaining the 
benefits of using both content analysis and sentiment analysis as well as their 
limitations. The next section will detail the qualitative approach taken when attempting 
to look at the use of comments on YouTube videos. Finally, this chapter will detail the 
sampling strategy used and provide both context and justifications behind the choice of 
news organizations used.
4.2: Research questions
As outlined in the introduction to this study, the main question this study is seeking to 
answer is “How does YouTube serve the public sphere?”. This central question has 
been broken down into more specific questions to enable more effective analysis.
RQ1: What type of news content is being uploaded to YouTube and how does its topic 
and format relate to types of user engagement with the videos?
RQ2: What role does the use of emotion in YouTube video titles play in the levels of 
user engagement?
RQ3: Do user comments reflect Habermas’ notion of the public sphere?
RQ 1 is concerned with the relationships between the types of news stories that are 
being on YouTube, the manner in which those stories are being presented and how 
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these may impact the levels of user engagement with the platform. The term ‘type’ in 
this question should be understood as what genre of news is being uploaded to 
YouTube, according the coding framework. There are several guiding motives behind 
this question. Firstly, is that considering existing research such as that by Uribe & 
Gunter (2007) showing that topics of a sensationalist nature elicit a greater emotional 
response from an audience, is whether this emotional response in the realm of online 
videos translates into a form of user engagement. Seeing as the topic of a news story is 
one of its fundamental elements, if this were to be the case, then this would go some 
way to providing evidence towards the idea that at very least, the topic of news in online 
videos contributes in some way to the public’s engagement and thereby success of said 
video. Secondly, when it comes to news in a visual medium, the manner in which it is 
presented can take many forms. These range from monologues direct to camera to 
panel discussions involving more than one person. It’s important to consider what 
impact this may have on user engagement, as because of the growing perception that 
journalism is a dialogic act (Soffer, 2009), if it is the case that particular formats do 
seem to encourage greater user engagement, then this may have potential explanatory 
power regarding future research on how the news is presented in online video formats. 
Finally, this question seeks to establish whether or not there is any connection between 
the topic of news being presented and the style of presentation used. If a relationship 
between these two variables can be established then it would lend strength towards any 
conclusions one may wish to make regarding prescriptions for the type of news video on 
YouTube which is likely to maximize its level of user engagement. 
Additionally, this question will also consider if the inclusion of user generated content 
has any impact on user engagement. The reason to include this consideration is that 
given the rise in the use of user generated content by news organisations  (Wardle & 
Williams, 2010), this would provide evidence towards the argument of an increasingly 
hybridized media and specifically if in this instance, it is encouraging user engagement 
and hence potentially benefited the public sphere.
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The purpose of RQ2  is to see whether the use of language in the framing of a story on 
YouTube has any impact on the level of engagement a video receives. The term ‘levels’ 
in this question refers to the numerical total of views, likes, dislikes and comments on 
each video. As has been discussed in the literature review, emotions and emotive 
language can play a crucial role in the framing of an issue or story. This, combined with 
other previous discussions about the ideas of hard and soft news and the distinctions 
between them should lead one to ask whether a news story on YouTube is more likely 
to be successful in terms of engagement if it frames its story in positive language or 
negative language. The results to this question should lead to two things. Firstly a basic 
answer to the research question. Secondly, provide evidence either for or against the 
common idea of ‘If it bleeds, it leads’ in that negative news stories are more common 
and more common due to the fact that people engage with negative stories more than 
they do positive ones.
Finally, RQ3 intends to evaluate the extent to which user comments left on YouTube 
videos provide any positive contribution towards the notion of the public sphere. The 
purpose of this is to attempt to provide some insight in regards to the quality of user 
engagement that occurs on YouTube. As was discussed in chapter 3, there are both 
passive and active forms of user engagement but among the active forms, comments 
written by the public have the greatest capacity for nuanced feedback for the producers 
of the news content. Not only do the quality of comments potentially influence news
producers by praising or criticizing the news values that the user perceives to be 
present in the content they watch, the quality of comments will also speak towards 
whether or not they reflect the informed and rational dialogue that Habermas referred to 
in describing the public sphere. By considering their contribution, one should be able to 
scrutinize the efficacy of Habermas’ requirement of freedom of expression and rational 
debate as criteria for determining the capacity of an online platform being a public 
sphere..
To answer all of these questions, this study undertook a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis methods which shall be detailed below.
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4.3: Content analysis and sentiment analysis
To answer the proposed research questions, a mixed methods approach was taken, by 
using a combination of quantitative methods, content and sentiment analysis as well as 
qualitative methods that afford this study the ability to look at user comments in finer 
detail.
A mixed methods approach to research has been a growing practice, most notably 
since the 1980’s (McKim, 2017) across all fields of academic study (Heyvaert et al, 
2013). The hallmark of a mixed methods approach is the combining of both quantitative 
and qualitative data to generate meta-inferences that could not be achieved by either 
approach alone (Guetterman et al, 2019). A mixed methods approach to the particular 
topic of study for this thesis is particularly beneficial as social media platforms such as 
YouTube are both quantitatively large in terms of raw data as well as containing 
qualitatively complex depth in terms of the nuance of unstructured text that is generated 
by users. (Colditz et al., 2017). That this benefit exists is illustrated in research by 
Snelson (2016) which has shown the large number of studies on social media platforms 
adopting a mixed methods approach. Colditz et al (2017), citing the work of Chou et al 
(2014) which studied obesity on social media platform, highlights how the use of natural 
language processing for the quantitative classification of themes alongside discourse 
analysis to provide illustrative qualitative examples. A further benefit of a mixed 
methods approach is detailed by Greene et al (1989), in which such approaches 
enhance the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each individual approach. A 
final motivation for adopting a mixed methods approach in this study is that given the 
concept of the public sphere and the research questions outlined above, a single 
method in isolation may not be able to adequately explore and answer this particular 
area.
The first methodological approach that is used in this study is content analysis. Content 
analysis is a methodological approach that whilst being used across a wide range of 
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disciplines, is commonly used in communication studies to systematically analyse any 
given media text in order to manifest various trends and features in a quantifiable 
manner (Deacon et al. 2007). Content analysis has been one of the fastest growing 
forms of research over the past few decades (Yale & Gilly, 1988; Riffe & Freitag, 1997). 
During a content analysis, all of the media texts go through the same process to ensure 
consistency and to prevent research bias influencing any of the results (ibid). In the 
case of this thesis, the media texts were the YouTube videos uploaded to the chosen 
network’s YouTube channels and the process that they went through was the coding 
framework described above.
The notion of using content analysis in the field of communication studies has been well 
established and thus can be seen to have been used frequently over the past several 
decades (Krippendorff, 2004). Its definition however has changed over time as 
demonstrated by one of the earlier definitions of it being “a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication” (Berelson, 1952). Issues have been raised about this definition, not 
least its adherence to the notion of quantitative content and therefore disregard for any 
qualitative elements of media texts and research, as well as its use of the term 
“objective” which Berger & Luckman (1966) highlight as being problematic in that “even
the most scientific methods of social research cannot produce totally objective results.” 
(Macnamara, 2011: 2).
More contemporary definitions are provided by Krippendorff who says that content 
analysis is a “systematic reading of a body of texts, images, and symbolic matter, not 
necessarily from an author’s or user’s perspective” (2004: 3), as well as Weber who 
says it is a “research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences 
from text” (1990a: 9). These are more appropriate definitions for this thesis as it allows 
for entrance of more qualitative elements which the study of language and emotion 
necessitate.
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It has been argued by Berelson (1952, cited in Macnamara, 2011) that there are 5 main 
purposes of content analysis “to describe substance characteristics of message content; 
To describe form characteristics of message content; To make inferences to producers 
of content; To make inferences to audiences of content; To predict the effects of content 
on audiences." (ibid: 3). These purposes are supported by Neuendorf (2002) who sees 
content analysis as being useful for allowing inference even though it cannot provide 
direct support for it. He also adds that such a methodological approach does allow for 
some limited predictive powers. 
Despite its widespread use, there are several limitations inherent in using a content 
analysis methodology. Krippendorff (1989) believes that one of the limitations “stems 
from its commitment to scientific decision making” (Ibid: 407) which means that such 
approaches require large units of analysis in order to generate any significant findings. 
Additional limitations pointed to by Krippendorff are that it has a replicability requirement 
that implies fixed observer independent categories and also that the results from 
content analysis can only be generalised as far as the data set used. A further limitation 
in the use of content analysis is in the consistency which texts are classified. As Weber 
(1990b) put it, “reliability problems usually grow out of the ambiguity of word meanings, 
category definitions, or other coding rules.” (Ibid: 2). This limitation is not one that would 
be mitigated by the presence of an additional research method within this study and so 
extra justification for the coding rules and category definitions must be provided. 
The overall reason why a content analysis approach was taken for this thesis is that it 
allows a researcher to quantify relevant and unambiguous features of a large quantity of 
media texts (Deacon et al, 2007). The quantification of a large body of texts allows a 
researcher to generate a set of interpretable data from which their analysis can be 
based and inferences made. The raw data generated for each of the variables enables 
a certain degree of basic analysis through the discovery of various trends and patterns 
in the data. However, it is when these variables are analysed against one another that 
deeper patterns can be ascertained and hence, can attempt to answer some of the 
research questions. It should be noted, as it is by Deacon et al that content analysis as 
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a method of research “tends to skate over complex and varied processes of meaning 
making within the texts” (2007: 119). This means that such an approach is not well 
suited for researching areas in a deep sense such as by attempting to answer questions 
pertaining to underlying reasons as to why certain trends or themes emerge from the 
data. However, as Berelson (1952) and Neuendorf (2002) contend, the purpose of such 
analysis is to provide description and inference.
In order to answer RQ2, which is concerned in part with the use of language, this study 
adopts a second methodological approach, sentiment analysis.
Sentiment analysis can be described as the “task of identifying positive and negative 
opinions, emotions, and evaluations.” (Wilson et al, 2005: 347). Although there were 
some arguable early forerunners in the research of sentiment analysis such as 
Carbonell (1979), there was a significant increase in the amount of research in this area 
around the turn of the 21st Century due to the improvement of machine learning 
methods and the datasets that the machine learning tools could utilise. Examples 
highlighting this flux of research include, Das & Chen (2001), Dini & Mazzini (2002) and 
Dave et al (2003). It should be noted that this area of research has used a range of 
terminologies in attempting to define itself including “opinion mining, sentiment analysis, 
and/or subjectivity analysis. The phrases review mining and appraisal extraction have 
been used, too, and there are some connections to affective computing” (Pang & Lee, 
2008: 8).
Since its first use in research by Das & Chen (2001), the term “sentiment analysis” has 
usually been attached to research that focuses on the notion of polarity, that is to say 
whether the language used is either positive or negative (Pang & Lee, 2008). Given the 
broad range of terminologies that can be used within this area of communications 
research and the fact that this thesis intends to focus more on a simple 
positive/negative distinction in the use of language, it is therefore prudent to settle on 
using the term “sentiment analysis” as it refers specifically to this narrower 
interpretation.
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A common approach in the conduction of sentiment analysis research is to start with a 
glossary or words and phrases that are all assigned either a positive or negative value, 
for example “love” being deemed positive and “hate” being deemed negative. However, 
due to the complexities of human language, context is also an important factor when 
attempted to put media texts through a sentiment analysis. Wilson et al (2005) give a 
range of examples where phrases such as “not good”, “does not look very good” and 
“not only good but amazing” (2005: 347-348) where the word “not” whilst usually being 
considered a negative word, can in fact just be negative of a small part of a phrase, 
negate the entire proposition or help intensify the positivity of a phrase.
At its most basic level, text that has undergone sentiment analysis can be deemed as 
having a positive/favourable reading, or a negative/unfavourable reading. Some of the 
early research into sentiment analysis looked at product and movies reviews and 
attempted to detect whether said reviews were overall positive or negative in nature 
(Turney, 2002; Pang, 2002). The intention of this thesis is to apply sentiment analysis to 
the titles of YouTube videos to determine whether or not the networks being researched 
are framing their videos, through their titles in either a positive or negative manner.
In order to implement a sentiment analysis, two main things are required. The first is a 
dataset to which the analysis can be applied. For this study, this takes the form of the 
title of each YouTube video. The second requirement is an algorithm through which the 
data can be processed through. To do this, the sentiment analysis software 
SentiStrength was chosen.
There were several reasons why this software was chosen. Firstly the programme has 
already been used in other studies that have looked at measuring the emotion within the 
text of social media posts (Thelwall, Buckley & Paltoglou, 2011). This helps establish 
the notion that the software is suitable for academic use. A second reason is that 
software comes with a glossary of words and phrases so that it is not required that an 
entire new glossary of words and what their perceived positive or negative value is. This 
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is beneficial as it prevents any bias from the researcher in the selection of words that 
may be chosen to be analysed. 
A third benefit of the software is that the end result of a sentiment analysis through the 
use of SentiStrength is a numerical value being ascribed to each data input. In the case 
of this thesis, each YouTube title that is processed by SentiStrength will be given a 
value ranging from +3 to -4, denoting the overall positive or negative strength of the 
sentiment expressed in the language of the title. Whilst the software does allow for a 
more binary result to be generated, +1 or -1, the option of having the data presented in
a scale was chosen to enable greater nuance in the discussion of the data. A further 
benefit of the SentiStrength software is that its algorithm factors in contexts of language 
such as the use of punctuation that may act as an intensifier as mentioned by Wilson et 
al (2005). Finally on practical grounds, the software is not complex to use and hence 
should another researcher wish to replicate the study with a different dataset, they 
would not require much training in order to conduct the research. 
The way that SentiStrength was used in this study was that each of the 1239 videos of 
the dataset had their video title input into the SentiStrength programme. This then 
generated both a positive and negative sentiment score for the title based on the type of 
words and grammar used. By combining the positive and negative scores together, a 
final total sentiment score was created for each video title. This ranged from +3 to -4 
across the entire dataset. 
The reason why headlines were chosen to go through the sentiment analysis was that it 
was the only variable that could be collected from YouTube videos that had the 
capability of having its language analysed in such a systematic way. Although it may 
have been possible to transcribe all of the words that were being spoken in each video 
and then put these transcripts through the SentiStrength software, not only would this 
have not been practical with some videos being over an hour in length and some not 
having any spoken words as the video relied on just visual graphics, but such analysis 
would not be necessary to answer the proposed research questions.
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It is hoped that by performing a sentiment analysis on the titles of YouTube videos that 
it will generate results that not only help answer RQ2, but also be relatable to some of 
the existing work and ideas detailed in chapters 1 and 2.
A final aspect of this study’s methodological approach is the use of case studies. The 
final analysis chapter of this study attempts to answer RQ3 which is concerned with 
whether user comments reflect Habermas’s notion of the public sphere through the 
highlighting of particular instances of user comments that speak towards aspects of 
Habermas’ public sphere. Whilst answers to this question could be derived from the 
more broader results generated in the data collection used to answer RQ1 and RQ2, 
case studies all for an “in-depth inquiry into a specific and complex phenomenon (the 
‘case’), set within its real-world context.” (Yin, 2013: 321). Even though case studies are 
limited to descriptive or exploratory objectives, for the purposes of this study, they will 
be used to illustrate various aspects that can be found within the user comments on 
news videos on YouTube in order to not only facilitate discussion for RQ3 but also 
suggest future areas for academic research. The use of user comments in academic 
research raises the ethical consideration of user privacy. that must be addressed. The 
issue of user privacy is a common concern when researching social media platforms 
(Baym & Boyd, 2012). For this study, the ethical risks can be considered relatively low 
due to two key factors. Firstly the comments being analysed have been posted by 
members of the public who have accepted the platforms terms of service which 
acknowledges how the posting of comments means that their “content may become 
accessible through search engines” (Google, 2019). Secondly, by adopting the 
approach taken by Trevisan & Reilly (2014: 1143) wherein focus is placed on what was 
said rather than who said it, by not naming who wrote the comments and focussing 
simply on the content of what was written, the risk of a user identification is greatly 
mitigated.
The five case studies that are analysed in this study were chosen by selecting videos 
after the initial content and sentiment analysis, that demonstrated some aspect of the 
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literature discussed regarding user engagement within chapter 3. These five aspects 
were capitalisation, the use of hashtags, the use of humour/anger, the target of the 
comments and the depth of discussion. With all cases, the comments looked at were 
sorted using YouTube’s own algorithm of the ‘Top comments’ sort function. There are 
two reasons for this. Primarily is that it helps focus on the comments that are most likely 
to be read by the news outlets that has produced the video and hence deserve greater 
attention. Secondly, the only other sorting function is by ‘Newest first’ and the comments 
produced by this are less likely to have had an impact on both the producers of the 
video as well as other commenters. It is also worth noting that because of commercial 
reasons, YouTube is secretive about how its ‘Top comments’ algorithm works and so it 
is impossible to precisely say why particular comments have risen to the top of any 
given video.
The purpose of using both content analysis and sentiment analysis is that both of these 
methods generate different data which is suited towards answering the different 
research questions. A purely statistical analysis of the metrics that can be recorded on 
YouTube, whilst providing some of the answers to RQ1, would not provide data that 
would help answer any of the issues raised in RQ2. Whilst there are a number of ways 
in which the use of language can be analysed, given the large amount of data that is 
used in the study, sentiment analysis is well suited to be used alongside content 
analysis. Whilst both methods are able to work in tandem with one another, there are 
limitations that arise in doing so. One of these limitations is that by using both methods 
in one project, is that it limits the range of replicability of the study. Whilst future studies 
could be done in a similar manner, in order for comparisons to be drawn between this 
and future studies, similar categorisations as well as values of sentiment would be 
required.
4.4: Research sample
In order to answer the proposed research questions, a decision was made to was made
to look at 5 YouTube channels that were run by large, professional news organisations. 
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Given that YouTube has attempted to raise authoritative voices on the platform 
(YouTube, 2019), the 5 channels that were chosen were either already well established 
news brands that existed on other platforms or were news organisations that YouTube 
itself has partnered with, thereby demonstrating their trust in that organisations. 
Given the global reach of the internet as well earlier discussions around how 
polarization is most clear in Western societies, most notably America, the channels that 
were chosen all had at least some output that was centred around American politics. 
Also, as there is the argument that American politics and culture informs global politics 
and culture (Sussman & Galizio, 2003) along with the practical consideration of the 
researcher and software only being able to analyse English language media texts, the 5 
networks that were chosen were: CNN, Fox News, BBC News, Al Jazeera English and 
The Young Turks.
The justifications for each of these networks being looked at range from practical 
reasons that were applicable to each of them such as for the research to be meaningful 
each channel would have to have uploaded a sufficient and consistent amount of videos 
during the time of data collection, to individual reasons for their selection based on the 
nature of the news organisation itself as well as them being established news brands 
within both existing scholarly research and the general public.
The first network chosen for this study was Fox News. For many years, Fox News has 
been one of the most dominant voices in news in America. It has been the most 
watched news network in cable news for 62 consecutive quarters (Katz, 2017a). Not 
only does it dominate the cable news landscape but also the cable media landscape 
having the most prime time and total viewers for all of basic cable. The average number 
of viewers during prime time across the week is around 2.3 million total viewers and 
472,000 for those between the ages of 25 to 54 (Katz, 2017a). The demographics of 
Fox News are that 53% of its audience is over the age of 50, slightly over half are 
women, 43% have attained a high school level of education or less and over 60% of its 
audience considers itself ideologically conservative (Pew Research, 2012). The 
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ideological slant of its audience can be attributed to the idea that the network caters 
towards conservative points of view. Research conducted by Jamieson & Cappella 
(2008), Groeling (2008) and Bard (2017) all indicate that Fox News has a positive bias 
towards conservative ideology or at least provides more favourable coverage to the
Republican party in America. It is also worth pointing out that at the time of data 
collection, two of Fox News’ most watched shows which are hosted by Sean Hannity 
and the now sacked Bill O’Reilly, skew even more towards a conservative audience with 
78% and 69% respectively (Pew Research, 2012). One apt summation of Fox News is 
provided by Jim Rutenberg in which he states, “Fox has brought prominence to a new 
sort of TV journalism that casts aside traditional notions of objectivity, holds contempt 
for dissent and eschews the skepticism of government as mainstream journalism’s core” 
(2003). It is for these reasons that Fox News was deemed a suitable network for this 
study.
A network that is similar to Fox News in terms of scope and presence within the media 
ecosystem is CNN. In recent years, the cable news channel has seen a record number 
of viewers in a number of measurements such as for particular shows like ‘The Lead’ 
with Jake Tapper and in more general terms such as viewers between the ages of 25 to 
54. The average number of prime time viewers across a week is around 1.05 million 
(Katz, 2017b). In terms of demographics, CNN has a slightly younger audience than its 
rival Fox News with 43% of its audience being over the age of 50. Unlike Fox News 
however is the ideology of its audience which is fairly evenly split between conservative, 
moderate and liberal: 32%, 30% and 30% respectively. CNN has traditionally been 
viewed as a ‘hard news’ channel, this particularly being seen during breaking news 
events like the first Gulf war and the attacks on 9/11. However, even as far back in 2003 
it was noted that “in order to avoid losing viewers to their competitors, CNN has 
substantially increased the percentage of its broadcasts devoted to soft-news oriented 
topics and formats” (Baum, 2003:179). This point is worth holding on to as it will likely 
come up during later discussions around the network’s YouTube content. Further 
rationale for including CNN’s YouTube channel in this study is based upon the existing 
scholarly work that has been done on the organisation (see Robinson, 2002; Bahador, 
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2011).Existing research on this organisation legitimises further investigation, particularly 
that which explores the networks use of new platforms such as YouTube.
The third YouTube channel chosen for this study was BBC News. There are several 
reasons for its inclusion, the first of which being the perception that it produces some of 
the highest quality journalism on the international stage (Anderson & Eggleton, 2012). 
Due to its extensive network of bureaus and journalists, the BBC has the capacity to 
cover various issues and events across the world. As such, it has a weekly global news 
TV audience of 99 million (BBC, 2017). The breadth of the BBC’s international news 
service audience means it is difficult to pin down precise data regarding its 
demographics. For example, among its top 10 markets are America, Pakistan, Tanzania 
and Brazil. This coupled with the fact that “one in every 16 adults around the world uses 
BBC News” (BBC, 2016) means that its inclusion in the study should go some way to 
alleviating criticisms of the studies heavily US/Western focus. Also, much like CNN, 
there is a deep well of research on the organisation, covering its multiple aspects (see 
Bicket & Wall, 2009; Anderson & Eggleton, 2012), further legitimising research that 
looks at the organisation from new perspectives. One final consideration in choosing 
BBC News for this study is that it is a public service broadcaster and therefore does not 
have to worry, at least not as much, as its commercial counterparts. This may be an 
important factor when it comes to reviewing the use of sensationalised video titles in 
order to get the attention of a larger audience as it may be the case that the news 
values pursued by public service broadcasters like the BBC, may differ to those from 
the likes of CNN and this may come through in the data for this study. This is also an 
important consideration due to points raised during the literature review that commercial 
forces are deemed by many to have a degrading impact on the public sphere (Franklin, 
2008; McQuail, 2010: 222).
The fourth network chosen for this study is Al Jazeera English (AJE).This is the English 
language version of its Arabic speaking parent network Al Jazeera. Much like the BBC, 
because the channel is carried all over the world, it is difficult to pin down precise and 
recent numbers regarding its demographics and viewing figures. It broadcasts in over 
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260 million homes in over 130 countries (Al Jazeera, 2012). Whilst it is hard to say how 
many people in those 260 million homes is watching, the size of AJE’s audience can still 
be put in perspective when compared to other networks. For instance, in 2011 a public 
broadcast station in America, KCET-TV, decided to carry AJE’s newscasts four times a 
day. The station claimed that each week these newscasts drew in over 285,000 viewers 
(Szalai, 2011). For further context, one can also look at AJE’s America specific channel 
Al Jazeera America which launched in 2013. During its first few months, the channel 
averaged 13,000 viewers a day (Mirkinson, 2014) which was far below all other cable 
news channels. Despite this, AJE has a more established brand than its American 
offshoot channel did and likely performs far better in terms of overall audience numbers, 
not just in America but internationally as well. This is demonstrated during particular 
global events such as the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 during which time Al Jazeera 
English saw over 1.6 million views from America on its internet livestream of the event 
(Stelter, 2011). This shows that there is indeed a substantial audience willing to 
consume AJE content. Academic work concerning the audience preferences and 
content interaction of Al Jazeera have tended to focus more on its Arabic speaking 
channels (see Al-Rawi, 2016) and comparisons between the Arabic and English 
speaking audiences are unlikely to be apt. 
All of the channels detailed so far belong to well established, traditional news 
organisations. As such, the range of academic research on these news networks is 
exceedingly large and spread across a range of diverse research interests. Coupled 
with this is that due to the impact of the fast pace of change in technology has had over 
the industry, many studies are somewhat dated when it comes to trying to contextualise 
each of the networks. Examples of this include studies by Dilawari et al (1991) and 
Johnson et al (1999). In more recent years however, there have been more network 
specific studies such as those done by Palmer (2012) and Haigh & Bruce (2017) that 
each looked at CNN. It is for this reason that a fifth YouTube channel was chosen, one 
that was native to the platform that is being researched as this would help provide both 
context and contrast against these established news organisations.
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Thus, the final YouTube channel chosen for this study was The Young Turks (TYT). The 
network’s origins are from a radio show from 2002 on Sirius Satellite Radio with the 
same name. It began producing online video content in 2005 soon after the launch of 
YouTube. Since then the network has expanded to contain multiple channels on 
YouTube, partnered with the platform on a number of initiatives such as premium 
subscriptions and also appear on a number of distribution platforms such as streaming 
services like Hulu and also on traditional platforms such as on the Current TV cable 
channel. This being yet another example of media hybridization.
Whilst it is hard to make operational comparisons between TYT and the other networks 
in this study due to factors like them having no official news bureaus, fewer than a 
dozen reporters and running a budget of only $1million per month (Oh, cited in 
Flanders, 2017) there are still other metrics that can be used to contextualize them 
against the others. For instance as of March 2016, they received 86 million unique 
views a month and have a lifetime total of over 4 billion views (Yu, 2016). Their 
audience is far younger than the other networks mentioned with 76% being under the 
age of 25 (Uygur, cited in Variety, 2015). The network styles itself as having a politically 
progressive approach to the news (Madlena, 2010) and will often approach topics from 
a liberal perspective. The hosts of the main show are open about this fact (see Burrell, 
2014; Murphy, 2017) and believe their openness to this potential bias has a number of 
upsides when it comes to delivering the news. Other factors that justify TYT’s inclusion 
in this study in grounded in the argument that their news values and their style are 
different from the other organisations. Firstly, due to the aforementioned lack of bureaus 
and reporters the vast majority of their content relies on reporting from journalists of 
other networks or news organisations. This may mean that Harcup & O’Neill’s (2001) 
news values of ‘Follow-up’ and ‘Newspaper agenda are less likely to being in the 
decision making process at the organisation. Secondly, as TYT was not established 
within the confines of traditional media, it is not as prone to the use of teleprompters or 
not swearing live on air. A final reason for including TYT in this study is due to the 
current lack of academic research that has been conducted on the organisation. Given 
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its current size, it is prudent to raise its profile within academia so that it may warrant 
further studies on the organisation from different perspectives.
In all, these 5 organisations represent a significant section of the news content being 
uploaded to YouTube by new organisations and in combination provide enough of a 
foundation in order to attempt to answer the research questions posed in this study. The
choice of networks does however shape the scope of any conclusions that can be 
drawn from this study in that they are all focused in varying degrees to an American-
centric approach to news production. This Western media focus may mean that it is 
difficult to make broader claims about news media in general on YouTube. Additionally 
as four of the networks in this study are commercial organisations, it may be difficult to 
make arguments about public service news providers.
With the organisations for the study established, it was decided that each of the 
organisations main YouTube channels would be monitored over two 1 week periods, 
wherein each video uploaded to the channels was documented according to the coding 
framework that will be detailed below. Over the combined two week period, a total of 
1239 videos were coded.
The two 1 week periods where the data collection took place were the weeks 
commencing 01.05.15 and 08.11.15. The main reason for collecting the data across two 
distinct time periods was that if there were any major global news event that had the 
potential to dominate a news cycle for an extended period of time, then by having two 
distinct periods of data collection any effects a single event may have on the data 
should be somewhat mitigated. Altogether across the combined two weeks, 1239 
videos collected. This was deemed a broad enough sample size to answer the 
proposed research questions. Had additional data been required, additional weeks 
could have been added to the data collection period.
Following a brief pilot study wherein what sort of data it would be possible and practical 
to collect, it was determined that each video in the sample could be broken down into 15 
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distinct variables that could easily be coded and used during the analysis phase of the 
study. 
4.6: Coding Framework
During the periods of data collection, the following coding framework was used to record 
each of the variables for each video. Each of the variables was recorded in an Excel 
spreadsheet with the data being manually input by a single coder. The variables 
recorded were chosen based on the availability of the variable, in that was it publicly 
accessible on YouTube; the relevance to the literature review and proposed research 
questions as well as if the variable would afford the researcher some pragmatic use 
when searching through the database at a later date. A full description of the frame can 
be found in the appendix but these are the outlines and justifications for each of the 15 
variables:
The first variable was an individual ID for each video. This was done so that each video 
collected could be uniquely identified.
The second variable was the date that the video was uploaded onto its respective 
YouTube channel. This was recorded so that any patterns in the frequency that each of 
the networks uploaded videos could be potentially determined.
The third variable was the organisation that had uploaded the video.
The fourth variable was the topic of the video. This was the predominant subject that 
was covered in the video. Although some videos may have broached several subject 
matters, the predominant one was chosen for recording. How the predominant topic 
was determined can be found in the appendix.
The fifth variable was the length of each video. This was recorded as during the pilot 
study, some videos were found to be of extreme length compared to others and so it 
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was determined that it would be an important variable to track if one wished to easily 
group these longer videos, particularly given the discussion of literature surrounding the 
notion of audience attention presented in earlier chapters.
The sixth variable was the format of the video. This meant recording what was the 
predominant way in which topic of the video was being presented such as in an 
interview format or a group discussion. How the format was determined is detailed in 
the appendix.
The seventh variable was whether the video contained any user generated content. 
The eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh variables were the total number of views, 
comments, likes and dislikes that the video had received at the time of recording. Each 
as these were seen as the variables of user engagement, with the latter three being 
considered more active forms of user engagement.
The twelfth variable recorded was the title of each video. These titles were copied 
verbatim as it was deemed important to retain the original formatting of the title so that 
aspects such as capitalisation and use of punctuation were preserved. This was 
important due to the sentiment analysis that would be performed on the data.
The final three variables were the URL of the video, the tags of the video and additional 
notes. The URL was recorded so that it would be easy to find the videos again. Tags 
were assigned to various videos if they pertained to a particular news event such as a 
specific natural disaster. This was done so that it would be easier to search through the 
data set during analysis. Finally, a specific variable was created so that the coder could 
write any additional notes on any video if there was something particularly noteworthy 
such as the entire video not being in English. Like the previous two variables this was 
done to make searching the database slightly easier. 
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One of the key characteristics of content analysis is having an objective research 
procedure that is free of any potential biases of the researcher. (Berelson, 1952 cited in 
Richardson 2007, p.15). Given that Krippendorf (1986) and Weber (1990b) highlight the 
need for reliability in content analysis, the coding framework (Appendix A) was given to 
a seconder coder along with 50 randomly chosen videos from the study sample. Out of 
all of the variables in the coding framework only V4 Topic, V6 Format and V7 Use of 
user generated content, were checked for agreement between both coders as these 
were the variables that required subjective interpretations in terms of categorisation. 
The other variables were just factual inputs and so the reliability in recording them 
through a single coder was guaranteed. 
For the variable of “Topic”, across the 50 videos, there was an 86% agreement on what 
topic was being discussed in each video with only 7 disagreements in total. For the 
variable of “Format”, there was a 94% agreement on what format was being used in 
each video with 3 disagreements in total. For the variable of “Use of user generated 
content” there was an agreement of 98% on whether there was any user generated 
content was present in the video. The high level of agreement across these variables 
helps guarantee the extent to which this study can be replicated as well as 
strengthening the validity of arguments made in the analysis based on the entire sample 
used in this study. Due to these high levels of agreement, it was determined that the 
coding framework did not need to be changed. 
4.7: Conclusion
The previous chapters in this study discussed the existing literature around the 
concepts of the public sphere, news values, objectivity, the role of emotions, changes in 
news consumption and how YouTubes a platform has been previously approached by 
scholars. With these areas in mind, this thesis intends to look at the role that YouTube 
plays within the public sphere, particularly in relation to the news content that is being 
uploaded to the platform as well as how audiences are engaging with the content. In 
order to do this, three main research questions were proposed: RQ1: What type of news 
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content is being uploaded to YouTube and how does its topic and format relate to types 
of user engagement with the videos?; RQ2: What role does the use of emotion in 
YouTube video titles play in the levels of user engagement?; RQ3: Do user comments 
reflect Habermas’ notion of the public sphere?
In order to answer these questions, a mixed methods approach was adopted by using 
both a content analysis and a sentiment analysis. Both these methodological 
approaches help provide data towards answering particular aspects of each research 
question. The reason why a content analysis was chosen was due to the nature of data 
that was being collected in that it required a systematic approach in order to quantify 
relevant and unambiguous features (Deacon et al, 2007). By being able to quantify 
these features, one should, according to Neuendorf (2002) not only be able to make 
some inferences about the data but also some limited predictions as well. The reason 
why sentiment analysis was chosen was that it allowed the generation of interpretable 
data that could be derived from short bits of media text, in this case, the titles of 
YouTube videos.
After the data collection process had been completed by following the coding framework 
laid out above, a total of 1239 videos were coded over two 1 week periods. 
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CHAPTER 5: Trends across all YouTube channels
5.1: Introduction
The intent of this chapter is to demonstrate that there are clear trends in the 
consumption and engagement with news videos on YouTube. The specific areas that 
will be covered are the links between topic and engagement, format and engagement, 
topic and format, user generated content and engagement and finally, between the 
language used in the titles of videos and engagement. By being able to establish these 
links, this chapter approach answering various aspects of both RQ1 and RQ2 proposed 
in the methodology
One of the reasons for looking at the link between topics and engagement is that 
previous research by Uribe & Gunter (2007), has shown that sensational stories, that is 
to say ones that have dramatic content within them, whilst not necessarily having a 
greater capacity to elicit an emotional reaction from an audience in general, on the 
subjects of crime in particular as well as political stories, there are “clear manifestations 
of the presence of high and low emotion-laden attributes” (2007: 207). It can be argued 
then, that the like and dislike buttons on YouTube are one way in which a viewer can 
express their reaction to a video and whilst the binary option presented to them offers 
little nuance, it does allow them to express at least some form of reaction.  With this in 
mind, if one is to consider terrorism as an extreme criminal act, Uribe and Gunter’s 
research would support the idea that the topic of terrorism would elicit the greatest 
amount of engagement by the audience. 
Benefiting the public sphere, as discussed in chapter 1, is one of the main roles in 
journalism and one aspect of this is generating discussion about various news events 
by encouraging audience participation. Due to this it is important to consider the link 
between the format of presentation and user engagement. This is because past 
research suggests that there is a parasocial interaction between the public and on-
screen personas of the media (Horton & Wohl, 1956). The “style of behavior and 
conversational communication delivery by the persona, and the efficacious use of 
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production features” (Pellizzaro & Gimbal, 2018: 4) can all play a role in how an 
audience engages with the media. This would suggest that the more conversational 
approaches to presenting news content, such as roundtable discussions may be more 
likely to generate user engagement.
As discussed in chapter 3, the process of online content being shared across multiple 
platforms is sometimes referred to as “cross-pollination”, a term coined by Jain et al 
(2013). In their study they looked at how content from social media platforms, YouTube 
being one of them, diffused onto Twitter. They found that the popularity of content on 
one platform, did not dictate that it would also be popular on Twitter. Other studies by 
Myers el al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2014) further confirm that whilst there is indeed a 
level of cross-pollination or interconnectedness between various online platforms, there 
is no clear indication that content that is popular on one platform would gain traction on 
another platform. Research in this area is rapidly growing and with combined forces of 
both the growth in the power of new social media platforms to share content like 
WhatsApp (Benton, 2014) and the uptake of these platforms by traditional media outlets 
means more insight into how popularity on one platform translates or transfers onto 
another will increase. It is due to this climate in communications research that it can be 
considered important to look at what factors may be at play in relation to the popularity 
or levels of user engagement when it comes to YouTube videos. Therefore, one of the 
final sections of this chapter intends to look at how the language used in the titles of 
videos may play a role.
However, before attempting to answer these research questions, it is worthwhile to give 
an overview of the data collected for this research as a whole, primarily to introduce and 
explain the key variables being looked at.
5.2: Overview of the data
In the process of the data collection, 1239 YouTube videos on YouTube’s website were 
analysed from five news networks, these being CNN, Fox News, BBC, Al Jazeera 
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English and The Young Turks. The videos were collected during two separate weeks, 
the week commencing 01.05.15 and the week commencing 08.11.15. All of the videos
uploaded by the five networks during those weeks were included in the analysis. Each 
video was analysed according to 15 distinct variables which were chosen based on the 
pragmatic use of recording such variables so that they could be used and analysed 
against one another. There are a number of trends that can be pulled out from the data 
due to the large number of variables and to begin with the larger, more prima facie 
trends will be discussed.
Of the videos analysed, CNN and Fox News combined made up over two thirds of the 
total videos analysed, 840 (Table 5.1). The BBC made up only 3.6% of the total number 
of videos at 45, and whilst this is not an insignificant number, it is worth noting that this 
would lessen any future conclusions drawn being applied to the BBC simply due to the 
small sample size they provided. 
Table 5.1: Total number of videos uploaded by each network
Network Number observed Percent observed
AJE 227 18.32%
BBC 45 3.63%
CNN 531 42.86%
Fox News 309 24.94%
TYT 127 10.25%
Total 1239 100%
The format of reporting done across all of the dataset shared a somewhat similar 
breakdown compared to the network breakdown. Videos that were in a ‘produced 
segment’ format, that is ones in which the content is presented in a pre-recorded, pre-
edited news story, usually by a reporter, with the use of pre-made graphics and sound, 
made up almost 40% of the total number of videos. ‘One to one’ interviews were the 
second most frequently used format with 27.5% (Table 5.2). The least used format 
overall was live reporting.
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Table 5.2: Total number of videos uploaded by the type of format used in each video
Format Number observed Percent observed
1 to 1 341 27.52%
Live reporting 38 3.07%
Monologue 175 14.12%
Produced segment 476 38.42%
Round table 209 16.87%
Total 1239 100%
The topic of discussion across all of the networks focussed most on the issues of 
domestic politics and crime, with all of the other topics having fewer than 150 videos 
each (Table 5.3). There is arguably two main causes for these two topics to dominate 
the network’s YouTube channels. For crime, a large proportion of the videos were about 
the rioting and protests being held in Baltimore during the first week of data collection. 
As this was a major news story that dominated the headlines in America during that 
time and the fact that the majority of stories regarding this event were around the issues 
of criminality and police conduct, this could explain why there is a large number of crime 
focussed stories in relation to the entire data set. A reason why domestic politics was 
the most prominent topic discussed may be down to the choice of networks being 
looked at. With CNN and Fox uploading the most videos during the data collection 
(Table 5.1), the fact they are both American 24 hour cable news channels operating 
during an election season, means they are more likely to focus on campaign stories. 
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Table 5.3: Total number of videos uploaded by topic of each video
Topic Number observed Percent observed
Advert 41 3.31%
Business 25 2.02%
Crime 179 14.45%
Domestic Politics 360 29.06%
Education 32 2.58%
Entertainment 70 5.65%
Health 46 3.71%
International News 142 11.46%
International Politics 82 6.62%
Media 53 4.28%
Misc 103 8.31%
Tech/Science 34 2.74%
Terrorism 62 5.00%
Weather 10 0.81%
Total 1239 100%
Another broad trend is that user generated content is not very likely to be used. Of the 
1239 videos only 149, or 12% contained any user generated content. A large proportion 
of the UGC was either cell phone footage about the Baltimore protests and the events 
that caused those protests or tweets and Facebook posts that relate to the story in a 
video. Although initially this trend may seem surprising owing to the nature of YouTube 
content in general, the fact that the channels looked at are well established news 
networks with, apart from The Young Turks, a large infrastructure, they do not need to 
rely on UGC to produce content and hence only need to use it when the UGC in 
question is unique and unobtainable any other way.
Further trends to point out are those of ‘views’, ‘likes’, ‘dislikes’ and ‘comments’ for each 
video. The average number of views per video across the entire sample was 18874, the 
median was 2528 and the mode was 1439. This shows that there are small portion of 
videos with significantly large viewing figures. 
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There are similar trends when it comes to likes and dislikes where there are a small 
number of videos with a large number of likes and dislikes that pulls up the average for 
each variable to 241 and 56 respectively. What is interesting here is that it appears 
viewers tend to like a video more than dislike it. What this indicates is something that 
will be discussed later as on face value the like to dislike ratio does not tell us a great 
deal beyond how many viewers clicked the corresponding button.  When it comes to 
comments, they also follow a similar trend to those just mentioned. 
The final variable to give a general overview to is that of the tags for each video. One of 
the reasons to look at tags is to track the most covered events or news stories during 
the data collection and so that in later analysis, comparisons could be made between 
various events despite these events having the same topic. Overall, almost 50% of the 
videos analysed were standalone videos that did not link to any specific trending story 
at the time. The single most used tag was ‘2016 election’ which was assigned to 23.7% 
of all videos. This was somewhat expected due to the general focus across the 
networks being on domestic politics as mentioned above. With America at the start of 
an election cycle during the period of data collection, the heavy focus on political stories 
relating to the election is expected. The second most used tag was ‘Baltimore’ which 
was in relation to stories that focussed on the events in that city, namely the police 
abuse issues and resulting protests, that occurred. A total of 95, or 7.6% of videos 
related to this event. One other tag to make note of here is ‘Paris’ which was for any 
stories relating to the terrorist attack that happened in Paris on November 13th. Whilst 
the tag was only assigned to 4% of the total videos analysed, it’s important to point out 
that the event happened at the very end of the period of data collection and had this 
period been extended for another week, one can assume that the percent of videos 
assigned with this tag would be significantly higher.
As stated at the start of this chapter, its purpose was to present data that various 
metrics on YouTube can have an impact on the levels of engagement on videos 
uploaded onto the platform. The data presented so far has inspected each of the 
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variables measured during data collection individually. This was done to introduce the 
relevant metrics and lay the groundwork for the forthcoming discussions. Whilst some 
trends can be pulled out from looking at each variable on its own, as had been 
demonstrated thus far, in order to fully explore and understand the data in this chapter, 
one must consider how the variables interact with one another. Hence, discussion will 
now turn to the interactions between various variables and whether the research 
questions can be answered, hence building towards a case that various metrics on 
YouTube can have an impact on the levels of engagement on videos on YouTube. 
5.3: Topic and user engagement
One of the areas this thesis was interested in was the potential link between the topic of 
news being presented and the levels of user engagement with them. Due to the 
multifaceted interests of any given society, one would expect that certain topics of news 
are more popular and hence engaged with more than others. With the idea that a 
healthy democratic society has a fully functioning public sphere in which the public 
engage with all “matters of general interest.” (Habermas, 1964: 49), it is crucial to 
consider the relationship between the topic of news content and the extent to which the 
public engages with it.
Initially just looking views, the most passive forms of user engagement, one can see 
that the most viewed topic on average across all five networks was terrorism with just 
over 70,000 views per video (Table 5.4). Not only did terrorism have the highest number 
of views on average, it also had the highest number of comments with 435 and dislikes 
with 212. The only variable that it did not rank highest was in likes, where it only had the 
6th highest on average across videos covering that topic. 
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Table 5.4: Average number of views a video received per topic as well as the standard 
deviation for each topic and total number of videos that covered each topic
Topic Mean StDev Number observed
Advert 3,987 9,170 41
Business 5,208 17,278 25
International Politics 6,849 25,344 82
Health 8,103 28,778 46
International News 10,136 23,173 142
Weather 11,148 18,606 10
Tech/Science 12,244 22,770 34
Entertainment 13,288 40,885 70
Crime 17,913 40,538 179
Media 18,835 37,489 53
Domestic Politics 19,458 39,538 360
Education 20,219 39,106 32
Misc 28,300 52,280 103
Terrorism 70,604 117,950 62
As to the relationship between all topics and whether they receive a similar level of 
engagement across the four variables of likes, dislikes, comments and views one can 
see in Table 5.5 that the rank, that being how each topic fared against each other by 
variable seems somewhat consistent. Every topic aside from business and international 
politics has its own median rank. These rankings lead one to think that there is a 
correlation between the number of views, likes, dislikes and comments.
139
Table 5.5: How each topic performed against each other by engagement variable as 
well as it’s average rank of all four variables combined
Topic ranking
Topic Likes Dislikes Comments Views Average rank Median rank
Terrorism 6 1 1 1 1 1
Misc 1 3 2 2 2 2
Media 2 2 3 5 3 3
Education 3 4 4 3 4 4
Domestic Politics 4 5 6 4 5 5
Crime 5 7 5 6 6 6
Entertainment 9 6 9 7 7 7
Tech/Science 7 8 8 8 8 8
International 
News 11 10 11 10 10 10
Health 8 13 7 11 10 11
Business 10 12 10 13 12 12
International 
Politics 12 11 12 12 12 12
Advert 14 9 13 14 12 13
Weather 13 14 14 9 12 14
One way in which the link between each of the variable can be further established is 
through looking at scatterplot charts in which each of the variables are measured 
against each other. As can be seen in charts 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, there is clear evidence to
suggest that the more views a video receives, the more likes, dislikes and comments it 
will receive.
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Chart 5.1: Scatterplot chart showing the number of views each video received by the 
number of likes each video received.
Chart 5.2: Scatterplot chart showing the number of views each video received by the 
number of dislikes each video received.
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Chart 5.3: Scatterplot chart showing the number of views each video received by the 
number of comments each video received.
From the data gathered, one could say that there is indeed a relationship between the 
topic being discussed in a video and the number of likes, dislikes, comments and views 
a video receives. Good examples of this are three videos by CNN on the topic of 
terrorism, specifically the attacks in Paris. Videos ‘New video of Swat team storming 
The Bataclan’, ‘Paris shooting survivor: It was 'a bloodbath'’ and ‘Report: People killed, 
injured in Paris shooting’ all had relatively high, yet similar number of views, comments, 
likes and dislikes. This data lends support to Shoemaker’s (1996) model of news values 
in which it is theorized that the public pays more attention to events that are both 
deviant and socially significant.
Similarly at the other end of the spectrum videos ‘Bush vs. Rubio: A tale of two heat 
maps’, ‘Gretchen's Take: FBN debate was about candidates, policies’ and ‘Rating the 
performance of GOP debate moderators’ which all covered the topic of media, had a 
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relatively low and similar number of views, comments, likes and dislikes. In all three of 
these cases they had fewer than 100 views.
One interesting example to highlight is by TYT which is entitled ‘Woman Freaks Out 
Over Gay Soup Ad’. This is in the miscellaneous topic category and as can be seen in 
Table 5.2, the average number of views for videos in this category is 28,300. However, 
the video has nearly 194,376 views as well as 3726 comments, 5035 likes and 515 
dislikes. All of these are far higher than the average for videos in the miscellaneous 
category. However, other videos in that same category such as ‘Kimberly's OMT: 
Honoring our veterans’ has only 158 views, 2 likes and no comments or dislikes. Similar 
instances of extremes can be found in other topic categories as well. What this indicates 
is that when looking at relationships between the topic of a video and the amount of 
user engagement it has, one must be mindful of looking at individual examples or small 
groups as individual videos may in fact be outliers and hence must be looked at 
alongside a larger sample of videos within that topic.
The motivations that go into a viewer deciding whether to like or dislike a video is a 
subjective one that is wholly dependent upon the context and content of the video being 
viewed as well as the individual’s reaction to said video.
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, past research by Uribe and Gunter (2007) 
indicated that news stories with sensational or dramatic content are more likely to elicit 
an emotional response by an audience. Due to this it was suspected that topics like 
terrorism would generate the greatest number of user engagements. The evidence from 
the data suggests that this is indeed the case with terrorism focussed videos garnering 
on average the most number views, comments and dislikes. Whilst videos on the topic 
of terrorism did not elicit the highest number of likes on average per video, this is likely 
due to the context and content of the video being hard to ‘like’. This is a key finding in 
two regards. Firstly, not only does it address the part of RQ1 that is concerned with how 
the topic of a news video on YouTube is related to the levels of user engagement, but it 
also lends support to the idea that YouTube as a platform is not vastly different from 
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other media formats at least in regard to this specific area. This speaks towards aspects 
of Jenkins’ (2004) concept of media convergence in that the trends in the cultural 
consumption (Garcia Canclini, 2008) can be seen to be similar across various platforms. 
Secondly, the fact that a generally unpleasant topic such as terrorism does not generate 
the same number of likes as it does in other manners of user engagement, suggests 
that there is greater nuance required in the understanding of what makes a user decide 
to ‘like’ a video. Although there is existing research relating to the appeal of horror 
(Tudor, 2010) and how news organisations tend to push more negative news stories 
under the guiding idea of ‘if it bleeds, it leads’ (Kupchick & Bracy, 2009; Melkote, 2009; 
Dimitrova et al, 2005), future work must be considered in relation to the appeal of bad 
news videos on YouTube and what makes people ‘like’ them.
5.4: Format and user engagement
According to the data, out of the five formats looked at, roundtable discussions 
averaged the highest number of views, comments, likes and dislikes. The format with 
the lowest average across the four variables was produced segment videos. Also 
notable between these two formats is that they each have the highest and lowest 
standard deviation across the variable respectively. When looking at Table 5.6 one can 
see that for the roundtable discussion videos, there were a larger number of outlier 
videos with extreme levels of engagement, whereas in produced segment videos, the 
amount of engagement per variable is similar to one another.
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Table 5.6: Average and standard deviation of views, comments, likes and dislikes per 
video by each format recorded as well as total number of videos observed per format
Type of user engagement Format Mean StDev Number observed
Views
Produced 
segment 6,578 15,085 476
1 to 1 13,844 35,892 341
Monologue 30,552 67,527 175
Live reporting 32,403 68,904 38
Round table 42,318 65,515 209
Comments
Produced 
segment 36 67 476
Live reporting 119 197 38
1 to 1 150 446 341
Monologue 339 778 175
Round table 493 837 209
Likes
Produced 
segment 40 69 476
Live reporting 62 74 38
1 to 1 170 568 341
Monologue 436 938 175
Round table 683 936 209
Dislikes
Produced 
segment 16 42 476
1 to 1 39 98 341
Live reporting 41 68 38
Monologue 91 223 175
Round table 150 439 209
The data in the table above shows that round table discussions tend to generate greater 
amounts of user engagement with monologues being the second highest, which would 
lend support to the idea that presentation formats that allow for greater parasocial 
interactions tend to generate more user engagement and hence enhance the public 
sphere more. By feeling that there is some form of relationship or bond between 
themselves and the news presenter, an audience member is more likely to interact with 
that content (Rihi & Wegner, 2017). However, it does not indicate that this is the sole 
reason in determining the level of user engagement a video will receive. To highlight 
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this, if one looks at the top ten and bottom ten videos in terms of any of the variables of 
user engagement, there is an even spread in the format being used. What this therefore 
suggests is that the format that the news is presented in has little to no impact on the 
level of user engagement that it generates on its own, but when considered alongside 
other factors such as the topic of the content then it may play an enhancing role.
To illustrate the fact that format by itself has little impact on the levels of user 
engagement, one can look at some of the videos that whilst having a very low number 
of views, even for their given format, also happen to have a high level of engagement in 
terms of comments or likes. One such example is ‘Gretchen's Take: A win for traditional 
holiday displays’ which whilst being a monologue, only has 559 views yet also has 38 
comments. Similarly, ‘Bush vs. Rubio: A tale of two heat maps’ has only 10 views yet 
has 3 comments, 3 likes and 5 dislikes.
What the data suggests is that whilst there may be some relationship between the 
format of the news being discussed and the levels of engagement it is certainly not the 
main determining factor. Roundtable discussions appear to generate noticeably more 
engagements than produced segments, thereby implying that the format for the news 
being discussed is a factor. 
5.5: Topic and format
This section looks at whether cumulatively the networks tend to use one particular 
format when covering any of the recorded topics such as whether monologues were 
used more frequently when covering education videos for example. If there is a 
relationship, this would contribute towards the idea that there is not one single variable 
that dictates user engagement with a video as they would all, or at least in the case of 
topic and format, be linked to one another and hence influence one another.
One of the relationships regarding these two variables that sticks out from the data is 
between live reporting and crime related videos. Whilst crime related videos made up 
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14.4% of the total number of videos analysed (Table 5.7), they made up 55% of all the 
videos that had a live reporting format whereas across the other formats, crime videos 
only accounted for between 10 to 13% of the total for each format. Other notable data 
points in relation to the link between topic and format, is that for 1 to 1, monologue and 
roundtable formats, domestic politics was the single largest topic for each of them with 
45%.
Table 5.7: Total number of videos for each topic, by the format they were presented in.
Format Advert Business Crime
Domestic 
Politics Education Entertainment Health
1 to 1 0 6 51 141 9 21 17
Live reporting 0 0 21 3 0 0 0
Monologue 0 0 17 78 4 3 0
Produced 
segment 41 18 63 43 9 40 21
Round table 0 1 27 95 10 6 8
Total
41 25 179 360 32 70 46
3.31% 2.02% 14.45% 29.06% 2.58% 5.65% 3.71%
Format
International 
News
International 
Politics Media Misc Tech/Science Terrorism Weather
1 to 1 19 20 15 17 6 18 1
Live reporting 3 1 0 1 0 9 0
Monologue 11 5 18 21 3 13 2
Produced 
segment 95 43 11 49 17 19 7
Round table 14 13 9 15 8 3 0
Total
142 82 53 103 34 62 10
11.46% 6.62% 4.28% 8.31% 2.74% 5.00% 0.81%
Overall, it appears that there is no link between the topic and format being used. Whilst 
there does seem to be some tendency for the networks to use live reporting for crime as 
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stated above, there does not seem to be any other noticeable trends. A possible a case 
could be made for international news focussed stories being more likely to be given a 
produced segment format as it makes up 20% of the videos with that format which is 
substantially higher than in the other formats. However, it is not clear from the data 
collected that there is enough evidence to suggest that there is a link between the topics 
being discussed in a YouTube video and the format that is used to present it.
5.6: User generated content and user engagement
Although YouTube is a platform built for the purpose of sharing user generated content, 
this section is specifically looking at whether or not news networks using the platform 
have any greater success, that being the amount of engagement a video receives, with 
their own videos if they utilise UGC within their own videos. 
From the data gathered there are two key aspects to note. The first is that UGC was 
only used in 12% data sample. This means that if UGC were to have any impact in any 
way on other variables, it would only do so on a relatively small amount. The lack of 
presence of UGC on videos uploaded by established news organisations does have 
ramifications for future research as with YouTube becoming more professionalised and 
dominated by already established brands (Kim, 2012), then the role that YouTube plays 
in enhancing the public sphere through the empowerment of members of the public is 
called into question.
The second aspect to note is that it would appear that the use of UGC has a very limited 
effect on the four variables of engagement. The data shows that having UGC does on 
average lead to a higher number of views and a higher number of comments (Table 
5.8). A video containing UGC will on average have just under 3000 more views and 30 
more comments, or 1.15 times the number of views and comments that a video that 
does not. However, for the variables of likes and dislikes, having UGC in a video has a 
negative effect on these variables with the number of likes being 0.95 times the average 
and the number of dislikes being 0.78 times the average. An important aspect to note is 
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that these numbers do not factor in the title of the videos. This is important as the 
audience is unlikely to know whether a video has UGC in it or not and hence choose to 
engage with it. For example, the title of the video ‘Baltimore officer: Freddie Gray's knife 
was illegal’ gives no indication that the video contains user generated content. Other 
videos such as ‘Miami Cop Brutally Assaults Handcuffed Woman [VIDEO]’ contain a 
clear indicator to the potential viewer that the YouTube video is likely to contain 
additional video content not produced by the news organisation that has uploaded the 
video, in this case, TYT. Due to this, the significance of having UGC in a video does fall 
into question.
Table 5.8: Average number of views, comments, likes and dislikes per video as well as 
total number and percent observed
Type of user 
engagement
Contains UGC Mean Number observed Percent Observed
Views
No 18,437 1,090 88%
Yes 21,326 149 12%
Comments
No 186 1,090 88%
Yes 215 149 12%
Likes
No 242 1,090 88%
Yes 231 149 12%
Dislikes
No 58 1,090 88%
Yes 45 149 12%
Total for each variable 1,239 100%
However, the actual content of the UGC that is being used is more likely to have an 
impact than the fact it is being used in the first place. As stated in the coding guide, 
UGC includes things such as “Facebook posts and tweets” as well as mobile phone 
footage etc. Some UGC taking the form of a video of a riot or a natural disaster is likely 
to have a greater impact on the engagement variables than a single tweet or Facebook 
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post. Two videos that highlight this point are ‘Racial incidents reported on several 
campuses’ and ‘#AnswerMann -- Answering viewer questions’. The first video contains 
footage filmed on a mobile phone showing students conducting racial chants on a bus. 
The latter video contains a tweet from a member of the public asking a question to the 
shows anchor. Both videos are from CNN and both are produced segments however 
the video containing the more sensational UGC received 109 comments, 31 likes and 
69 dislikes compared to the sedated UGC of a viewer's tweet in the other video which 
only received 2 comments, 7 likes and 10 dislikes.
Overall the data suggests that the mere use of UGC in a video does not have any large 
impact on the level of engagement with a video. What is more apparent is that it is the 
type of UGC that is used that would be a greater factor in determining the strength of 
engagement from the audience
5.7: YouTube titles and user engagement
As outlined in the literature review, the use of language is very important to journalism 
as it is language that helps frame the issues that are being presented by any news 
organisation. The use of sensationalist or ‘clickbaity; headlines is an effective means of 
getting an audience’s attention (Pengnate, 2019, Bhowmik et al, 2019) and hence 
getting them to engage with the public sphere in some form. Due to this, RQ2 which is 
concerned with the role that emotional language plays in the levels of user engagement 
was asked, in order to explore this relationship further.
Measuring emotion is a tricky matter and one that can be done in a number of different 
ways. To answer the question of whether the titles used for each news video on 
YouTube can have any impact on the engagement of that video one must have a 
quantifiable means of doing so. As detailed in chapter 4, this study used the sentiment 
analysis program SentiStrength which has been used in various other academic studies 
that focus on social media and comments (Thelwall, Buckley & Paltoglou, 2011). This 
program helps break down the title of each video into a positive and negative sentiment 
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score based not only on the words used, but the sentence structure and punctuation as 
well.
Before exploring the links between the sentiment expressed in the title of a video and 
the levels of user engagement, there are some other trends in the data that are worth 
noting. Firstly, across all 1239 videos in the dataset, the average sentiment expressed 
in the titles was -0.54. This means that the overall language to describe the news videos 
on YouTube by the 5 networks analysed was slightly negative in nature. When one 
looks at the average sentiment for each network (Table 5.9), it can be seen that the 
range of sentiment goes from -0.31 with Fox News, to -1.08 with TYT. The potential 
reasons for this difference will be explored in chapter 6.
Table 5.9: Average sentiment in video titles for each network as well as the total number 
observed per network
Network Mean Number observed
AJE -0.687 227
BBC -0.578 45
CNN -0.473 531
Fox News -0.314 309
TYT -1.079 127
When looking at title sentiment by the topic of each video (Table 5.10), there are some 
unsurprising trends in the data. The two topics with the most negative sentiment score 
on their videos were the ones on terrorism with -1.68 and crime with -0.98. Due to the 
nature of these topics, one would expect the titles of these video to carry a greater 
number of negatively connotative words. Words such as “deadly”, “killed”, “fear” and 
“attacks” appear in many of the videos on terrorism and these words have a large 
impact on the overall sentiment of a title. To illustrate this point, video ID1142 has the 
title “Deadly suicide attack rocks southern Beirut”. In SentiStrength, the first three words 
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of the title generate a negative sentiment score and the fact they are chained together 
further increases the negative score to a total of -3.
Table 5.10: Average sentiment in video titles for each topic as well as the total number 
observed per topic
Topic Mean Number observed
Advert -0.073 41
Business -0.320 25
Crime -0.983 179
Domestic Politics -0.278 360
Education -0.625 32
Entertainment -0.300 70
Health -0.478 46
International News -0.852 142
International Politics -0.293 82
Media -0.491 53
Misc -0.291 103
Tech/Science -0.118 34
Terrorism -1.677 62
Weather -0.800 10
At the other end of the scale, videos which were adverts for other shows had the least 
negative sentiment score of -0.07. Whilst it is still negative, the fact that it is the least 
negative out of all of the topics should not be surprising as these videos are actively 
looking to promote the network they are on.
From studying all of the data, it appears that there is indeed some relationship between 
the sentiment of the video’s title and the amount of audience engagement there is. 
Across all four measures of engagement, views, comment, likes and dislikes, the data 
suggests that videos with a greater negatively sentimented title attract more of each of 
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those measurements. Whilst the correlation is weak, and notably even weaker for the 
measurement of likes, there does seem to be some relationship. 
Looking at the total number of videos that have a particularly high individual positive 
sentiment (above 3) and a high individual negative sentiment (-4 and below), one sees 
that there are a greater number of videos with high negative sentiment, 69, than there 
are those with a high positive sentiment, 50. If the range of high individual negative 
sentiment is broadened to include videos with a score of -3 and below there are in fact 
255 videos. This again adds to the notion that news coverage by the networks in this 
study tend to frame their videos in a more negative than positive way.
The reason for why this trend is unsurprising is due to previous studies linking negative 
news coverage to greater interest and engagement than more positive stories. Studies 
by Trussler & Soroka (2014) and Robinson (2007) show that audiences tend to gravitate 
towards not only more negative topics as Robinson showed, but also towards stories 
that are framed negatively as shown by Trussler & Soroka.
One interesting aspect to consider in particular is the difference between likes and 
dislikes in relation to a videos sentiment score. When examining the relationship with 
likes, one sees that videos that have an overall positive sentiment score received far 
fewer likes than those that had an overall negative sentiment score. It would seem then 
that the language that is used in a video’s title does have some impact upon the degree 
to which the audience will engage with it.
5.8: Further discussion
From the data analysed, one can reflect on the overall picture that has been painted 
and place it in context with other works in this area by considering how the data helps 
answer research questions 1 and 2 proposed in this study.
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It has been argued that hard news topics such as politics or international affairs are 
often more negative in nature than soft news topics (Soroka, 2015). With this in mind, it 
is no surprise that the data in this study shows that videos covering the topics of crime, 
international news and terrorism had on average the titles with the most negatively 
sentimented language. Although this is not the only reason for videos on these topics to 
have negative sentiments, others being that some networks may have more negatively 
titled videos in general and happen to also cover these three topics the most, a case 
can be made that the data shows a clear link between topic and the level of negativity in 
any videos title. 
However, some of the data does go against the notion that hard news is more negative 
in nature as both domestic and international politics, whilst still having overall negatively 
titled videos, -0.278 and -0.293, the average for these two topics was less negative than 
the average across all topics, -0.54. There are a few potential explanations for this. The 
first one is simply due to the sample of videos that was chosen, and it just happened to 
be that of those videos that were dealing with domestic and international politics, this 
sample group was less negative than potential other sample groups. Another 
explanation is that of the networks looked at, they do not choose to frame, whether 
conscious or unconsciously, such topics negatively. A third factor that may explain this 
is the nature of the domestic politics videos, in that a large portion of them in the data 
set were dealing with the American 2016 election campaign which has been deemed by 
many to be an exceedingly untraditional campaign season (Seib, 2015; Kay, 2016). Due 
to this perception, news organisations may be framing such stories in a different way. 
Despite this factor, it could be seen as contributing towards the notion of media hybridity 
in that news organisations appear to be applying similar news values across all their 
content output. Whether it is one of these reasons or a combination of others, the trend 
in this data set is certainly something that further research should look into as to 
whether or not, at least on online video platforms, the hard news topics of domestic and 
international politics are having different frames or news values placed upon them 
compared to either their other platform counterparts or their historical counterparts such 
as videos from the 2008 US election.
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Another area of discussion can be had around how the data did not show any 
correlation between the format of the videos and the amount of engagement that they 
received. There are large bodies of work dedicated to the impact the framing of news 
stories can have on an audience. Some work suggests that format can play a key role in 
regards to an audience’s ability to recall the story (Van Der Molen & Van Der Voort, 
2009) as well as having a role in shaping the audience’s attitude to the story in question 
(Oliver et al., 2012). However other research suggests that format does not play that 
large a role in determining the amount of engagement an audience has with a story  
(Guerrazzi et al., 2016). In Guerrazzi’s study, one of the hypotheses tested was whether 
the format of an online video would be a significant predictor in the amount of time spent 
viewing a news video. The study found that there “was no relationship between format 
and time spent viewing a story” (2016: 9). 
Despite the earlier point being made that the data in this study lends support to 
Shoemaker’s (1996) model of news values, Guerrazzi’s findings along with the data in 
this study relating to the use of different formats, should force future research to 
consider the extent to which the manner in which a story is presented factors into the 
levels of audience attention when considering news values that are associated with 
deviance and social significance. One cannot exclude however, the idea that format 
plays no role in determining engagement. There are a number of variables that were not 
accounted for in the data that could show some level of impact. Among these variables 
is the effect each format had on each individual topic as for example, a live report may 
have a greater impact on engagement for the topic of terrorism than the format of a 
round table discussion. Another variable unaccounted for is the news anchor/journalist 
in the video. Some anchors may excel in a monologue format, regardless of topic and 
through their delivery of the news, may cause an audience to engage more, than an 
anchor who does not excel in a monologue format. An example to illustrate this notion is 
that for Fox News, a number of their videos in which they use a monologue format have 
the anchors name in the video. The video titled “Kurtz: The media's 'thug' fixation” 
alludes to the fact that the anchor Howard Kurtz is delivering the monologue, something 
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that he frequently does on his show. The video itself whilst only receiving just 1031 
views, in terms of active engagement it received 18 comments, 25 likes and 8 dislikes 
which is far higher than what would be expected with that relatively low number of 
views. This among a number of other cases highlights how the impact of the format of a 
video may depend more on the person delivering the news in that format rather than the 
format itself. The success of a news video being more dependent on the deliverer rather 
than the format or topic is certainly an area that requires further academic research.
Another area worth noting upon is the nature of user generated content and its use by 
the news networks looked at in this study. The premise of YouTube is to allow “billions 
of people to discover, watch and share originally-created videos.” (YouTube, 2016). For 
the vast majority of the videos analysed, the notion of originally created videos is not 
true as for Fox News, CNN, Al Jazeera and the BBC nearly all of their videos are 
segments taken from their TV channel which links back to the ideas of cross pollination 
and a hybrid media system discussed in chapter 3. The reason this is worth 
commenting upon is that the original premise of YouTube seems somewhat different 
when it comes to the genre of news videos. Whilst the elements of discovery, watching 
and sharing are all there, it seems that the established news networks see it as a 
platform where original content is not necessary and that it is simply another platform 
from which their TV content can be watched and shared. Jin Kim has suggested, that 
the “evolution of YouTube from an amateur-driven medium to a professional-dominated 
channel coexists with the market expansion of the TV industry into the web.” (2012: 61). 
What this proposes is a move from user generated content to professionally created 
content. The convergence between professionally created content and an amateur-
driven medium suggests that the role of UGC is somewhat different when it comes to its 
use by large organisations. The blurring of lines between professional content and 
amateur appears to be happening on YouTube. 
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CHAPTER 6: Trends with individual networks and branding
6.1: Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how each of the news organisations 
analysed in this thesis display particular traits that make their YouTube channel unique 
in some way. This will be done by presenting some of the data collected and discussing
it around the concepts of the breadth of topics covered, the concept of viewership and 
the notion of branding. It is important to make these distinctions as scholars have 
argued that the news media is becoming homogenized in the content it is producing 
(Groshek, 2008; Boczkowski, 2010; Boczkowski & Santos, 2007). With each network 
starting to use the platform between 2005 and 2006, one may expect that their success 
on the platform would be somewhat similar. However as will be shown in the data 
collected, this has not been the case and this may be due to the distinct traits that each 
one manifests. The discussions in this chapter also geared towards both research 
questions 1 and 2, but unlike the previous chapter, will be approaching them from the 
perspective of the individual organisations rather than the news media as a whole.
With the contexts and justifications for why each organisation was chosen for this study 
being discussed in the methodology of this study in mind, one can proceed to analyse 
some of the trends for each network in regards to the videos analysed in this study. To 
begin with, one can compare the range of topics covered by each of the networks. It is 
important to consider the breadth of coverage that each of the networks provides as this 
may have implications regarding further discussions as if certain topics are neglected 
for example, then not only may this mean that any general conclusions drawn later in 
this analysis would have to be tempered when it came to those neglected topics, but it 
also would speak towards any arguments being made regarding the organisations in 
question contribution towards the public sphere.
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6.2: Breadth of topics covered
Out of the 14 topics that were specifically accounted for, when viewed across all five of 
the networks combined, it would appear that there is indeed a broad and relatively 
balanced spread of topics covered. The balance is relative as whilst domestic politics 
and crime combined make up 43% (Table 5.3) of the total number of videos, there has 
been a precedent for cable news networks to focus more heavily on these topics 
(Jurkowitz et al., 2013). This trend is not just limited to national news or American news 
channels as studies by Brown & Roemer (2016) as well as Henderson (2014) show. 
Therefore, whilst it can be argued that there is indeed a broad range of topics covered 
by the networks, it is important to look at each specific network to see if by themselves 
they provide a broad range. The reason why this is important to consider is due to the 
existing research concerning the idea that audiences are becoming more siloed and 
selective in terms of their news consumption (Garrett, 2009b; Stroud, 2008) and that if it 
is the case that audiences are choosing to consume news from a limited pool of 
sources, then is it important to see whether or not these siloed audiences are at least 
receiving a broad range of news topics.
Looking at Al Jazeera English first, the most notable point about the breadth of its 
coverage of the 14 news topics is that there is a disproportionate focus on international 
news. Whilst international news made up 11.4% of the total news coverage across all of 
the networks, on AJE it accounted for 38% of that networks coverage (Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1: Total count and percent of coverage given to each topic by AJE
Topic Number observed Percent observed
Advert 21 9.25%
Business 12 5.29%
Crime 11 4.85%
Domestic Politics 1 0.44%
Education 6 2.64%
Entertainment 10 4.41%
Health 2 0.88%
International News 86 37.89%
International Politics 42 18.50%
Media 9 3.96%
Misc 10 4.41%
Tech/Science 8 3.52%
Terrorism 7 3.08%
Weather 2 0.88%
Total 227 100.00%
Part of the explanation for this could be due to the structuring of the organisation in 
which it is the only major English speaking global news channel with its headquarters 
based in the Middle East, as well as maintain bureaus in places such as Gaza and 
Harare where other news networks do not. This, combined with one of the network’s 
slogans ‘Every Story, Every Side’, implying that they wish to provide an alternative 
perspective than the Western centric one provided by other global news networks, 
would account for why they have a greater proportion of their content covering 
international news than other networks. Along with their higher rate of international 
news coverage, is the fact that videos that were adverts for other programs on the 
network made up 9% of its total videos which is three times greater than the average 
across all networks. With AJE having a much stronger focus on these two topics 
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compared to the other networks, it could be suggested that any future conclusions 
drawn about videos that cover these two topics, are much more applicable to AJE than 
the other networks.
CNN follows what other studies in the field would expect in terms of topic spread as it 
focuses most heavily on crime and domestic politics. Whilst domestic politics makes up 
a large portion of its total videos at 24% (Table 6.2), this is in fact below the combined 
network average of 29%. However when it comes to crime, whilst making up 25% of its 
total videos, this is significantly higher than the combined network average of 14%. 
CNN’s strong focus on crime stories means that conclusions drawn about crime stories 
are potentially more applicable to this network than to the others. The other topics 
covered by CNN are relatively similar to the combined network average and so it could 
be said that it does provide a broad range of topics.
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Table 6.2: Total count and percent of coverage given to each topic by CNN
Topic Number observed Percent observed
Advert 17 3.20%
Business 12 2.26%
Crime 132 24.86%
Domestic Politics 129 24.29%
Education 8 1.51%
Entertainment 49 9.23%
Health 14 2.64%
International News 39 7.34%
International Politics 21 3.95%
Media 3 0.56%
Misc 39 7.34%
Tech/Science 17 3.20%
Terrorism 43 8.10%
Weather 8 1.51%
Total 531 100.00%
When considering the BBC’s content (Table 6.3), it follows a somewhat similar spread 
to the other networks. However, it is harder to derive strong conclusions as to whether 
the BBC covers a broad range of topics due to the small sample it has. It should be
noted that the three networks mentioned so far have had the breadth of their coverage 
analysed in a study by Kenneth Loomis (2009) who did a content analysis of the three 
network’s, world news web pages. Whilst a like for like comparison cannot be made 
between the webpage content and broadcast content, it is nonetheless noteworthy that 
Loomis found that the “networks covered essentially the same stories and quoted 
similar sources” (2009:143). This study, taken in conjunction with the discussion of the 
range of topics covered by the three networks mentioned thus far could lead one to 
conclude that if it is the case that CNN and AJE do in fact cover a broad range of topics, 
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then despite the low sample size for the BBC in this study, Loomis’ research would 
suggest that it too would also cover a broad range of topics in its YouTube content. One 
way to test this would be to expand the data collection period of this study so as to 
collect a suitable number of BBC YouTube videos. By combining the results of this 
study along with Loomis’ findings, the suggestion could be made that the media 
convergence that has been alluded to in other parts of this study is contributing towards 
the notion of the homogenization of news media alluded to at the start of this chapter. 
By highlighting how content between CNN, AJE and the BBC is similar on their websites 
and how this also then seems to be the case for their YouTube content, this seems to 
not only provide that it is the case that the news is becoming more homogenized, but 
that YouTube as a news platform is contributing towards this homogenization.
Table 6.3: Total count and percent of coverage given to each topic by the BBC
Topic Number observed Percent observed
Advert 0 0.00%
Business 0 0.00%
Crime 2 4.44%
Domestic Politics 12 26.67%
Education 0 0.00%
Entertainment 2 4.44%
Health 1 2.22%
International News 9 20.00%
International Politics 10 22.22%
Media 0 0.00%
Misc 8 17.78%
Tech/Science 0 0.00%
Terrorism 1 2.22%
Weather 0 0.00%
Total 45 100.00%
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Fox News has three notable data trends in its range of coverage in comparison to the 
other networks. The most stark one is its significantly strong focus on domestic policy 
stories, which makes up over half of its total output with 54% (Table 6.4) which is far 
greater than the combined network average of 29%. The two other trends occur in two 
of the smaller topic categories of education and health, which made up 4% and 8% 
respectively of Fox’s total output. These are both twice the combined network average 
for these topics. Whilst still relatively low in the total amount of videos, the fact that Fox 
News provides greater coverage to these two topics is worth noting for any future 
discussions when dealing with them.
Table 6.4: Total count and percent of coverage given to each topic by Fox News
Topic Number observed Percent observed
Advert 1 0.32%
Business 0 0.00%
Crime 15 4.85%
Domestic Politics 168 54.37%
Education 13 4.21%
Entertainment 4 1.29%
Health 26 8.41%
International News 4 1.29%
International Politics 7 2.27%
Media 32 10.36%
Misc 25 8.09%
Tech/Science 6 1.94%
Terrorism 8 2.59%
Weather 0 0.00%
Total 309 100.00%
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Finally with The Young Turks, there are three noticeable aspects to the spread of topics 
that it covers. The first is that much like Fox News, domestic politics forms the most 
frequently covered topic by the network, with 39% (Table 6.5). Whilst the focus is not 
quite as strong as Fox’s, it is still 10% higher than the combined network average. The 
second noticeable aspect is the proportion of videos that cover miscellaneous stories. 
This statistic is of particular note as TYT is considered to be a non-traditional news 
network and so it may be suggested that because of this, they are more likely to cover 
stories that fall outside of the remit of traditional news networks like the others in this 
study. When one takes a closer look at the miscellaneous videos by TYT, it is possible 
to draw together a theme that runs across these videos. The titles of many of these 
videos make reference or allude to religion, religious figures in society and LGBT 
issues. Examples such as ‘Why YOU Have To Follow YOUR Religion And WE DON'T’, 
‘Millionaire Pastor Said Jesus Doesn’t Want You To Know How Much Money He Has’ 
and ‘Woman Files Lawsuit Against Gay People…ALL OF THEM’ highlight this. The final 
noticeable aspect to TYT’s spread of topics is that it has a higher than average number 
of media focussed stories with 7% which is almost double the combined network 
average. It could be argued that these two final aspects may stem from TYT having 
adopted slightly different news values, or at least places a different level of importance 
on them, than the other organisations analysed. Using Harcup and O’Neill’s (2001) set 
of news values, one could argue that TYT has weighted the value of ‘Entertainment’ 
more heavily than others, due to its content focuses more on stories that deal with the 
media offer opportunities for humorous treatment. Similarly it could be argued that the 
news value of ‘Magnitude’ plays a diminished role in the organisations choice of stories 
to cover given some of the example detailed above that have a limited impact on 
society.
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Table 6.5: Total count and percent of coverage given to each topic by TYT
Topic Number observed Percent observed
Advert 2 1.57%
Business 1 0.79%
Crime 19 14.96%
Domestic Politics 50 39.37%
Education 5 3.94%
Entertainment 5 3.94%
Health 3 2.36%
International News 4 3.15%
International Politics 2 1.57%
Media 9 7.09%
Misc 21 16.54%
Tech/Science 3 2.36%
Terrorism 3 2.36%
Weather 0 0.00%
Total 127 100.00%
Overall it appears that individually, the networks do in fact cover a broad range of 
topics. Whilst each of the networks do focus more on some topics than others, these 
differences appear limited to a single topic such as more international news for AJE, 
more miscellaneous stories for TYT or more domestic politics for Fox. Hence when 
considering the total output across all five of the network’s YouTube channels one can 
conclude that they do cover a broad range of topics and contribute positively towards 
the public sphere, at least on the narrow terms of publishing content about matters of 
general interest (Habermas, 1964: 49).
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6.3: YouTube Channel Viewership
It is understood that in the world of media, particularly online news media, that one of 
the key indicators of success is the number of people who are watching, reading or 
listening to your content as this speaks towards the role that journalism plays within a 
democratic society which was discussed in previous chapters. When it comes to video 
content it can be argued that the number of views a video receives increases the 
commercial value of that video as advertisers seek to reach the largest audience and 
are willing to pay more for their adverts to be placed in or alongside content that attracts 
the most viewers. For cable news channels in America, viewership has generally 
increased over the last decade, with a noticeable increase between 2015 and 2016 
(Matsa, 2017). This is in part why these channels have seen increased revenue during 
the same time as they, like many other cable channels, have been able to charge 
advertisers more to be able to advertise alongside their content (Steinberg, 2017). 
Similarly on YouTube the more views a video receives the more money the videos 
owner, and YouTube itself, will receive. It should be noted that a news network like the 
BBC which is a public service broadcasters may choose to not run adverts on any of 
their YouTube videos and due to the nature of public service broadcasters, are not 
concerned with the amount of money that can be generated by each video.
If one uses total viewing numbers as the sole determinant of the commercial success of 
a YouTube channel, then the data in this study clearly suggests which of the five 
network is the most successful (Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6: Average number of views received per video by network
Network Mean
TYT 104,790
BBC 24,526
CNN 12,975
Fox News 4,749
AJE 2,226
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The Young Turks attains a far larger number of viewers per video on YouTube than any 
of the other more traditional news networks. Despite having a smaller infrastructure and 
a smaller budget than the other networks, they are at least in terms of viewing figures, a 
greater success than the other four networks looked at combined. Whilst none of the 
networks publicly disclose the amount of money they make via YouTube in terms of 
advertising, it is reasonable to assume TYT is far more profitable than the others when it 
comes to YouTube. There are of course two key things to point out here. Firstly, as 
stated previously, TYT is a news network whose business model is heavily focussed 
towards YouTube and so they are likely to devote resources towards getting as many 
views on YouTube as possible. The other networks are likely not as concerned with 
their YouTube viewing figures as they are with their TV figures, as the latter is where the 
majority of their advertising revenue will come from. Hence, in terms of devoting 
resources in each of their networks, their YouTube channel may be a somewhat 
neglected platform. Evidence for this argument can be found in how these other 
organisations devote resources to the platform. In the case of CNN, their press releases 
about their digital platforms make no reference to YouTube or their competitors on the 
platform like TYT (CNN Press Room, 2019a). Alongside this, CNN does promote its 
online video content but only for its native website for other social media platforms like 
Facebook (CNN Press Room, 2019b). Similarly, Fox News and BBC News have shown 
that their focus for online video is more geared towards their own native platforms rather 
than YouTube (Smith, 2020; BBC Online, 2015). Al Jazeera English does acknowledge 
the role that YouTube plays, however it does so through comparison with other online 
video sharing platforms (Maccise & Marai, 2018). So despite the evidence that in 
general news organisations are investing resources in digital video content 
(Kalogeropoulos, Cherubini & Newman, 2016: 5) this effort appears to undervalue 
YouTube.
As discussed in chapter 3, the manner in which the public consumes the news is 
changing and this is one of the reasons why it is important for news networks to pay 
attention to the number of views they receive. Research shows that more people, 
currently around 38%, are getting their news online and that this trend is especially true 
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for younger people (Matsa & Lu, 2016). This, combined with other trends like greater 
access to broadband internet and use of smartphones mentioned in previous chapters 
means that news networks wishing to gain the maximum number of views on their video 
content may need to shift their priority away from TV production and towards online 
video production. As Table 6.6 above shows, the YouTube channels of TV networks lag 
far behind in terms of views compared to the online video focussed TYT. However, 
going forward the average number of views all of the networks will receive is likely to 
increase as YouTube has seen a 10-fold increase in total number of views since 2012 
(Nicas, 2017) whereas the total amount of TV being watched in America has been 
declining for a number of years (Soloman, 2017).
Other notable areas where there are distinctions between each of the networks is in 
terms of the frequency in which they uploaded videos to their channel and the length of 
their videos. The reason for considering this aspect is that the notion of consistency in 
regards to the regular update of content on a YouTube channel is likely to contribute 
towards the overall success of a channel (Welbourne & Grant, 2015: 715). Also, the 
reason why the notion of video length is important in relation to this thesis is that it 
speaks towards the notion of user engagement in that the length of a video may have 
some impact on the number of views it receives. This idea stems from research that 
suggests longer written articles not only have audiences spend more time engaged with 
them than shorter articles but also that they have an equal amount of interactions 
(Mitchell et al. 2016). The research from Mitchell found that audiences spent almost 
twice as much time with long-form articles and that they get the same amount of visitors 
than shorter news articles. If this concept is true across all forms of news content, then 
one would expect the longer videos in the dataset to have at least relatively similar 
levels of engagement if other variables stay the same.
Each network did not seem to have any discernible pattern in the number of videos they 
uploaded per day. As can be seen in Table 6.7, some days would see a greater number 
of videos uploaded across all networks when compared to others. Out of each of the 
five networks, TYT seemed to be the most consistent in the number of videos that they 
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uploaded per day with an average of 9. Whilst CNN did upload the most with an 
average of 37 a day, the number of uploads per day ranged from 20 to 52. Whilst one 
would not expect an equal number of videos uploaded per day due to the varying nature 
of each day’s news and breaking stories, one might expect some level of consistency.
One of the potential reasons why TYT was the most consistent in the number of videos 
it uploaded is that their business model is based on YouTube content and is hence 
financially reliant on the platform, whereas for networks like CNN, their main platform for 
video content is on TV. For TYT to upload an inconsistent number of videos each day 
would arguably be similar to CNN broadcasting an inconsistent number of hours of TV.
Table 6.7: Number of videos uploaded by each network every day during data collection
Date AJE BBC CNN Fox News TYT Total
01.05.15 Count 9 11 48 10 7 85
02.05.15 Count 14 3 22 1 7 47
03.05.15 Count 17 2 20 2 7 48
04.05.15 Count 23 3 40 8 10 84
05.05.15 Count 17 6 46 7 10 86
06.05.15 Count 10 10 45 15 9 89
07.05.15 Count 11 7 52 18 9 97
08.11.15 Count 18 1 21 12 0 52
09.11.15 Count 16 2 49 47 10 124
10.11.15 Count 13 0 29 56 17 115
11.11.15 Count 23 0 41 19 8 91
12.11.15 Count 29 0 52 0 10 91
13.11.15 Count 11 0 46 101 8 166
14.11.15 Count 16 0 20 13 15 64
Total Count 227 45 531 309 127 1239
One aspect of the data that is worth pointing out is which specific days there was a drop 
in the number of videos being uploaded. When looking at both CNN and Fox which 
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uploaded the greatest number of videos in total, one can see that on the 2nd and 3rd of
May and the 8th and 14th of November, each of which being weekends, there was a 
noticeable drop in videos uploaded. For example, CNN’s average was 37 videos a day 
and yet on weekends it was only uploading around 21 videos. There are obvious 
irregularities in Table 6.7 such as Fox uploading no videos on November 12th, yet 101 
videos the very next day. Similarly, the BBC did not upload any video between the 10th 
and 14th of November. These do distort the numbers somewhat, but given a larger data 
sample, one imagines that the trends hinted at in Table 6.7 would likely hold true.
When looking at the variable of video length on its own, the average length of a video 
was 4 minutes and 26 seconds, however a number of videos, particularly ones by AJE 
heavily impacted the average length of the videos as they had uploaded entire show 
broadcasts meaning that some of their videos ranged from 30 minutes in length up to 
almost 50 minutes. An example of this would be ‘Head to Head - Nigeria's future: Failed 
state or African superpower?’. This video is the entire broadcast of a weekly show 
hosted on AJE minus the advert breaks that would be present in the TV broadcast 
version of it. AJE was the only network to consistently upload entire program broadcasts 
onto its YouTube channel. Fox also had 2 videos that were a full hour in length. These 
were ‘Fox News Digital Special: Analysis of the first GOP debate’ and ‘Fox News Digital 
Special: Analysis FBN's prime-time debate’. As can be seen in their titles, these are 
both digital specials which meant that they were produced, solely for online 
consumption and were not broadcast on TV. The point that is noteworthy here is that 
amongst the hundreds of videos Fox uploaded during the data collection period it was 
only these two that Fox was willing to produce longform content specifically for their 
online audience on YouTube. The ramifications of this data for the public sphere can be 
derived through consideration of Machill, Köhler & Waldhauser’s 2007 study which 
found that “retention and comprehension can be improved by employing a narrative 
device to present TV news.” (2007: 185). Based on this, it can be argued that the public 
sphere is benefitted more by these longer YouTube videos as their length affords the 
ability for narrative structures to be developed more easily than they could be in a short 
4 minute video. Due to the fact that AJE and TYT had average video lengths of almost 7 
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minutes and 6 minutes respectively, compared to the BBC and CNN’s average length 
being closer to 3 minutes (Table 6.9), it could be argued that at least on this one issue, 
AJE and TYT are more able to positively contribute towards the public sphere as their 
length of videos allows for better narrative structures to be developed, thus improving 
the public’s retention of knowledge.
In regards to the relationship between the length of a video and the metrics of user 
engagement that were recorded in this study, an initial thought one may have had is 
that the longer a video is, the more content there is for a viewer to like or dislike and 
hence engage with. However, when one looks at the levels of user engagement 
compared to the length of video (Chart 6.1, 6.2), the data seems to indicate that there is 
no benefit in terms of generating more user engagement once a video is over 12 
minutes in length.
Chart 6.1: The length of each video compared with the number of views it received
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Chart 6.2: The length of each video compared with the number of comments it received
Also, one may think that people would prefer to watch entire shows online rather than 
just clipped out segments of TV shows. The data gathered indicates that this is not the 
case. With the two Fox videos cited above, both received fewer than 3000 views which 
is below the average number of views for a Fox video and relatively low number of 
engagements in the other metrics as well. If these two videos are compared to another 
Fox video such as ‘O'Reilly's take on the GOP debate’ which is only 1 minute in length 
yet has received over 5000 views and more engagements than either of the hour long 
Fox videos, it suggests that the length of a video has little to no bearing on the success 
of a video when it comes to audience engagement.
Academics in the past have suggested that the preferred length of a YouTube video is 
around 40 seconds in length (Thurman & Lupton, 2008) as this aids it’s shareability and 
arguably, its digestibility to the audience. Though not a like for like comparison, Pew 
Research indicates that the public engages for longer with long-form written articles 
than they do with short-form articles (Matsa & Lu, 2017). When it comes to engagement 
with videos, one can look at extreme examples that seem to indicate that the length is 
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not all that important. For instance, a video uploaded by TYT in 2014 entitled ‘Sam 
Harris and Cenk Uygur Clear the Air on Religious Violence and Islam’ is over 3 hours in 
length and yet has gained over 2.4 million views. For this many people to watch such a 
long video suggests that they are not put off by the length, but are rather drawn in by 
the topic or substance of the video. Looking at further examples from this study’s own 
data, two videos by CNN ‘New video of Swat team storming The Bataclan’ and ‘Bush 
begins 'Jeb Can Fix It' tour’ both of which are around 50 seconds in length, each have 
vastly different engagement figures. The first video which deals with the topic of 
terrorism has 411323 views, whereas the second video which deals with the topic of 
domestic politics only has 1270 views. Even when one compares videos which share 
the same topic and relative video length such as ‘Bernie Sanders: I'm not a fan of 
regime changes’ which also deals with domestic politics and received 14106 views, it is 
clear that engagement with news content, at least when it comes to the passive 
engagement of just simply viewing a video is not impacted in any way in which there is 
a noticeable pattern or trend and certainly not the case for individual networks.
One aspect that does distinguish each of the networks apart is the prominence in which 
they give their hosts when titling a video. Whereas the BBC, AJE and TYT make no 
reference to any of their hosts within the titles of their videos, both CNN and Fox do 
(Table 6.8)
Table 6.8: Number of videos uploaded by each network that make reference to their 
host
Network
Videos referencing the 
show’s host
Total number of 
videos
Percent of videos referencing the 
show’s host
AJE 0 227 0.00%
BBC 0 45 0.00%
CNN 3 531 0.56%
Fox News 48 309 15.53%
TYT 0 127 0.00%
173
It should be noted that in CNN’s case, this happens only 3 times out of the 531 of their 
videos analysed and 2 of these cases were adverts for an entertainment program being 
hosted by Anthony Bourdain whereas the other ‘Dr. Gupta: Should all high school 
athletes get EKG test?’ is a produced segment with CNN’s chief medical correspondent. 
In Fox’s case, there are 48 of their 309 videos that mention the host of the show. 
Common examples include ‘Gretchen's take: Will Obama get real about terror threat?’ 
and ‘Gutfeld: GOP infighting puts Clinton closer to White House’ both of which are 
monologues by the hosts, giving their opinion on recent news events. As was discussed 
at the start of this chapter, Fox News has a pro conservative bias when it comes to 
reporting the news and will advocate for conservative positions on many issues as this 
appeals to the particular demographic of people that they want to watch their network. 
The fact that a large proportion of their YouTube content is in effect sold to any potential 
audience, through the means of the video’s title, as a video that will contain the opinions 
of someone on the topic contained in the rest of the video’s title is something worthy of 
note. The use of the journalists name in trying to get an audience’s attention can be 
seen as an example of McGregor’s proposed news value of  ‘celebrification of the 
journalist” (2002). If one agrees with the premise of the value, it would seem that the 
data in this study suggests that at least in the case of Fox News, this value has risen in 
significance within the organisation.
This manner of titling videos brings up the notion of network identity or brand, as in what 
do networks wish to be known for. If each network’s YouTube channel is looked at in a 
vacuum, that is to say ignoring their other media platforms, one can outline a basic 
profile for each.
6.4: Branding
The idea of a news channel having a unique brand is not a new concept. News 
organisations have, for the most part, tried to brand themselves according to traditional 
news values such as those laid out by Kovatch and Rosenstiel (2001). By trying to build 
a brand around the notions of objectivity, fairness etc, news organisations believed that 
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this would encourage the public to consume their content. However growth in the 
industry, particularly through technological advancements, led to a greater choice in 
news organisations. The subsequent increase in competition has arguably forced news 
organisations to cultivate and tune their brand beyond traditional news values. Jeffery 
Jones (2012) makes the argument in favour of the idea that “cable news channels are 
now politics channels – or, better yet, they are cable television networks that, at this 
moment, use politics as the central identifying mark of their brand.” (2012: 148). He 
goes on to argue that cable news networks are no longer news operations, but are 
entertainment operations and hence brand themselves as such. As has been discussed 
in previous chapters, the news industry is heavily driven by economic factors and for 
visual mediums like TV or online video, a key element of this is viewing figures/ratings.
Having a strong brand image is now more important than ever when it comes to having 
the best TV ratings (Chan-Olmsted & Cha, 2007). It is not only academics that have 
realised the importance of branding in the news industry, but also by those in charge of
news organisations. The current president of CNN has said that “in television, and in 
particular cable television, brand is everything.” (Jeff Zucker, in Sherman, 2010). 
Similarly, the president of MSNBC has accepted this new news environment and 
realised that “Fox figured it out that you have to stand for something in cable” (Phil 
Griffin, in Sherman, 2010). Both these quotes highlight how commercial TV 
broadcasters realise that to succeed in the currently competitive environment they must, 
through branding, distinguish themselves from each other. Whilst there is competition in 
TV markets, there is arguably greater competition online due to a far greater choice in 
content. This would suggest that when it comes to news organisations, branding is an 
even more important concept. As the CEO of TYT puts it, “there is an ocean of content 
and no one will watch your brand-sanitized vanilla anymore because they have 
unlimited options.” (Uygur, 2016). The reason why this notion of branding is important is 
that, as outlined above, it speaks towards the further commercialisation of the news 
industry which as discussed in chapter 1, contributes towards the eroding of the public 
sphere.
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If the identity or brand of a news organisation is key to its success then considering the 
data discussed in the previous chapter, one is able to identify some key characteristics 
that arguably form part of each network’s YouTube channel brand. It is important to 
consider these characteristics of the network’s YouTube channels as not only does it 
generate part of the answer to a key underlying question in this thesis, that being how 
do traditional news organisations and new news organisations differ on YouTube, it also 
helps this field of study in general by providing material towards the ongoing debate as 
to whether like for like comparisons can be drawn between traditional and new media 
platforms.
There are several characteristics that are discernible from Fox News’ YouTube channel. 
As has already been stated, there is an emphasis on using their on air talents names in 
their video titles. In nearly all cases this is done to highlight to the potential viewer that 
the video will contain the opinions of that host on whatever topic is described in the rest 
of the video’s title. A related characteristic, is that nearly 1 in 5 of their videos contains a 
“?” which indicates that the video is either asking the audience to consider a question or 
that the video itself, perhaps the host named in the video’s title, will be directly 
answering it themselves. A third characteristic is their heavy focus on domestic politics 
stories, with 168 of their 309 videos focussing on that topic. Similarly, there is very little 
focus on international news or politics. A final characteristic of its YouTube channel is 
that in relation to other channels, their videos receive a relatively low number of views 
per video, with an average of 4749 (Table 6.6). In all, Fox News’ YouTube channel’s 
identity could be surmised as a channel that delivers opinion driven news predominately 
about the current events going on within the American political system. 
CNN’s YouTube channel has a number of characteristics that are different to those of 
Fox News’. The first characteristic is CNN uploads a large amount of content to the 
channel. As can be seen in Table 2, CNN uploads almost twice as many videos on any 
given day than the next closest network which is Fox. They upload nearly 3 or 4 times 
as many videos per day than the other networks. A second characteristic is the 
channel’s focus on crime and domestic politics. Another characteristic is that whilst the 
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majority of their videos receive under 10,000 views, their average was 12,975. This was 
in part due to a small number of their videos, 11, reaching over 100,000 views. A final 
characteristic is that almost half of their videos are in a produced segment format. In all 
CNN’s YouTube channel has the identity of one which has a large amount of resources 
due to the volume of content being produced as well as being a channel that focuses on
topics that most traditional TV news channels do, as according to Henderson (2014) 
and Jurkowitz et al (2013). Finally, CNN does not appear to push a particular point of 
view, and merely serves as a platform from which the details of an event or the views of 
an expert/relevant party are given, as indicated in their video titles.
Whilst there is a relatively small sample size for the BBC it is still possible to identify 
some characteristics of the network’s YouTube channel. Firstly, its content is equally 
focussed on both domestic and international events. Secondly, only a small number of 
their videos, 3, gain over 100,000 views and hence can be said to perform well in 
comparison to the rest of their videos. A third characteristic is that videos on the BBC’s 
YouTube channel are on average 2 minutes and 39 seconds in length and this is the 
shortest out of all of the other networks (Table 6.9). Looking at the YouTube channel in 
a vacuum, one would not suspect the vast resources that the BBC has as its disposal.
Table 6.9: Average length of video uploaded by each network
Network
Average length of video 
(m:s)
AJE 6:41
BBC 2:39
CNN 2:47
Fox News 5:21
TYT 5:55
Al Jazeera English’s YouTube channel has a number of distinct characteristics that the 
other networks do not have. First is its focus on international news and politics which 
makes up 56% of its content. The second is the average length of their videos which is 
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6 minutes 41 seconds (Table 6.9). This is the longest out of all the networks and is 
largely caused by AJE’s willingness to upload entire TV show broadcasts onto the 
YouTube channel. In total 34 of their videos were over 20 minutes in length. These two 
characteristics alone enable AJE to arguably have a clear identity and brand which is 
providing in-depth international news coverage to a Western audience.
As The Young Turks are based on YouTube as their main platform, it is difficult to look 
at their YouTube channel’s identity in a vacuum as it is their identity. One of its 
noticeable characteristics is that its primary topic of focus is domestic politics. Secondly, 
60% of its videos use a roundtable format when delivering and discussing the news. 
Thirdly, as noted in the previous chapter, TYT has the most negatively sentimented 
titles for their YouTube content. Finally, a key characteristic is the success of TYT’s 
content in relation to the other networks when considering the metrics of engagement. 
As can be seen in Table 6.10, TYT content generates drastically more engagement 
than any of the other networks.
Table 6.10: Average number of comments, likes, dislikes and views per video by each 
network
Comments Likes Dislikes Views
AJE 14 16 5 2,226
BBC 45 99 11 24,526
CNN 83 59 34 12,975
Fox News 37 28 14 4,749
TYT 1,374 1,973 360 104,790
With all these characteristics, one could describe TYT’s YouTube identity as a channel 
that successfully engages with its audience by using open discussion formats to present 
politically focussed news with a greater than average emotional tone. These statistics 
provide evidence towards the claim that within the platform of YouTube, TYT is the 
greatest contributor towards the public sphere.
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Whilst these profiles are basic in nature, they provide a good foundation from which to 
compare not only the news organisations’ content on other platforms but also to 
compare individual videos on their YouTube channels against this profile. It is arguably 
very important for news organisations to have strong and identical branding across all of 
its platforms as research by Kalogeropoulos & Newman (2017) has shown that through 
the use of strong branding, people are more likely to correctly attribute content to the 
original makers of that content when it is being accessed via other platforms such as on 
Facebook or YouTube. Kalogeropoulos & Newman’s study highlights the importance of 
branding in today’s media landscape as due to more and more news being distributed 
and consumed on social media platforms, correct attribution to the content originator is 
essential in driving web traffic and ergo increasing revenue through advertising or 
subscriptions.
It could be argued that networks like TYT, Fox News and CNN see greater correct 
brand attribution as they focus more on domestic politics, which is the topic that sees 
the highest rate of correct attribution (Kalogeropoulos & Newman, 2017). This would 
then justify their focus on political topics as not only then does it help brand attribution 
but as was shown in the previous chapter, domestic politics also performs well in terms 
of measures of user engagement.
6.5: Conclusion
This chapter aimed to highlight the key characteristics of the news network’s YouTube 
channels. Whilst there is existing research regarding the characteristics of the network’s 
TV channels (see Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Groeling, 2008; Baum, 2003), there is 
little work done towards mapping the characteristics of YouTube news channels. One 
explanation for this is that one would expect the characteristics of CNN’s TV channel to 
exactly mirror those of its YouTube channel owing to the hybridization of our media 
system and the cross pollination that comes with it.
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Whilst this largely might be the case as seen in the discussion earlier in this chapter, 
describing these characteristics in relation to the platform of YouTube leads to more 
nuanced discussion such as looking at user engagement or how segments are titled. 
Another reason why it’s important to attempt to highlight the individual characteristics of 
these YouTube channels is that due to changes in how people consume the news, 
there is now greater reason to look at the growing mediums of news consumption. A 
final reason that is connected to the previous point, is that whilst many studies 
considering traditional news platforms have tended to look at large corporate entities, 
whether this be TV channels or national newspapers, studies that focus on online news 
have to consider smaller news operations whether these are run by an individual or a 
small group of people. This therefore means that highlighting the differing 
characteristics between YouTube channels like CNN and channels like TYT is important 
as it draws attention to the potential explanations as to why smaller operations on 
YouTube appear to be far more successful than their structurally larger competitors.
In conclusion, the issues that the data raises in this chapter reinforces many of the 
established notions in communications research. Firstly, they are reinforced in that the 
topics that are predominantly covered by traditional news organisations are also 
dominant in their coverage in YouTube videos. Even though a majority of the content 
analysed was cross pollinated from TV, the fact that YouTube only networks like TYT 
follow many of the same trends as more traditional news organisations this indicates 
that these networks share a number of common news values and hence, what sort of 
news stories should be covered. This reinforcement is an important one as it also 
speaks to the notion of homogenisation in the media that both Groshek (2008) and 
Boczkowski (2010) allude to. 
One area of existing research that is challenged by the data in this chapter is that strong 
brand identity will lead success. Whilst a clear case can be made that the strong brand 
identity that the Fox News network has, has helped it be successful in the platform of 
television, the same cannot be said for the platform of YouTube in which it performed 
poorly in terms of user engagement variables. However, the idea that brand identity is 
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maybe not as important on YouTube as it is on other news platforms is somewhat 
dampened by the success of TYT which openly says that “we’re progressive when 
almost no one else [is]” (Uygur in Yu, 2016). The fact that TYT is notably more 
successful on YouTube than its competitors whilst maintaining a strong brand identity, 
indicates that having a strong news brand, whilst being important for TV ratings, (Chan-
Olmsted & Cha, 2007) is not the driving factor behind the success of news videos in 
YouTube.
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CHAPTER 7: YouTube comment sections
7.1: Introduction
Whereas the previous two chapters have dealt with the overall picture of news videos 
on YouTube and the individual networks looked at in this study, this chapter will focus 
on individual videos within the data sample. The aim will be to explore and discuss in a 
closer manner how various aspects of each video, in particular the user engagement on 
each video, raise certain ideas that have been considered in other studies broadly 
within this field. By considering these aspects, one should also be able to adequately 
discuss RQ3: “Do user comments reflect Habermas’ notion of the public sphere?”. 
This will largely take the form of discussing the sentiment and form of comments written 
on each video. This will take the form of 5 case studies. These discussions should serve 
to highlight that as a platform for news, YouTube should be considered just as a 
legitimate news platform as other social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook 
where much academic work is currently focussed. The implications that should result 
from these discussions are that YouTube as a platform from which journalism can be 
delivered, is a valid platform which past studies in journalism that have been conducted 
on other platforms, can also be applied and investigated on YouTube as well. Rather 
than being a platform that is considered distinct enough from others to warrant different 
approaches or considerations to areas of research, it should in fact be seen as 
extremely comparable and hence, a platform that contributes towards the public sphere. 
As it has already been argued by some scholars that online social platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter provide a positive contribution towards democratic engagement 
(Dennis, 2016: 267), then a case could also be made for YouTube.
As has been detailed in earlier chapters both in the discussion of literature regarding the 
use of comments on news platforms as well as their significance in relation to other 
metrics recorded in this study, user comments clearly serve as a key indicator of user 
engagement. However thus far in this study, comments have been viewed from a 
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statistical perspective. In order to adequately answer RQ3, it is necessary to review the 
types of comments that are being written by the audience. The reasoning for this stems 
from Habermas’ idealised notion of the public sphere which required rational discussion 
in order to lead to sensible decision making.(Chouliaraki, 2013). Given the existing 
literature discussed in chapter 3, there may be a concern that online comments actually 
do little for the public sphere due to their widely perceived nature of being toxic 
(Braithwaite, 2013; Massanari, 2015; Salter, 2017).
7.2: Choice of case studies
From what was discussed in chapter 3 regarding the existing literature on user 
comments, a case can be made that it is important to look at what comments are being 
written on news videos on YouTube in a qualitative manner. Previous chapters have 
considered comments at a macro, quantitative level and from the business side of 
news, this would be of interest. However, for the individual journalists, as outlined 
earlier, user comments can and do have an impact on future content they produce 
(Santana, 2011). With this in mind, one can now turn to look at specific cases of user 
comments on YouTube videos within this paper’s data sample and consider the 
comments being made as to whether they can be interpreted as improving the 
audience-journalist relationship and providing the reasoned discussion needed for a 
well formed public sphere.
Five case studies were chosen from the data set as each of them contained comments 
that clearly highlighted distinct aspects of online user comments that have been found in 
research on other platforms. These five aspects are capitalisation, the use of hashtags, 
the use of humour/anger, the target of the comments and the depth of discussion. As 
acknowledged in this study’s methodology, even though case studies are limited to 
descriptive or exploratory objectives (Yin, 2013), for the purposes of answering RQ3, 
this can be seen as a suitable approach as the cases chosen help facilitate broader 
discussions around whether any argument can be made that user comments do in fact 
reflect Habermas’ notion of the public sphere.
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7.3.1: Case 1
The first case looked at was the most viewed video in the data sample, ID1217, 
‘BREAKING: Terrorists Attack Paris, Hostage Situation Unfolding’. This video was 
posted by TYT as the terrorist attack in Paris was unfolding. It is a 4-person panel 
discussion upon the limited information that was being reported elsewhere about the 
attack as well as discussion about what should be done going forward in regards to 
policy. As well as being the most viewed video it also had 4852 comments at the time 
the data was collected.  
The top comment on the video was “TOO MUCH CONTROVERSY TO SAY 
SOMETHING FUNNY”. This generated 68 replies by other users and was liked 187 
times. There are a number of ways to interpret this comment. The most notable aspect 
of the comment is that it is written entirely in capital letters. There are multiple possible 
interpretations of a comment when it has been written all in capitals, also known as ‘all 
caps’. Regardless of the writer’s intention any statement written in all caps can be 
perceived as angry (Rösner & Krämer, 2016), rude, (Huxley in Guarino, 2017) or as if 
being shouted (NOAA, 2016). Use of all caps has become synonymous online with 
shouting and as with real life shouting it is to gain attention. The fact that this comment 
employs this technique and is also the top ranked comment with a considerable number 
of replies to it should not be of surprise. In terms of interpreting the comment in regards 
to its actual content, the user appears to be criticizing either the terrorist attacks 
themselves or TYT’s discussion about the policy implications of the attack in that the 
attacks are too sensitive a topic for there to be any humour involved, which as 
discussed in the previous chapter, is an aspect of TYT’s brand when discussing the 
news.
Criticism of the hosts and network continue in the other top-rated comments. These are 
“Cenk as usual will twist the story to America's faults.  Holy shit this man is an asshole”, 
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“MUSLIM TERRORIST ATTACK PARIS. Should be the title.” and “sigh, i'm actually sick 
of TYT now, they have tired me with their quasi enlightened logic.”. All three of these 
commenters are critiquing the network in some way and all three generated multiple 
replies by other users. Whilst it is debatable the extent to which these comments are 
constructive in their criticism, it is within reason to suggest that it is these type of 
comments that create the environment alluded to in Santana’s (2011) study in which 
very few journalists strongly agreed that user comments promoted thoughtful 
discussion. It can be argued that part of the reason user comments are often seen as 
unhelpful is their toxicity in nature. As discussed in the literature review, it is hard to 
define what constitutes a toxic comment as it is often open to interpretation however, 
comments like “The world needs another world war to clean the shit out” certainly could 
be deemed as toxic due to its violent and vitriolic language. It has been thought that 
online anonymity encourages people to be more aggressive in their interactions (Siegel 
et al, 1986) however, more recent work by Rösner & Krämer (2016) has found 
anonymity has no direct effect on the aggressiveness of comments that users write. 
What was a greater contributor to the aggressiveness of user comments was when the 
group norm was aggressive, which is to say that the environment in which users were 
asked to comment, already contained aggressive comments. Rösner & Krämer’s work 
is important to consider when looking at YouTube comments as it would suggest that 
part of the reason more recently written comments on the video such as “SCenk is a 
radical islam sympathizer.” and “People that watch TYT cannot wait anything else then 
LIES and/or BULLSHIT!” exist, is because of the vitriolic comments written previously. 
The idea of comment sections having a snowball effect wherein a handful of initial 
vitriolic comments lays the foundation for more vitriolic comments to be written (Sood, 
Churchill and Antin, 2012) is something for news organisations to consider when it 
comes to the moderation of comment sections.
To further support the idea that there is a lack of thoughtful discussion by users in 
comment sections, one can consider the length of the comments being made. Many of 
the comments on this video are a single sentence in length and sometimes just a 
handful of words. Comments such as “religion of peace at work” or “Stop blaming 
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America Cenk.” highlight the bluntness of users. The brevity in the user comments 
appears to be in contrast to the content of the video itself which is an open discussion 
about what the reaction should be to the events unfolding in Paris. This dichotomy is 
noteworthy because as mentioned previously, the dialogic nature of the video is a 
contributing factor to the amount of user interaction (Weber, 2013), however it does not 
mean that the comments will mirror or reflect the dialogical or constructive tone of the 
video. Taking this single factor on its own, one could potentially argue that the content 
and tone of a video plays a lesser role in influencing the type of comments that are 
written by users on it compared to the role of the tone of existing comments on the 
video. 
In all, this video highlights several aspects of user engagement, particularly the use of 
vitriolic of comments and the overuse of capitalisation both of which demonstrates that 
research by Weber (2013), Rösner & Krämer (2016) and Santana (2011) appears to be 
relevant to the medium of YouTube videos as well.
7.3.2: Case 2
The second case looked at was ID1027, ‘Rep. Peter King: Paris attack should be wake-
up call for US’, which was uploaded by Fox News. Much like the video looked at in the 
case above, this is also focussed on the events surrounding the immediate aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks in Paris. The format of the video is a one to one discussion with a
Republican representative who is named in the title of the video. This was Fox News’ 
most viewed and most commentated upon video in the data sample.
Much like with case 1, a number of the top ranked comments on the video contain 
criticism of the network itself, with users writing things such as “not one mention of the 
syrian illegals” and “I was waiting for someone to blame it on Obama”. However, the top 
ranked comment on the video was “Don't allow this horrific act allow you to be drawn 
into the loss of your humanity or tolerance. That is the intended outcome. 
#PrayForParis”. The fact that this is the top ranked comment by YouTube’s algorithm is 
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noteworthy for several factors. The first is that unlike in case 1, this comment is not toxic 
in nature at all. In fact this comment is actively asking other commenters and viewers 
not to be drawn into toxic thinking. Whether or not this call was heeded by other 
commenters is hard to tell, however there are very few comments on the video that use 
all caps which as discussed above tends to be a contributing factor to the perceived 
vitriolic nature of comments. A second noteworthy factor is the use of the hashtag 
“#PrayForParis”. Whilst hashtags are commonly associated with the social media 
platform of Twitter, the fact that this commenter included it in their comment highlights 
the idea of overlapping social media trends/narratives. Although some research 
suggests that it is still difficult to fully conceptualize and measure social media content 
across multiple platforms (Zelenkauskaite, 2016 and Driscoll & Thorson, 2015), this 
instance can be seen as serving two purposes. The first is to attempt to utilize the 
hashtag on Twitter which was used to aggregate all the positive tweets about the attack, 
in a similar manner on YouTube and secondly the hashtag itself serves as a search 
function where when clicked on, directs users to other content on YouTube using that 
hashtag. The use of hashtags as a method of organizing audiences on a social media 
platform is not a new concept (see Kaun & Uldam, 2017) however much of the 
academic work on this issue focuses on the platform of Twitter. Examples of this include 
Barnard’s study on hashtags used during the Ferguson riots (Barnard, 2017) and 
Ellcessor’s study looking at celebrity activism on Twitter (Ellcessor, 2016).
One final thing to consider when looking at this video and the comments written on it, is 
the fact that this is a Fox News video and hence the demographics should be a factor to 
bear in mind for the video. Research shows that older people are less likely to use 
YouTube in any capacity, let alone news, than younger people (Blattberg, 2015). This 
combined with the fact discussed in previous chapters that the average age of a Fox 
News TV viewer is 68 years old can lead one to conclude that the majority of users 
commenting on this Fox News YouTube video are less likely to be a regular Fox News 
viewer. Further to this, young people tend to be more liberal in their world views (Zell & 
Bernstein, 2013). Considering that Fox News tends to have a conservative slant 
towards its take on the news (Monica, 2009; Barr, 2009; Jones, 2012; Smith. & Searles, 
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2013) one could suggest that the comments, because they are more likely to be written 
by younger users due to the demographics of internet users, and hence more liberal 
users (Pew Research, 2018), are going to be more hostile and critical towards the 
network and its presentation of the news. Whilst there are still some comments such as 
“Fucking fox news needs to die out already.” the majority of the comments tend to be 
focussed on the news event in the video itself rather than the presentation of the video. 
This lends strength to the idea touched upon in the first analysis chapter that content, 
particularly when it is more sensational, is a the main driving force behind why 
comments are made (Tenenboim & Cohen, 2013 and Weber, 2013)
7.3.3: Case 3
The third video looked at in greater depth was ID304, ‘Attack survivor: Cell phone saved 
me’. This was a relatively short video at 45 seconds long, uploaded by CNN soon after 
the terrorist attack in Paris. Despite the video being short in length, it still generated a 
large amount of engagement with 348 comments at the time of data collection.
This is an interesting case for several reasons. The first is the type of comments that 
were written. Amongst the top rated comments were ones such as “Samsung has paid 
to cnn for such advertisement lmao”, “bulletproof cell phone????? who makes this???  I 
need one to beat you in the head if you believe this bullshit” and “FUCKING SAMSUNG 
MARKETING AGENDA”. All three of these comments suggest a form of criticism 
towards either CNN itself for running the story or at the member of public involved who 
claimed his phone stopped a bullet from hitting him in the head. Whilst all being critical 
in nature there is the potential for an interpretation wherein the use of humour is being 
used as well. Over exaggeration through use of multiple question marks, all caps and 
acronyms like “lmao” (laughing my ass off) can be seen as an effective way of 
communicating a critique of the content. This style of criticizing can be seen in other 
mediums, most notably in political cartoons (Hietalahti et al, 2016 and Conners, 2005). 
Due to their over the top nature, one can also see the employment of sarcasm or 
silliness in these comments. This is important to consider as Taecharungroj & 
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Nueangjamnong (2015) suggest that both of these styles of communication are the 
most prevalent forms of humour used on the internet. Their study looked exclusively at 
content on Facebook and so extrapolating from one platform to the whole of the internet 
may be too big a stretch, however the comments on this YouTube video at least lend 
support to their claim in that it appears these two forms of humour are used on other 
social media platforms as well.
A second reason why this is an interesting case is how it illustrates the work done by Li 
& Thorson (2015) on newspaper content, in that it may also be applicable to new news 
platforms such as YouTube. Their study looked at 10 years worth of newspaper content 
and financial data and concluded that “publishing more news content, particularly in 
shorter article length and more diverse topic areas, boosts the newspaper’s circulation 
and ad revenue over time.” (2015: 382). Applying this idea across to YouTube, it would 
suggest that uploading more videos but of shorter length would benefit news 
organisations in terms of both potential ad revenue and number of people who will 
engage with their channel on YouTube. 
One final point to be made about this video arises from the fact that the video looked at 
in this case is particularly short in length and yet has performed successfully in terms of 
user engagement relative to other videos in the data sample by the same network. Due 
to this, one could say that despite the suggestion made in chapter 5, looking at the data 
set as a whole, that it may in fact be in a news network’s best interest to upload shorter 
length videos rather than entire hour long program broadcasts that some have done.
7.3.4: Case 4
The fourth video looked at in more detail was ID1049, ‘Greta: Use good judgment with 
first amendment rights’. This was a monologue delivered by Fox News host Greta Van 
Susteren about her views on protecting the first amendment of free speech and how 
sometimes protecting that right can put police officers lives in danger. This story was 
inspired by the event of an anti-Islam campaigner holding a draw Muhammad contest in 
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Garland, Texas. Despite receiving a relatively low number of views at 458, it did 
generate a proportionally large number of engagements in terms of dislikes, 26, and 
comments which totalled 18. 
Some of the top comments on this video such as “FREE SPEECH IS JUST THAT, 
PERIOD.  PROTECT IT FOOL.  AS SOON AS YOU PUT CONDITIONS ON IT, YOU 
LOOSE IT.  GET OFF YOUR SOAP BOX” further highlight the earlier discussion around 
the use of all caps in user comments. However, when this comment it put alongside 
others such as “She grits her teeth- like a flying dick is going to try to shove itself in” and 
“GRETA your on my SHIT LIST!!!!!!!!!” a pattern begins to emerge. Notably many of the 
comments on this video are directed, in an aggressive manner, towards the news 
anchor. As was discussed in case 2, there is reason to believe that users on YouTube 
are unlikely to be traditional Fox News viewers and may disagree with its take on the 
news, hence the vitriolic language directed at it in their videos. However for this video 
the vitriol seems especially directed at the anchor. One reason as to why this might be 
the case is the fact that Greta Van Susteren is specifically named in the title of the 
video, thereby making her the focal point of the video. It could also be suggested that 
there is an element of sexism at play which would link back to Massanari’s (2015) study 
discussed earlier in this chapter.
By making herself the focal point of the video Greta, as well as Fox News, appear to be 
falling into Fengler & Ruß-Mohl’s (2008) economic theory of journalism which suggests 
that “journalists’ self-interests affect newsgathering and news processing. Unlike many 
other professions, journalists may have an exceptional interest in non-material rewards 
for their work, like attention and influence.” (2008: 675). The desire for public attention 
whether in the form of seeing their work in print, or in this case on TV/YouTube, can be 
seen as a “rational choice” (2008, 674) for any journalist as it can be seen as a fringe 
benefit of the job. However, by making themselves, or more importantly their personal 
analysis of the news, the main point of the video, this likely focuses the attention of the 
viewer/commenter on that aspect of the video rather than on the news event itself. It is 
arguable that the impact of these comments arising from the news anchor being a focus 
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of the video are minimal in terms of their influence over the anchor’s own perception of 
how they can change their content to better suit their audience. This is because despite 
there being research suggesting that audience feedback does impact journalist's view of 
their role (Hanusch & Tandoc, 2017), journalists working for large networks such as Fox 
News are extremely unlikely to read user comments on a platform that is not the main 
means of delivery. In this case, it would be TV. An area for further research would be to 
look at the differences in the sentiment of feedback that news shows or hosts receive 
between live feedback social media platforms like Twitter and delayed feedback 
platforms such as YouTube, where the content is uploaded some time after its initial 
airing.
7.3.5: Case 5
The fifth video looked at in greater depth is ID1168, ‘Inside Story - How should France 
deal with aftermath of Paris attacks?’. This video is the entire program of the weekly 
show called Inside Story by AJE which looks at what France should do after the terrorist 
attacks in Paris. Whilst the start of the show contains a produced segment, the vast 
majority of the show is a round table discussion between the host and three academics.
Whilst a number of the top comments are short, single sentences in a similar manner to 
those outlined in previously discussed videos, what is notable about this video is that 
many of the comments are far greater in length and greater in substance. For example, 
the top comment on the video is:
Instead of spending 25 minutes talking about how different experts fear this 
attack might impact the muslim community, how about debating the subject of 
how to freaking stop these maniacs? Even when the interviewer asks how to 
reach these young men before they become to radicalized, the expert just talks 
about how muslims feel marginalized. I'm am not denying that it might be the 
case, but it is not the problem at hand. Loads of people feel marginalized without 
turning to violence. This is a farce.
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This comment shows a high level of engagement between the viewer and the video 
content as the viewer makes reference to specific questions the host asks of the guests. 
Despite some research (Newman, 2010; Hassoum, 2012) suggesting that audiences 
have ever decreasing attention spans and hence are less likely to watch a relatively 
lengthy YouTube video, the fact that this video whilst being long in length has still 
generated not only a high total number of comments, but that a noticeable number of 
these are lengthy as well, is a point to reflect on. One could hypothesize that because of 
the video’s length, there is greater depth to the discussion in the video and hence there 
is more content for viewers to discuss in their comments. Work by Almgren & Olsson 
(2015) found that news websites preferred to let user only comment on soft news 
stories. As discussed in the literature review, soft news stories tend to lack the level of 
depth and newsworthiness that hard news stories do. Their research also found that 
users tended to prefer commenting on hard news stories such as politics. Previous 
chapters have indicated that videos covering hard news topics tend to have more user 
engagement. What the comments from this particular video suggest is that users when 
they do engage with hard news videos, the depth of the discussion in the video could 
have an impact on the depth of the discussion in the user comments.
7.4: Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to present several case studies that were emblematic 
of the type of comments that news videos received on YouTube. Through discussion of 
five aspects of user comment namely: capitalisation, the use of hashtags, the use of 
humour/anger, the target of the comments and the depth of discussion, guided by 
existing research on these areas a number of conclusions can be drawn as to whether 
user comments on YouTube videos reflect Habermas’ notion of the public sphere.
One could suggest that the simple answer to this question is, yes. The reason for this 
stems from the literature cited in chapter 1 wherein the minimal functions of journalism 
(McNair, 2011), by their very nature contribute towards the public sphere. In particular, 
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the role of contextualising and adding meaning to news events as well as acting as a 
watchdog over governments and institutions. User comments on YouTube videos can 
be said to fulfil the function of adding meaning and context to news events because as 
has been demonstrated in some of the case studies looked at, of the top comments on 
them reviewed, some of these comments attempt to contextualize the information being 
presented in the video to other users through a number of means. For instance user 
comments, through capitalisation and hyperbole, emphasize a particular aspect of the 
news story being presented in the video. The role of acting as a watchdog can also be 
said to be fulfilled as is evidence by the criticisms aimed at the news producers. Whilst 
some of these criticisms are superficial or off topic, some such as the one highlighted in 
case 5 can be well thought out and constructive. As the media can be deemed an elite 
institution in and of itself due to its closeness and reliance on other elite institutions 
(Davis, 2003; Wedel, 2017), any criticism aimed at the media, which in this case are the 
YouTube channels of news networks, can be argued as attempts to hold them 
accountable for the content they produce. The fulfilment of these two roles of journalism 
I believe are enough to say that user comments on YouTube videos do contribute 
towards the public sphere. However, underlying this argument is the assumption that 
comments made contributed to rational discussion that would lead to sensible decision 
making. This is a large assumption to make for two key reasons. The first is that 
rationality of the comments written is highly open to interpretation. Secondly, without 
further research it is impossible to know whether the presence of these comments 
influenced any decision making process either for other users or for the news 
organisations themselves. From this, it could be said that user comments on YouTube 
videos do not reflect Habermas’ notion of the public sphere. This is because as Kilby 
(2014: 23) has pointed out, Habermas emphasis on the importance of rationality ignores 
other forms of participation such as emotive and passionate rhetoric. Therefore, it could 
be argued that whilst Habermas’ notion of a public sphere cannot be found in the user 
comment on YouTube videos, alternative interpretations of the public sphere concept 
could be found in such comments. An example of an alternative interpretation is 
provided by Wahl-Jorgensen (2019) in which she highlights how an ‘emotional turn’ has 
occurred in media studies wherein emotions are seen as making “their way into our 
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mediated discussions, where they have the potential to form the basis for the 
articulation of collective grievances, toward the aim of political and social change” (Ibid: 
2) and that social media in particular has helped facilitate the expanding role that 
emotions play within the public sphere.
The implications from the discussion in this chapter are twofold. The first is that despite 
these issues having been looked at on other platforms, it appears that these issues are 
also relevant for YouTube. This means that going forward, YouTube needs to be 
considered not only as a platform on which videos can be uploaded, but also as a 
platform that contains compelling avenues for further research into user engagement 
with respect to comments. This would go some way to further advancing the arguments 
and suggestions made about other social networking sites where news content is 
consumed. Secondly, the discussions held were informed and arranged around 
research from other platforms. Due to this guiding influence, it is likely that were one to 
approach these comments, particularly from a wider pool of case studies, from a fresh, 
undirected perspective, that new aspects of YouTube comments may be revealed. This 
is important as currently this chapter makes its case on only a small number of 
comments from across a small sample of videos. The assumptions made about the role 
that YouTube comments play in the public sphere are just assumptions and that a 
broader inquiry is required in order to determine if the arguments made hold across a 
wider sample of both comments and YouTube channels.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
8.1: Introduction
The final chapter of this thesis will attempt to situate the findings of this study within the 
wider debates surrounding the concepts raised throughout this thesis. In doing so, it is 
hoped to highlight the significance of this study to both academic research as well as 
the industry itself.
At the core of this study was the concept of the role that YouTube plays within a 
democratic society. In order to approach this issue, Habermas’ concept of the public 
sphere was utilised in order to help align this study with other research in the field of 
communication studies that is concerned with the intersection of media systems and the 
public.
The justification for this study can be found in three main factors with both the theory 
and practice of journalism. The first factor to consider is what the main purposes of 
journalism are. As detailed in chapter 1, this can be boiled down to the idea of helping 
facilitate and enhance the public sphere through informing the public, providing meaning 
and context to news events, providing space for ideas to be discussed and acting as a 
watchdog of those in power (McNair, 2011). The second factor that gave justification for 
this research is the issue of framing as because facts “possess no intrinsic meaning” 
(Gamson, 1989: 157), it is the role of the journalist or news organisation to provide that 
meaning which is done through their use of language. Given that the headlines of a 
news story are viewed as trying to both attract attention and summarise the subsequent 
content (Andrew, 2007), the study of how the titles of YouTube videos frame stories 
through their use of emotive language is important to consider. 
Thirdly, due to changes in technology, political economic factors have driven traditional 
newsrooms towards more digital spaces and practices (Bunce, 2017; Aviles & Leon, 
2002). This has also happened in part due to the increasing number of people who are 
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seeking their news from online platforms (Caumont, 2013). These changes detailed in 
chapter 3, demonstrate that as more and more people seek news online and are 
capable of watching video content online, that YouTube is a critical platform to study 
with regards to its relation with journalism. A final factor is that the growth of digital news 
is linked to the ability for the public to engage with the news more directly and play a 
role in the news making process (Allan & Thorsen, 2009). By demonstrating how 
audiences engage with news content on YouTube one could show that YouTube as a 
platform serves a similar civic duty of enhancing the public sphere as other traditional 
forms of news media. 
By documenting past scholarly research in the areas regarding debates on the nature of 
the public sphere, the role of journalism in society, how emotional language has been 
used by journalists and how there have been shifts in news consumption habits, this 
thesis has attempted to highlight both the relevance and importance of YouTube within 
the field of journalism studies through its relation to the public sphere. In order to 
investigate the role that YouTube plays within a democratic society, three research 
questions were devised:
RQ1: What type of news content is being uploaded to YouTube and how does its topic 
and format relate to types of user engagement with the videos?
RQ2: What role does the use of emotion in YouTube video titles play in the levels of 
user engagement?
RQ3: Do user comments reflect Habermas’ notion of the public sphere?
In order to answer these questions, a mixed methodological approach was taken where 
both a content analysis and sentiment analysis was conducted across a total of 1239 
videos sampled from five news channels on YouTube over two 7 day periods.
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This concluding chapter will present the findings that relate to each of these questions 
and discuss the wider implications of the results and what significance they hold in the 
field of communication studies.
8.2: Answers to the research questions
In answer to RQ1 the data from the study showed that there was a relative degree of 
similarity  of topics of news reported on across each of the channels analysed. Apart 
from a few exceptions, the networks combined devoted almost 45% of their content 
towards the topics of crime and domestic politics (Table 5.3). The distribution of topics 
appeared to support existing research looking at the range of topics covered by the 
news media (Jurkowitz et al, 2013; Henderson, 2014; Brown & Roemer, 2016). In terms 
of the use of different formats of presenting the news, the channels did not exhibit a 
clear preference for any one of the types of format recorded although produced 
segments were utilised slightly more than the others (Table 5.2. Given Soffer’s 
contention that journalism is a dialogic act (2009), it was mildly surprising that the round 
table discussion format was relatively infrequently.
As to how the topic and format of a news video on YouTube relates to the levels of user 
engagement with it, there is a clear case to be made that there is some link between the 
two. Given that videos covering the topic of terrorism received on average 70,604 views 
and that the topic of business only received 5,208 views on average (Table 5.4) shows 
that the topic of a news video plays a role in the number or people who will watch a 
video. This data appears to reinforce existing research such as that by Uribe & Gunter 
(2007) that sensational news stories garner more attention from the public than less 
sensational stories. This idea is further supported by the fact that miscellaneous stories 
analysed, which often dealt with topics of religion or bizarre events had the second 
highest average number of views (Table 5.4) and the second highest amongst the other 
measures of user engagement (Table 5.5). Given that these videos have performed 
well, it lends support to research conducted by Tenenboim & Cohen (2013) in which the 
more sensational content tended to be engaged with more. One datapoint that does 
197
challenge the idea that there is a link between topic and user engagement is the 
average number of likes received for videos covering terrorism. The topics of media, 
education, domestic politics, crime and miscellaneous all received a higher number of 
likes on average. The fact that terrorism videos are not ‘liked’ as much by the audience 
suggests that the relationship between the news content being presented and the act of 
clicking a ‘like’ button is more complex than a simple expression of approval. A further 
challenge to existing research that the data presents involves the fact that the topic of 
crime whilst being the second most covered topic, only received the 6th highest average 
number of views (Table 5.5). This presents a challenge to existing conceptions as 
despite researchers like Franklin (2003) arguing that there has been an increase in 
“McJournalism” which focuses on sensational topics like crime due to their attention 
grabbing nature, the data in this thesis suggests that crime is in fact not as attention 
grabbing, at least when it comes to news content on YouTube. This data point speaks 
to the idea that there is a fundamental difference in regards to what is popular on 
YouTube in regards to news. As mentioned in this thesis, a majority of the content 
uploaded to YouTube by traditional news networks is taken from their TV broadcasts. 
This then leads one to consider the idea that certain topics such as crime, whilst being 
popular on traditional news platforms, are not as well received on new platforms like 
YouTube. This is clearly a space where future research could be conducted regarding 
why a user’s attention to a topic may differ depending on the platform or medium that 
are consuming it from.
In regards to the relationship between the format of the news being discussed and the 
levels of user engagement a video received response to RQ2, there are some notable 
trends as well. The first of these was that the most engaged with format was round table 
discussions. Across all four of the types of engagement, views, comments, likes and 
dislikes, (Table 5.6) round table discussions performed the best. This data lends 
support to the theory of parasocial interactions between audiences and on screen 
personas (Horton & Wohl, 1956) in that the more conversational style of presenting the 
news encourages audiences to join in with that conversation, whether through the form 
of liking or disliking the video or more actively engaging through the form of writing 
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comments. This finding also has to potential to lend support to other areas of research 
such as in political communications where these styles of interaction between the public 
and elite institutions or people are a critical area of research (Chadwick & Stromer-
Galley, 2016; Kreiss, 2016)
This aspect of the data analysed also reinforces the notion that YouTube helps support 
the public sphere as it empowers the public to take part in the dialogic process 
necessary for a democratic society (Berger, 2011). With this type of dialogic news 
presentation being the most popular on YouTube this also raises challenges towards 
the idea that pure objectivity is something that should be pursued. The call for a more 
dialogic form of journalism such as by Anderson et al. (1994) would therefore endorse 
the idea of treating YouTube as a beneficial news platform in regards to the public 
sphere. Finally in relation to RQ1, it should be noted that whilst the averages suggest a 
relationship between the format used and the levels of user engagement, when looking 
specifically at the top 10 and bottom 10 videos in each of the user engagement 
variables, there is a mix of each of the formats and so once again, the variable whilst 
seeming to be a good indicator as to how well a news video on YouTube will perform, is 
by no means the sole determining factor.
It can be argued from the data gathered that there is indeed some relation between the 
topic and format of a news video on YouTube and the level of user engagement it 
receives. This relates to this studies overarching question as to what role YouTube 
plays in a democratic society, because the public can be seen to be engaging with 
“opinions about matters of general interest.” (Habermas, 1964: 49) which is a 
fundamental part of Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. One way the extent of its 
role can be considered is by taking the wider media ecosystem into consideration. 
There has been a recent trend within the past decade for news organisations to hide 
some or all of their content behind a paywall. In 2019, 50% of Americans and a similar 
number citizens in other Western countries experienced news content being hidden 
behind a paywall. (Newman et al, 2019: 12). This can be seen to have damaging effects 
to the public sphere as a fundamental aspects of Habermas’ public sphere is that 
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“access is guaranteed to all citizens” (Habermas, 1989, 49). The fact that YouTube is 
open to everyone, albeit necessitating an internet connection, the wide range of news 
topics being presented on the platform means that it is contributing towards the public 
sphere. Considering that some of the news organisations analysed have some of their 
content hidden behind the paywall of a cable TV subscription, the fact that YouTube 
enables a wider portion of the public to see such content when it is uploaded to 
YouTube also contributes to the idea that YouTube as a platform is closer to Habermas’ 
idealised notion of the public sphere. 
Where the argument for YouTube being closer to Habermas’s ideal public sphere run 
into trouble is in the exceedingly open nature of the platform itself. Regardless of if the 
news organisations are collectively uploading a wide variety of news topics, when the 
spread of topics covered by each individual network (Tables 6.1; 6.2; 6.3; 6.4; 6.5) is 
looked at, one sees that there is evidence to suggest that particular audiences do not 
receive news on a wide range of topics. This is a troublesome point in regards to the 
public sphere as if people are getting more and more of their news online yet they are 
still being highly selective in which sources to gain information from, then this would 
leave portions of the public that are not as well informed as they could be. This coupled 
with the fact that users of YouTube are unlikely to be consuming every single video 
uploaded by a single news channel and will be selective in regards to where they 
consume their news (Garrett, 2009b; Stroud, 2008), means that YouTube may be 
further from Habermas’s ideal of the public sphere than argued for above.
In response to RQ2, the data collected in this thesis presents both several 
reinforcements and challenges to existing scholarly ideas regarding the use of language 
and user engagement. The first idea that is reinforced is that audiences tend to gravitate 
towards stories that are framed negatively (Trussler & Soroka, 2014). This can be seen 
in the data where topics such as terrorism, whilst being framed in the most negative 
language with their titles having an average sentiment score of -1.67 (Table 5.10) also 
had the highest levels of user engagement (Table 5.5). This is further supported by the 
data in Tables 5.9 and 6.10 which show that the network with the most negatively titled 
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videos, TYT, also has the highest levels of user engagement. The data here suggests 
that negatively framed videos elicit a greater response than more positive ones. This is 
an important finding as not only does it reinforce works such as that by Trussler & 
Soroka (2014) but it also lends some support to the notion that news is becoming more 
sensationalised through the use of language to frame stories (Vettehen et al, 2005; 
Gans, 2004). This trend is then not only happening on traditional news platforms but 
also on new ones like YouTube. A second concept that is reinforced by the data is the 
notion that stories which can be sensationalized are covered more often (Tenenboim & 
Cohen, 2013; Stroud et al, 2016). The topic of crime was the second most covered topic 
as well as having the second lowest average sentiment of its video titles at -0.98 (Table 
5.10). 
One of the challenges to existing notions around news and framing that is generated by 
the data in this thesis is the fact that the topics of both domestic politics and 
international politics had only slightly negatively titled YouTube videos with average 
sentiment scores of -0.27 and -0.29 (Table 5.10). This challenges the conceptions put 
forward by the likes of Bennett & Iyengar (2010) who suggest that news content has 
become more polarized over time. If this were the case, then one would expect the 
language of YouTube video titles covering politics to have more emotionally driven 
language. The fact that political videos on YouTube are not framed with negative 
language in their titles is an important finding in that it impacts studies that consider how 
the framing of a story influences an audience’s reception of that story (Iyengar, 1989; 
Price et al, 1997). Given that hard news stories are more beneficial to the public sphere 
(Habermas, 1989), one can suggest that the notion that political stories on YouTube are 
more beneficial to the public sphere due to the fact that they are framed in less negative 
language than other hard news topics such as education or crime.
RQ3 posed the question of whether user comments on YouTube videos reflect 
Habermas’s notion of the public sphere. Drawing upon the issue raised during the 
analysis of the case studies in chapter 7, a direct answer to this question is difficult to 
give. 
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When one considers that part of Habermas’ theory says that citizen interactions in the 
public sphere should lead to sensible decision making, it is hard to suggest whether any 
sensible decisions can be made based off the type of comments that are written. 
Research by Vu (2014) argues that audience metrics, such as user comments, 
influence editors in gatekeeping. However, given the existing literature around the 
antagonistic and toxicity of comments within digital platforms (Massanari, 2015), it is 
hard to see what value gatekeepers could derive from such comments. Whilst content 
producers may derive little benefit from user comments on YouTube videos, the work of 
Kwon & Cho (2015) which found “positive effects of swearing on increasing the public’s 
attention and perception toward the comments” (Ibid: 99) may suggest that user 
comments merely only provide benefit for other users.
A second reason why it is difficult to directly address RQ3 stems from the debates 
surrounding the function of the public sphere itself. Part of any actors role with the 
public sphere is to “provide sites for public participation” and “expert accountability” 
(Livingstone & Lunt, 1994: 10). Given that the news networks themselves can at some 
level be deemed as part of the elite institutions of society (Davis, 2003; Wedel, 2017), 
how then do the antagonistic comments hold these institutions to account? Especially 
when the impact that the comments have is determined by how many people see them, 
which in the case of YouTube, is controlled by the platforms algorithm. Even though 
existing research suggests that audience feedback does impact how journalists view 
their role (Hanusch & Tandoc, 2017), it is still unclear as to the extent that journalists 
read and engage with the comments left on YouTube videos. This is an important 
consideration for future research as if the public’s call for different news values to be 
adopted or different topics to be covered by the organisations is not reaching the 
decision makers at these organisations, then this too would be further evidence that 
user comments on YouTube are further away from Habermas’s notion of the public 
sphere.
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The above points forces  this study and future studies to ask whether Habermas’ notion 
of the public sphere is the right theory to use in evaluating the worth of not only user 
comments but potentially all online news as a whole. Given the seeming impossibility of 
totally rational discussion within the public sphere, which would require the removal of 
“social and economic hierarchies” (Gibson, 2019: 2), an alternative approach that 
places a far lower emphasis on rationality is suggested
By recognising the works of Wahl-Jorgensen (2019), Ruiz et al. (2011) and McNair 
(2011), a conceptual framework where an emphasis is placed on the value of 
contextualisation and emotional engagement. Should be considered for future research 
within this area. Contextualisation remains one of the fundamental roles of journalism 
(McNair, 2011) and given the clear emotional turn in media studies, but particularly 
social media that has taken place in recent years (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019), a model that 
acknowledges how both thoughtful discussions as well as ones which express feelings 
in an overt way (Ruiz et al, 2011) needs to be developed.
8.3: Wider research implications
The findings from this study raise a number of issues both for news organisations 
themselves and for broader academic discussions. In both cases these issues have 
often been considered already in traditional media forms such as newspapers or TV but 
not as much in the area of YouTube. 
One of the key issues raised in this study is that new news networks like The Young 
Turks, appear to follow many of the same trends that traditional news networks do. For 
example, traditional networks have tended to have their content focus on more negative 
or sensational stories as this has been rewarded financially in terms of larger audiences 
(Kupchick & Bracy, 2009; Melkote, 2009; Dimitrova et al, 2005). TYT can be seen to 
have copied this trait from traditional news media and the fact that they have the most 
negatively titled videos and the largest viewing figures speaks to the idea that ‘if it 
bleeds, it leads’ is a guiding phrase within the world of news on YouTube.
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Similarly TYT can be seen to mimic the type of content that traditional news networks 
produce in that they focus heavily on politics. Both these points are important findings 
as it grants legitimacy to the idea that new news networks that do not utilize the 
traditional platforms of TV and print should be considered for future research wishing to 
looking at comparing various news networks. Whilst there are clear differences in terms 
of audience demographics (Caumont, 2013; Olmstead et al., 2014), the data analysed 
in this thesis suggests that YouTube is clearly part of the larger news ecosystem and 
that due to the levels of cross pollination of content between traditional news platforms 
and new ones such as YouTube, that news organisations that are native to YouTube 
should be considered as good examples of media hybridization. The implication of 
TYT’s dominance in terms of audience metrics on YouTube could mean that it has an 
influencing factor regarding how traditional news organisations produce their content. 
This is particularly true when adopting Chadwick, Dennis & Smith’s (2016: 10) definition 
of a hybrid media system where it is not just older media logics informing newer ones, 
but newer media logics forcing behavioural changes on older ones. The extent to which 
TYT can influence the likes of CNN and Fox News and how this influence would take 
shape still remains to be seen and would require further research.
A second issue raised regarding journalism studies is how it can appropriately analyse 
comments left on YouTube videos. Many of the studies discussed in chapter 7 in 
relation to user comments on news websites often looked at every single user comment 
written on a story (Santana, 2015; Kwon & Cho, 2015). Whilst this is possible to also do 
on YouTube, the user interface of the platform makes research that wishes to use a 
large sample far harder to do. In future, scraping software would be required for any 
proposed large scale analysis of thousands of comments on YouTube. A corollary issue 
here is the notion of user-content comments and user-user comments (Ksiazek et al, 
2014). Whilst it would be possible to design software to sort out which comments are 
user-content and which are simply replies to other user comments, future research in 
this area would still have to bear in mind that some of the user-user comments may in 
fact be more directed towards the video itself than the initial comment they are replying 
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to. Additionally a greater emphasis on qualitative approaches could be considered when 
analysing user comments on YouTube. This point is echoed by Thelwall (2017) who 
says that “social media analytics methods are almost inevitably exploratory” (Ibid: 314) 
and therefore, “a radical mixture of methods coupled with renewed critical 
reflection”(Savage & Burrows, 2007 cited in Thelwall, 2017: 314).
The importance or value of comments for the news organisations themselves is an 
issue that this study raised as well. As detailed in chapter 5, videos that receive a large 
number of comments also tend to perform well when it came to other measurements of 
user engagement. However, as the case studies in chapter 7 highlighted, these 
comments can oftentimes be unconstructive, offensive or totally irrelevant to the video. 
Measurements of engagement are viewed by those in both YouTube (Chatzopoulou et 
al, 2005) and the news industry in general (Kramer, 2016) as metrics of success. 
However this study, when taken in the context of other research looking at the value 
journalists place on user comments (Nielsen, 2012; Tenenboim & Cohen, 2013; 
Almgren & Olsson, 2015; Krebs & Lischka, 2017), calls into question the extent to which 
news organisations should put value on YouTube user comments. If quantity of 
engagement is the focus of news organisations then this issue is not as large a concern. 
However, if news organisations wish to find value in user engagement beyond raw 
numbers then more work needs to be done investigating how value can be extracted 
from user comments on YouTube videos.
Once a more nuanced conceptual framework like the one outlined above has been 
further developed, future academic discussions should also consider not only the value 
that YouTube comments provide to the functioning of a democratic society, but whether 
this value is different in any way to comments left on other social media platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter or on the native websites of news organisations
One of the main findings of this study is the stark difference in terms of user 
engagement success between legacy news organisations such CNN, Fox, BBC and 
AJE, and new news organisations such as TYT. TYT’s videos on average received far 
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more views, likes, dislikes and comments compared to the others. Whilst one might 
expect that organisations with a large amount of resources and an already established 
audience across other platforms would be able to outperform relatively smaller and 
newer organisations, this does not appear to be the case. Given that TYT appears to 
mimic many of the approaches to news that traditional news networks use, namely 
negative language and a focus on politics, the reason for their success on YouTube 
may lie in a number of factors. The first of these factors was detailed in chapter 3 where 
the changing demographics and news consumption habits now favour online content 
that is geared towards younger people (Caumont, 2013). A second factor is that TYT’s 
content is made specifically for YouTube and cannot be found on traditional platforms 
like cable TV. Given that the other networks analysed in this thesis predominantly 
uploaded content on to YouTube that had already aired on TV, audiences, if they are 
inclined to consume their news from CNN, would do so at its point of origin, TV, rather 
than on a different platform. As the only place to get TYT content is on YouTube, then 
their entire audience will watch their content there. For networks like CNN, their 
audience is spread out across multiple platforms.  
This goes in hand with another reason in that whilst other networks have to deal with 
and invest in multiple platforms, TYT’s business is focussed on online video platforms 
and hence will invest all of its effort into its online video content and building its 
audience there. This would ineluctably lead to a higher quality in user experience. To 
illustrate this, one can look at the BBC’s YouTube channel that performed poorly 
compared to TYT’s in that, whilst TYT uploaded content on a consistent basis, the BBC 
whilst uploading mainly short videos, also happened to do so on a very infrequent basis. 
The wider academic implications raised here surround the concept of trust in media. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, online news media is currently less trusted than traditional 
platforms (Blöbaum, 2014), despite growing as the main source of information for the 
public (Geiger, 2019). This issue raises the idea that audiences may just be consuming 
a narrow band of news sources, ones that they personally deem trustworthy, whilst 
ignoring all other sources. This has ramifications for the public sphere in terms of 
whether the citizenry is well informed, but also from a communications research 
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perspective. As this study shows that TYT has large audience on YouTube 
communications researchers will have to consider the potential link between the 
popularity of an online video news source and its actual trustworthiness. This also 
means that future academic discussions need to consider whether or not there needs to 
be a greater distinction made in what is meant by ‘trust’ when it comes to the questions 
of trust in online media and trust in the media in general. In essence, does the public 
consider the word ‘trust’ to have different standards depending on the platform that the 
news content is on?
A final conceptual issue raised from the data produced in this study is that news 
organisations may wish to consider what factors are relevant to the overall success of a 
video. This is an important issue because as the industry moves towards more online 
video content due to the shift in news consumption trends, trying to maintain a large 
audience is vital for the revenue stream of advertising. If there are certain factors that 
predispose a video to generate higher user engagement, news organisations may lean 
on these factors to the detriment of others. The implications of this could be that news 
organisations may develop distinct sets of news values for the different platforms that 
they produce content for. This trend has already been established in online print media 
(Sambrook, 2017; Kormelink & Meijer, 2017) and further work needs to be done 
regarding how the elements of what goes into making a news article ‘clickbaity’ can be 
transposed onto video platforms such as YouTube. Along these same lines, the issue of 
to what extent different news values impact the levels of audience attention and 
retention need to be considered. For instance, does Harcup and O’Neill’s news value of 
‘Relevance’ take greater precedence in the decision making process when maintaining 
an audience’s engagement with a story is prioritised.
The research in this study also contributes towards debates around the role of 
journalism in society and how its role comes into conflict with the realities of running a 
news organisation in a highly competitive environment. With the notion that news is 
increasingly pushing sensationalized content (Tenenboim & Cohen, 2013), due to the 
need to attract audiences, the role that YouTube plays within the current media 
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ecosystem in accurately informing the public of news events must be considered going 
into the future.
8.4: Research Limitations and suggestions for future studies
The implications in this study must be held up against a number of limitations and other 
considerations.
The first limitation that is likely to have the greatest impact on any conclusions drawn is 
the data sample that was used. Despite 1239 videos being collected during the data 
collection period, the spread of videos that each of the networks uploaded was 
somewhat uneven with CNN uploading over 10 times more videos than the BBC. Whilst 
this is a noteworthy point in itself, future research must consider not only increasing the 
scale of the data collection, but also what news channels on YouTube should be 
considered. Future research may wish to focus on the channels run by print media 
companies such as the Daily Mail. Also, given that there are now hundreds of YouTube 
channels that are dedicated to delivering news content, whether it is on a broad range 
of topics such as channels like Secular Talk, or on a single niche topic such as video 
games like Jim Sterling, an alternate focus could also be on these smaller channels. 
These lesser known channels appear to share many similar features to those channels 
covered in this study such as style, upload frequency and levels of user engagement. 
Even though news and politics videos make up less than 3% of all channels of YouTube 
they account for 45% of all video uploads (Bartl, 2018). This, combined with the fact that 
across all of YouTube “0.64% of videos represent 81% of all views” on the platform 
(Sinclair, 2019) means that future research needs to be care in drawing broad 
assumptions across the platform as a whole.
The pursuit of this area of research is important, particularly in relation to citizen 
journalism studies as many of these types of channels are run by a single person. As 
technology has developed and improved, citizens have moved from writing their own 
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blogs analysing the news or current affairs on any given topic, to creating their own 
videos to explain their analysis that they previously would have just written down. 
Performing a similar study to this one, looking at the topics covered, language used and 
levels of user engagement would help reveal whether or not the tactics employed by 
large news organisations are not only mimicked by individual citizens on YouTube, but 
also whether these tactics have the same effect or impact regardless of the size of the 
channel. This would supplement further discussions around the extent to which the 
process of media convergence is taking place.
One of the normative assumptions made in this study relates to the analysis of user 
comments. It was assumed that comments written on YouTube videos were done with 
some purpose or intent on the end of the user. Without this assumption being made, 
further justification is required in order to ascribe any value of worth to any of the 
comments analysed. 
Another normative assumption made in this study is that the best way to determine the 
impact that emotion has on levels of user engagement is by analysing the titles of the 
videos. This assumption was made as at the time of data collection, YouTube had not 
implemented its ‘Thumbnailer’ tool which used “artificial intelligence to automatically 
generate the most compelling portions of a video” (Matsakis, 2017). Due to this, the role 
that a video’s thumbnail could play in determining user engagement was under 
appreciated. As pointed out by Heusner et al (2019), there is currently a large amount of 
scope for future research to help understand how this new critical aspect of the platform 
influences the decision making process for content creation on YouTube.
A further limitation of this study is that each of the five networks that were chosen were 
all English language, western news networks. This means that any conclusions drawn 
are restricted to the western news ecosystem. Whilst it may be the case that news 
networks in other languages may exhibit similar trends and data patterns, one should be 
hesitant in applying conclusions from this study to all news networks on YouTube. 
Future research is necessary to determine whether the predominance of negatively 
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sentimented words is a universal trend across all news videos on YouTube or whether 
this is limited to just western networks. As this study has focused on largely western 
news organisations, any claims made by this study are only applicable to at most, to 
other organisations and YouTube channels that have similar newsroom culture. This 
would be important research as it would help enhance discussions around the ideas of 
universal concepts in the field of journalism. 
Another potential limitation of this study related to the data sample, is the time period 
during which the sample was taken. This could be deemed too small a timeframe from 
which to collect a data sample for the purposes of this study. To illustrate the potential 
problems this can cause, one can look at the final day of data collection, 14th November 
2015, in which Paris suffered a large terrorist attack that subsequently dominated the 
news for several days and weeks afterwards. Whilst videos covering the topic of 
terrorism made up 5% of the total sample, had the data collection started on the 14th 
November, then the data would have skewed far more heavily in terms of total coverage 
of terrorism related news stories. Unique news events such as the Paris terrorist attack 
are likely to impact any research dealing with news content and coverage and whilst 
these events are impossible to predict, having a larger sample size would have 
diminished any impact these events may have on the total data sample. A potential 
remedy to this limitation would have been to use a random sampling method across a 
much wider timeframe. Although this would have reduced any problems caused by 
unique events such as the one mentioned above, due to the manner in which the 
sample had to be collected, that is scrolling down through each of the channel’s list of 
uploaded videos, obtaining a random sample in practical terms would have been very 
difficult.
An additional limitation is that the data sample is a snapshot in time. The reason why 
this is a potential issue is that any of the videos in the sample could post data collection, 
have gone viral and significantly increased its user engagement metrics. Again, the 
impact of this issue could have been mitigated by using a random sampling method 
210
across a much larger time frame but as mentioned, practical limitations prevented this 
approach.
A further area of study that would provide depth to understanding YouTube as a news 
platform is in researching the ethnography regarding YouTube commenters. Although 
this would be difficult due to the anonymous nature of many online interactions (Jardine, 
2016; Hong & Li, 2017), it is not impossible as demonstrated by Wu & Atkin (2016). The 
purpose for academic pursuit in this area would be to add the much needed deeper 
context regarding possible motivations behind why people leave comments. By further 
understanding these motives, more can then be read into the usefulness of those 
comments both in relation to their contribution to the public sphere and also in relation 
to the business side of news organisations in terms of how much attention should be 
paid towards the criticism in those comments.
A final, broader question that future research needs to consider surrounds the question 
of what makes a news video on YouTube successful? There are a range of factors such 
as levels of user engagement, an audience’s ability to recall information, the dialogic 
presentation of the content and the actual visual nature of the content itself, that should 
all be considered in regards to how successful as a news platform YouTube really is.
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Appendix A:
Coding framework:
V1. ID
An individual identification number assigned to each video. ID number = n+1.
V2. Date
The date that the video was uploaded. Format for date is dd/mm/yy.
V3. Network
The news network that uploaded the video. Shortened to their three letter acronym.
1. CNN
2. Fox News
3. AJE
4. BBC
5. TYT
V4. Topic
The predominant subject of the video. Whilst some videos may cover multiple subjects, 
it is the main one which will be recorded.
1. Crime
a. Any video that relates to the notions of criminal activity. This can take the 
form of any breaking of the law, actions of the police force, discussion 
about the police and individual crimes. Crimes committed in other 
countries should still be coded under the category of crime. 
2. Entertainment
a. Any video that relates to any form of the entertainment industry. This 
involves sport, film, the arts and anything pertaining to culture. 
3. Media
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a. Any video that covers how other elements of the media is covering a story. 
This includes the criticism/praise of news coverage by media outlets as 
well as any story that relates to social media campaigns by individuals or 
organisations.
4. Domestic Politics
a. Any video that relates to a news story that is situated with the news 
networks general geographic remit that deals with any issues of politics 
whether it be election news or new policies.
i. BBC and AJE domestic news covers Great Britain
ii. Fox News, CNN and TYT domestic news cover America
5. Health
a. Any video that covers health or the health effects of products.
6. International Politics
a. Any video that covers the subject of politics that is going on in other 
countries. This includes foreign elections, changes to policy that other 
countries make and any talks that take place between two countries, 
whether they be both foreign countries or between the domestic nation 
and another country.
i. BBC and AJE international politics covers anything outside of Great 
Britain
ii. Fox News, CNN and TYT international politics covers anything 
outside of America
7. International News
a. Any video that covers news that is happening in a foreign country that 
does not involve the politics of that country. (See 6i & 6ii)
8. Science and Technology
a. Any video that covers the topics of science and/or technology. Some 
videos may cover other topic areas, but if the focus of the video is on the 
science/technology aspect, then this topic category should be chosen.
9. Business
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a. Any video that covers business or entrepreneurial endeavours by 
companies or individuals. This also includes stories about banks.
10.Terrorism
a. Any video that pertains to acts of terrorism or attempted acts, both 
domestically and internationally. This involves shootings, bombings and 
any other action taken by internationally recognised terrorist groups.
11.Weather
a. Any video that covers meteorological events and the effects of the 
weather such as flooding, tornadoes, and drought.
12.Education
a. Any video that covers news relating to educational issues, for example, 
tuition fees, teaching methods or education policy.
13.Advert
a. Any video that is an advert either for another show on the network that has 
uploaded the video, or for a product/service by that network or other 
company.
14.Miscellaneous 
a. Any video that does not fall into any of the other categories. This can 
include videos that are an entire show and hence cover multiple other 
topics. It can also include videos that are oddities, in that they are ‘bizarre’ 
stories, for example some world record attempts.
V5. Length
The length of each video in mm:ss format.
V6. Format
The way in which the video is being presented.
1. One to one interview
214
a. Any video in which the main way the news is being discussed is in a one 
to one interview format. This can take the form of an in studio interview or 
one conducted via satellite link.
2. Produced segment
a. Any video in which the main way the news is presented via a produced 
segment. A produced segment is anything that involves voice over that 
has been added later, graphics and heavy use of editing. Often these are 
segments that have been made outside the newsroom and in the field.
3. Monologue
a. Any video in which the main way the news is presented is by an individual 
anchor or reporter solely describing the topic of the video. In some cases, 
the person giving the monologue may be quickly introduced by another 
person, but this should still be considered a monologue.
4. Round table discussion
a. Any video in which the main way the news is presented is via a discussion 
with three or more people. These people may either be all in the same 
studio or some via satellite link. In cases where there are three or more 
people shown in the discussion, but only two of them speak, this should 
still be considered a round table discussion.
5. Live reporting
a. Any video where the news was being reported live on the ground at an 
event at the time it was being recorded. Whilst many videos may have 
“live” written somewhere on screen, this does not necessarily mean that it 
is live reporting. The key element to this category is the aspect of reporting 
directly from the scene of an incident.
V7. Use of viewer generated content
If the video contains any content that has been made by a member of the public. This 
includes mobile phone footage, audio recordings, other videos already uploaded to 
video hosting sites such as YouTube, Facebook posts and tweets.
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V8. Views
The number of views that the video has received at the time of coding.
V9. Comments
The number of comments that the video has received at the time of coding.
V10. Likes
The number of likes that the video has received at the time of coding.
V11. Dislikes
The number of dislikes that the video has received at the time of coding.
V12. Title
The full title of the video. All formatting such as capitalisation quotation marks and 
ellipses to be left in. 
V13.URL
The web address to the video.
V14. Tag
Keywords that are associated with the subject of the video. Any additional tags that may 
become relevant during coding that are not listed in the coding framework should be 
noted and assigned its own unique coding number. Multiple tags can be assigned to 
each video up to a maximum of 3.
1. Baltimore
a. Any video that covers any news event that have occurred in or are related 
to Baltimore, Maryland.  
2. Religion
a. Any video that covers issues of a religious nature, whether it be a specific 
individual’s or an event or organisation.
3. Sport
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a. Any video that covers any sporting event, organisation or individual 
sportsperson.
4. Nepal
a. Any video that covers any news event that have occurred or are related in 
Nepal.
5. UK Election
a. Any video that deals with the election in the United Kingdom. This includes 
speculation, results, party news, policy announcements, etc.
6. Weather
a. Any video that covers weather events anywhere in the world. Whilst this 
tag should always be applied to Topic Category 11, it can also be used for 
other topics as well, where the weather is not necessarily the main focus 
of the video
7. Royal baby
a. Any video that covers the royal baby between Duke and Duchess of 
Cambridge.
8. Medical technology.
a. Any video that covers issues about advancements and innovations of 
technology within the medical field. 
9. NASA
a. Any video that makes reference to NASA.
10.Cuba
a. Any video that covers issues related to Cuba such as Cuban culture, 
business or its international relations.
11.N. Korea
a. Any video that covers issues related to North Korea such as its culture, 
business or its international relations.
12.2016 Election
a. Any video that deals with the 2016 election in America. This includes news 
about candidates, media coverage of the election or how the election has 
an impact on external factors such as foreign relations or domestic policy.
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13.Benghazi
a. Any video that covers events that happened in Benghazi, Libya. This 
includes any legal actions or claims about the attack that took place in 
2012.
14.Clinton
a. Any video that covers either Bill or Hillary Clinton, as well as any of their 
charitable works such as the Clinton Foundation.
15.Celebrity
a. Any video that covers news about celebrities. People should be 
considered celebrities if they are a well known individual in the media due 
to their work on television or film, such as actors or sportsmen. Well 
known politicians should not be counted as celebrities
16.Politicians
a. Any video that focuses specifically about an individual politician’s 
personality, lifestyle, demeanour, looks etc. Videos that deal with a 
politician’s voting record or support for specific policies, but focus on how 
this will affect the politician, should also include this tag.
17.Animals
a. Any video that covers any news relating to animals or animal rights.
18.Children
a. Any video that covers news that deals with child issues or involves 
children. A child is anyone who  is under the age of 16.
V15. Notes
Any additional notes by the coder that may want to be referred back to later during 
analysis. 
Examples: 
Whole show
Just for YouTube
Graphic image warning
Duplicate of ID 155
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Program advert
Not in English
219
Reference list
Abramowitz. A. I., 2010, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and 
American Democracy, New Haven CT: Yale University Press
Agarwal. S & Barthel. M., 2013, The friendly barbarians: Professional norms and work 
routines of online journalists in the United States, Journalism, 16(3), 376-391
Ahlers. D., 2006, News Consumption and the New Electronic Media, The Harvard 
International Journal of Press/Politics, 11, 29-52
Akhavan-Majid. R. & Ramaprasad. J., 1998, Framing Beijing: Dominant Ideological 
InÀuences on the American Press Coverage of the Fourth UN Conference on Women 
and the NGO Forum, Gazette 62(1), 45–59.
Althusser. L., 1971, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation), pp. 121-173 in Althusser, L. (Ed.) Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays. London: NLB. 
Al Jazeera., 2012, 260 million households, Al Jazeera. Available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Documents/2012/4/23/2012423115058508734Media
Brochure_2012_007.pdf [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Al-Rawi. A., 2016, Assessing public sentiments and news preferences on Al Jazeera 
and Al Arabiya, International Communication Gazette, 79(1), 26 - 44
Allan. S. & Thorsen. E., 2009, Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives, Vol. 1, Peter 
Lang, New York.
Altschull. J. H, 1990, From Milton to McLuhan: The ideas behind American Journalism. 
New York: Longman.
An. J., Cha, M., Gummadi. K., Crowcroft. J. & Quercia. D., 2012, Visualizing Media Bias 
through Twitter, AAAI Technical Report WS-12-01
Ancu and Cozma, 2009, MySpace politics: uses and gratifications of befriending 
candidates, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 53: 567-583
Anderson. R, Dardenne. R and Killenberg M. G., 1994, The Conversation of Journalism 
– Communication, Community and News. Westmesport, CT: Praeger.
220
Anderson. P & Eggleton. P., 2012, The development of effective quality measures 
relevant to the future practice of BBC news journalism online, Journalism 
13(7), 923 - 941
Anderson. A., Brossard. D., Scheufele. D., Xenos. M., Ladwig. P., 2013,  The “Nasty 
Effect:” Online Incivility and Risk Perceptions of Emerging Technologies, Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, 
Andrew. B., 2007, Media-generated Shortcuts: Do Newspaper Headlines Present 
Another Roadblock for Low information Rationality?, Press/Politics, 12(2), 24-43
Antony. M & Thomas. R., 2010, ‘This is citizen journalism at its finest’: YouTube and the 
public sphere in the Oscar Grant shooting incident, New Media & Society, 12(8), 1280–
1296
American Press Institute, 2014, What is the purpose of journalism?, 
http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/what-is-journalism/purpose-
journalism/ [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
American Press Institute, 2014, The Personal News Cycle: How Americans choose to 
get their news, Available at: 
http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/personal-
news-cycle/, [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
American Press Institute, 2015, How Millennials Get News: Inside the habits of 
America’s first digital generation. Available at: 
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/millennials-
news/ [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Araujo. T & Meer. T., 2020, News values on social media: Exploring what drives peaks 
in user activity about organizations on Twitter, Journalism, 21(5): 633–651
Aviles. J & Leon. B., 2002, Journalistic practice in digital television newsrooms: The 
case of Spain’s Tele 5 and Antena 3, Journalism, 3(3), 355-371
Bachmair. B & Bazalgette. C., 2007, The European Charter for Media Literacy: meaning 
and potential, Research in Comparative and International Education, 2(1), 80-87  
Bahador, B., 2011, Did the Global War on Terror end the CNN effect? Media, War & 
Conflict, 4(1): 37–54.
221
Baker. K., 1990. Inventing the French Revolution. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Baldwin. R & Coady. J., 1978, PSYCHOLINGUISTIC APPROACHES TO A THEORY 
OF PUNCTUATION, Journal of Literacy Research, 10(4), 363-375
Bann. E. Y & Bryson. J. J., 2013, The Conceptualisation of Emotion Qualia: Semantic 
Clustering of Emotional Tweets, In: Proceedings of the 13th Neural Computation and 
Psychology Workshop. 
Barbalet. J., 1998, Emotion, Social Theory, and Social Structure: A Macrosociological 
Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Barber. B. R., 1999, Three scenarios for the future of technology and strong democracy. 
Political Science Quarterly. 113(4), 573-590
Bard. T., 2017, Propaganda, Persuasion, or Journalism?, Electronic News, 11(2), 100-
118
Barr. A., 2009, Dunn stands by Fox slam, Politico, Available at: 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/politicolive/1009/Dunn_Fox_is_arm_of_Republican_Party.
html, [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Barrett. L., 2004, Feelings or words? Understanding the content in self-report ratings of 
experienced emotion, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 266-281
Barrett. L., 2006a, Are Emotions Natural Kinds?, Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 1(1), 28-58 
Barrett. L., 2006b, Solving the Emotion Paradox: Categorization and the Experience of 
Emotion,  Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(1), 20-46
Bartl. M., 2018, YouTube channels, uploads and views. A statistical analysis of the past 
10 years, Convergence, 24(1), 16 - 32
Bartlett. F. C., 1932, Remembering: A Study in Reply to Experimental and Social 
Psychology. New York: Macmillan.
Barnard. S., 2014, ‘Tweet or be sacked’: Twitter and the new elements of journalistic 
practice, Journalism, 17(2), 190-207
222
Barnard, S., 2018, Tweeting #Ferguson: Mediatized fields and the new activist 
journalist. New Media & Society, 20(7), 2252–2271.
Baron. D. P., 2004, Persistent Media Bias, Journal of Public Economics, 90(1-2), 1-36
Basu. M., 2010, ‘New Journalism’, Subjectivity and Postmodern News, Proof 2010: 
Journalists Defending Journalism Set 2, Politics, Postmodern Journalism, and the 
Public, Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/5822142/_New_Journalism_Subjectivity_and_Postmodern_
News [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Baum. M. A., 2003, Soft News and Political Knowledge: Evidence of Absence or 
Absence of Evidence?, Political Communication 20, 173–90.
Baum. M., 2003. Soft News Goes to War:Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in 
the New Media Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Baym, N & Boyd. D., 2012, Socially mediated publicness: An introduction. Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 56: 320–329.
BBC, 2016, BBC's weekly global audience rises to record 348m, BBC Media Centre. 
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2016/bbc-weekly-global-
audience [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
BBC, 2017, BBC's global audience rises to 372m, BBC Media Centre. Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2017/global-audience-measure [Last 
accessed: 19/01/20]
BBC Online, 2015, BBC Online Briefing Summer 2015: WORK PLAN. Available at: 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/commissioning/site/bbc-online-work-plan-summer-2015.pdf  
[Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Beck. R. C., 2003, Motivation: Theories and Principles, Pearson, 5th edition
Becker. H., 1967, Whose side are we on, Social Problems, 14, 239
Becker. L & Vlad. T., 2009, News Organizations and Routines, in Wahl Jorgensen. K & 
Hanitzsch. T. (eds), The Handbook of Journalism Studies, Routledge, New York
223
Beckett. C., 2014. Should news get personal? Emotion and objectivity in the face of 
suffering. POLIS: journalism and society at the LSE.
Bednarek. M & Caple. H., 2012, News Discourse. London/ New York: Continuum
Bednarek. M & Caple. H., 2017, The Discourse of News Values, Oxford University 
Press
Bell. A., 1984, Language style as audience design. Language in Society, 13, 145–204
Bell, D., 1960, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the
Fifties. New York: Free Press.
Bennedik. S., 2003, Here is the news - and here, and here, New Media Age,19.
Bennett. W. L., 1995, News: the politics of illusion. New York: Longman
Bennett. W. L., 1983, News: The Politics of Illusion, 8th edn. New York: Longman
Bennett. W. L., 2012, The Personalization of Politics: Political Identity, Social Media, 
and Changing Patterns of Participation. The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 644(1): 20–39.
Bennett. W. L. & Iyengar., S, 2008, A new era of minimal effects? The changing 
foundations of political communication. Journal of Communication, 58, 707-731.
Bennett. W. L. & Iyengar, S., 2010, The shifting foundation of political communication: 
Responding to a defense of the media effects paradigm. Journal of Communication, 60, 
35-39.
Benton. J., 2014, Here’s some remarkable new data on the power of chat apps like 
WhatsApp for sharing news stories, Nieman Lab. Available at: 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/11/heres-some-remarkable-new-data-on-the-power-of-
chat-apps-like-whatsapp-for-sharing-news-stories/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Berelson. B., 1952, Content analysis in communication research, Free Press, New York
Berger. G., 2011, Empowering the youth as citizen journalists: A South African 
experience, Journalism, (2)6, 708-726
224
Berger. J & Luckmann. T., 1966, The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge, Penguin Random House
Bergen. M., 2020, We made the wrong call, YouTube says after deleting videos about 
HCQ, The Print. Available at: https://theprint.in/world/we-made-the-wrong-call-youtube-
says-after-deleting-videos-about-hcq/431353/
Bhowmik, S., Rony, M.M.U., Haque, M.M., Swain, K.A. and Hassan, N., 2019. 
Examining the Role of Clickbait Headlines to Engage Readers with Reliable Health-
related Information. arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.11214.
Bialik. K & Matsa. K., 2017, Key trends in social and digital news media, Pew Research 
Center. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/04/key-trends-in-
social-and-digital-news-media/ [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Bicket, D. & Wall, M., 2009,  BBC News in the United States: a `super-alternative’ news 
medium emerges. Media, Culture & Society, 31(3): 365–384.
Bilton. R., 2014, 5 charts: The shifting landscape of digital video consumption, Available 
at: http://digiday.com/publishers/shifting-state-digital-video-consumption-5-charts/, [Last 
accessed: 19/01/20]
Bishop. S., 2018, Anxiety, panic and selfoptimization: Inequalities and the YouTube 
algorithm, Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media 
Technologies, 24(1): 69–84
Bishop, S., 2020, Algorithmic Experts: Selling Algorithmic Lore on YouTube, Social 
Media + Society.
Blaagaard. B., 2013, Shifting boundaries: Objectivity, citizen journalism and tomorrow’s 
journalists, Journalism, 14(8), 1076-1090
Blöbaum. B., 2014, Trust and Journalism in a Digital Environment, Reuters Institute for 
the Study of Journalism. Available at: 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-
11/Trust%20and%20Journalism%20in%20a%20Digital%20Environment.pdf [Last 
accessed: 19/01/20]
Blumler & McQuail, 1969, Television in politics: Its uses and influence, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 
225
Boczkowski. P., 2005, Digitizing the news innovation in online newspapers, Cambridge, 
Mass. London, MIT
Boczkowski. P., 2010, News at Work: Imitation in an Age of Information Abundance, 
University of Chicago Press
Boczkowski. P & Santos. M., 2007, When More Media Equals Less News: Patterns of 
Content Homogenization in Argentina's Leading Print and Online Newspapers, Political 
Communication, 24(2), 167-180
Born. R., 2007, Party Polarization and the Rise of Partisan Voting in U.S. House 
Elections, American Politics Research, 36, 62-84
Boudana. S., 2011, A definition of journalistic objectivity as a performance, Media 
Culture Society, 33, 385
Boulianne. S., 2009, Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of 
Research,  Political Communication, 26(2), 193-211
Bonyandi. A. & Samuel. M., 2013, Headlines in Newspaper Editorials A Contrastive 
Study, SAGE Open, 3(2), 1-10
Bradley. M; Greenwald. K; Petry. C; Lang. J., 1992, Remembering pictures: Pleasure 
and arousal in memory, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 18(2), 379-390. 
Brantner, C., Lobinger, K., & Stehling, M., 2020, Memes against sexism? A multi-
method analysis of the feminist protest hashtag #distractinglysexy and its resonance in 
the mainstream news media. Convergence, 26(3), 674–696.
Breed. W., 1964, Mass communication and sociocultural integration. In L. A. Dexter & 
D. M. White (Eds.), People, society, and mass communications, 183-201. New York: 
Free Press.
Bright. J. & Nicholls. T., 2014, The Life and Death of Political News: Measuring the 
Impact of the Audience Using Online Data, Social Science Computer Review, 2, 170-
181
Brighton. P. & Dennis. F., 2007. News Values. London: Sage
226
Brown. C & Roemer. R., 2016, Local Television News in Salinas, California: Defining 
and Informing a Latino Community With Excessive Crime News Coverage, Electronic 
News, 10(1), 3-23
Bunce. M, Wright. K, Scott. M., 2017, ‘Our newsroom in the cloud’: Slack, virtual 
newsrooms and journalistic practice, New Media & Society, 1-19 
Burgess. J & Green. J., 2009. YouTube. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Burkitt. I., 2002, Complex emotions: Relations, feelings and images in emotional 
experience. In: Barbalet J (ed.) Emotions and Sociology. Oxford: Blackwell, 151–67.
Burrell. I., 2014, Cenk Uygur's The Young Turks: This YouTube news bulletin is 
challenging the fogeys of US TV, The Independent. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/opinion/cenk-uygurs-the-young-turks-this-
youtube-news-bulletin-is-challenging-the-fogeys-of-us-tv-9761069.html [Last accessed: 
19/01/20]
Cable. V., 2018, The tech titans must have their monopoly broken – and this is how we 
do it, The Guardian. Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/20/tech-monopoly-apple-
facebook-data-extreme-content
Caple. H. & Bednarek. M., 2013, Delving into the Discourse:  Approaches to News 
Values in Journalism Studies and Beyond. Working Paper. Oxford:  Reuters Institute for 
the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford
Carbonell. J., 1979, Subjective Understanding: Computer Models of Belief Systems.
PhD thesis, Yale
Carey. J., 1995, ‘The Press, Public Opinion, and Public Discourse’, in T. Glasser and C.
Salmon (eds) Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent, pp. 373–402. New
York: Guilford
Carpini. D & Williams. B., 2001 Let us infotain you: Politics in the new media 
environ-ment, Bennett WL and Entman R (eds) Mediated Politics: Communication in the 
Future of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 160–81.
227
Carpentier. N & Trioen. M., 2010, The particularity of objectivity: A post-structuralist and 
psychoanalytical reading of the gap between objectivity-as-a-value and objectivity-as-a-
practice in the 2003 Iraqi War coverage, Journalism, 11(3),  311–328
Castells. M., 1996, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Malden, MA, 
USA: Blackwell (3 volumes)
Castells. M., 2008, The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication 
Networks, and Global Governance, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science,.616(1), pp.78-93
Caumont. A., 2013, 12 trends shaping digital news, Pew Research Center, Available at: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/16/12-trends-shaping-digital-news/, [Last 
accessed: 19/01/20]
Chadwick. A., 2013, The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power, New York: Oxford 
University Press
Chadwick. A., Dennis. J. & Smith. A., 2016. Politics in the age of hybrid media: power, 
systems, and media logics. In: Bruns. A. et al. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to 
Social Media and Politics. New York: Routledge, 7 - 22
Chadwick, A. & Stromer-Galley, J., 2016, ‘Digital Media, Power, and Democracy in 
Parties and Election Campaigns: Party Decline or Party Renewal?’, The International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 21(3): 283–293.
Chadwick. A., O’Loughlin. B & Vaccari. C., 2017, Why People Dual Screen Political 
Debates and Why It Matters for Democratic Engagement, Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media, 61(2): 220-239,
Chan-Olmsted. S.M. & Cha. J., 2007, Branding Television News in a Multichannel 
Environment: An Exploratory Study of Network News Brand Personality, International 
Journal of Media Management, 9(4), 135–50
Chatzopoulou. G, Sheng. C, Faloutsos. M., 2010, A first step towards understanding 
popularity in YouTube. In: Proceedings of INFOCOM IEEE conference on computer 
communications workshops, San Diego, CA, 15–19 March, pp. 1–6. New York: Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics 
228
Chou, W. S., Prestin, A., Kunath, S., 2014, Obesity in social media: A mixed methods 
analysis. Translational Behavioral Medicine, 4: 314-323
Chouliaraki, L. 2013, ‘Mediating vulnerability: cosmopolitanism and the public sphere’, 
Media, Culture & Society, 35(1): 105–112.
Crisell. A., 2002, An Introductory History of British Broadcasting (Second Edition), UK, 
Routledge 
Christie. T., 2006, FRAMING RATIONALE FOR THE IRAQ WAR: The Interaction of 
Public Support with Mass Media and Public Policy Agendas, The International 
Communication Gazette, 68(5–6): 519–532
Croteau. D & Hoynes. W., 1994, By Invitation Only: How the Media Limit Political 
Debate, Monroe, ME: Common Courage
CNN Press Room, 2019a, CNN Digital Leads All Competitors: #1 In Global And 
Domestic Unique Visitors, Mobile, Video, Millennials, Politics and Social. Available at: 
https://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2019/11/18/cnn-digital-leads-all-competitors-1-in-
global-and-domestic-unique-visitors-mobile-video-millennials-politics-and-social/ [Last 
accessed: 19/01/20]
CNN Press Room, 2019b, CNN Launching “Go There” Show on Facebook Watch. 
Available at: https://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2019/06/12/cnn-launching-go-there-
show-on-facebook-watch/ [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Cohen. E., 2002, Online journalism as market-driven journalism, Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 46(4), 532–548 
Colditz, J. B. et al., 2017, ‘World Vaping Day: Contextualizing Vaping Culture in Online 
Social Media Using a Mixed Methods Approach’, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 
13(2): 196–215
Colistra. R., Buchman. E & Duvall. K., 2016, User-Generated Content and Television 
News Stations, Electronic News
Collins. J., 2018, The Top 10 Most Popular Sites of 2018, Lifewire. Available at: 
https://www.lifewire.com/most-popular-sites-3483140 [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Conboy. M., 2002, The Press and Popular Culture, London: Sage
229
Conboy. M., 2014, Celebrity journalism − An oxymoron? Forms and functions of a 
genre, Journalism, 15(2), 171-185
Connor. J., 2007, The Sociology of Loyalty. New York: Springer
Constantinescu. A & Tedesco. J., 2007, Framing A Kidnapping, Journalism Studies, 
8(3): 444-464,
Cooper. P., 2019, How Does the YouTube Algorithm Work? A Guide to Getting More 
Views, Hootsuite. Available at: https://blog.hootsuite.com/how-the-youtube-algorithm-
works/
Cooper & Roter. D., 2000, ‘If It Bleeds It Leads?' Attributes of TV Health News Stories 
That Drive Viewer Attention, Public Health Reports 115: 331-338. 
Covington. P., 2016, Deep Neural Networks for YouTube Recommendations, In 
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on recommender systems, 191-198
Cushion. S & Lewis. J., 2010, The Rise of 24-Hour News Television: Global 
Perspectives, Peter Lang: New York and Oxford, 2010
Dahlgren. P., 1995, Television and the public sphere: citizenship, democracy and the 
media. London: Sage. 
Dahlgren. P & Sparkes. C., 1997, Communication & Citizenship: Journalism & The 
Public Sphere. London: Routledge
Dahlgren. P., 2009, Media & Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication & 
Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Dana. R., 2013, Slyer Than the Fox, New Republic, Available at: 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112733/roger-ailes-msnbc-how-phil-griffin-created-
lefts-fox-news, [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Das. S & Chen. M., 2001, Yahoo! for Amazon: Extracting market sentiment from
stock message boards, in Proceedings of the Asia Pacific Finance Association
Annual Conference (APFA)
230
Davis.N & Dunaway. J., 2016, Party Polarization, Media Choice, and Mass Partisan-
Ideological Sorting, Public Opinion Quarterly, 80(1): 272–297
Davis. D. K & Robinson. J. P., 1986, News story attributes and comprehension. In J. P 
Robinson & M. R. Levy (Eds), The main source: Learning from television news, 179-
210, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Dave. K, Lawrence. S, Pennock. D., 2003, Mining the peanut gallery: Opinion
extraction and semantic classification of product reviews, in Proceedings
of WWW, 519–528
De Aguiar. M., 2017, Good Journalism Won’t Be Enough, NiemanLab. Available at: 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/12/good-journalism-wont-be-enough/ [Last accessed: 
19/01/20]
Deacon. D, Pickering. M, Golding. P, Murdock. G., 2007, Research Communications. 
London: Hodder Arnold.
Dellavigna. S & Kaplan. E., 2007, The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1187-1234
Demunter, C, 2005, The digital divide in Europe. Statistics in Focus 38: 1–7.
Dennis. J., 2016, “It’s Better to Light a Candle Than to Fantasize About a Sun”: Social 
Media, Political Participation and Slacktivism in Britain, Royal Holloway, University of 
London Department of Politics and International Relations
Desilver. D., 2014, The polarized Congress of today has its roots in the 1970s, Pew 
Research Center, Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/06/12/polarized-politics-in-congress-began-in-the-1970s-and-has-been-
getting-worse-ever-since/, [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Deuze. M., 2003, The web and its journalisms: Considering the consequences of 
different types of news media online, New Media and Society, 5: 203–230
Deuze. M., 2004, What is multimedia journalism?, Journalism Studies, 5(2), 139–152
Deuze, M., 2005, What is journalism?: Professional identity and ideology of journalists 
reconsidered, Journalism, 6: 442
231
Dilawari. S., Stewart. R & Flournoy. D., 1991, Development news on CNN World 
Report, International Communication Gazette, 47, 121-137.
Dimitrova. D et al., 2005, War on the Web The Immediate News Framing of Gulf War II, 
The International Journal of Press/Politics, 10(1), 22-44
Dimmick. J., Feaster. J. C. & Hoplamazian. G. J., 2010, News in the interstices: The 
niches of mobile media in space and time, New Media Society, 13: 23-39
Dini. L & Mazzini. G., 2002 “Opinion classification through information extraction,”
in Proceedings of the Conference on Data Mining Methods and Databases for 
Engineering, Finance and Other Fields (Data Mining),299–310
Dixon. T., 2003, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological 
Category. Dunning. E, 1999, Sport Matters: Sociological Studies of Sport, Violence and 
Civilization. London: Routledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dixon. T., 2012, ''Emotion'': The History of a Keyword in Crisis, Emotion Review, Vol 4, 
No. 4, 338-344
Drinot. P., 2011, Website of memory: The War of the Pacific (1879–84) in the global age 
of YouTube, Memory Studies, 4(4), 370-385
Doran P. T. & Zimmerman M. K., 2009,  "Examining the Scientific Consensus on 
Climate Change," Eos Transactions American Geophysical Union, Vol. 90, Issue 3, 22
Domingo. D., 2008, Interactivity in the daily routines of online newsrooms: Dealing with 
an uncomfortable myth, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13: 680–704. 
Douglas. N., 2014, It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic. Journal 
of Visual Culture, 13(3): 314–339.
Du Gay. P., 1994, Making up managers: Bureaucracy, enterprise and the liberal art of 
separation. British Journal of Sociology 45(4), 655–74.
Dylko. I. B. et al., 2011, Filtering 2008 US presidential election news on YouTube by 
elites and nonelites: An examination of the democratizing potential of the internet, New 
Media & Society, 14(5): 832–849
232
Edkins. B., 2017, Report: U.S. Media Among Most Polarized In The World, Forbes. 
Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettedkins/2017/06/27/u-s-media-among-
most-polarized-in-the-world-study-finds/#5c53fb712546 [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Edna. J & Mitchell. A., 2013, Americans Show Signs of Leaving a News Outlet, Citing 
Less Information, Pew Research Center, Available at: 
http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/special-reports-landing-page/citing-reduced-quality-
many-americans-abandon-news-outlets/, [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Edmonds. R., Guskin. E., Mitchell. A. & Jurkowitz. M., 2013, Newspapers: By the 
Numbers, Pew Research Center, Available at: 
http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/newspapers-stabilizing-but-still-threatened/newspapers-
by-the-numbers, [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Ekman. P & Cordaro. D., 2011, What is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic, Emotion 
Review, 3(4): 364
Ekman. P., 1972, Universals and Cultural Differences in Facial Expression of Emotion. 
In J. Cole ed. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press: 207-283.
Eley. G., 1992. Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the 
Nineteenth Century. 289–339, in Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Calhoun, 
C. Cambridge
Elias. N, 1982, The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
Ellis. J., 2010, How does audience engagement work in the newsroom?, Available at: 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/10/how-does-audience-engagement-work-in-the-
newsroom/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Elshtain. J. B., 1981. Public Man, Private Woman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
English K., Sweetset. K & Ancu. M., 2011, YouTube-ification of Political Talk: An 
Examination of Persuasion Appeals in Viral Video, American Behavioral Scientist, 55(6), 
733 - 748 
English. P., 2014, Twitter’s diffusion in sports journalism: Role models, laggards and 
followers of the social media innovation, New Media & Society, 18(3), 484-501
233
Entman. R. M., 1993, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, Journal of 
Communication 43(4): 51–8.
Entman. R. M., 2004, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Entman. R. M., 2007, Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power, Journal of 
Communication. 57(1), 163–73.
Entman. R. M., 2010, Media framing biases and political power: Explaining slant in 
news of Campaign 2008, Journalism, 11(4), 389–408
Erdal. I., 2009, Repurposing Of Content In Multi-platform News Production, Journalism 
Practice, 3(2), 178-195
Esser. F., 1999, `Tabloidization' of News, European Journal of Communication, (14)3, 
291-324 
Eyerman. R., 2005, ‘How Social Movements Move: Emotions and Social Movements’. 
In H. Flam. D. King (Ed). Emotions and Social Movements. Oxon: Routledge. 
Fertig. B., Foster. T & Nicholas. I., 2005, Tsunamis and the International Response:
Economic, Social and Environmental Dimensions, Available at:  
http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/tsunami/overview.php, [Last accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Fiorina. M. P. & Abrams. S. J., 2008, Political Polarization in the American Public, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 11: 563-588
Fisher. C et al, 2019, Digital news report: Australia 2019, News and Media Research 
Centre (UC)
Fiske. J., 1987, Television Cultures, UK, Routledge 
Flam, H & King, D., 2005, Emotions and Social Movements. Oxon: Routledge
Flanders. L., 2017, The Young Turks Are Beating Major Media Operations—on 
YouTube, The Nation. Available at: https://www.thenation.com/article/the-young-turks-
are-beating-major-media-operations-on-youtube/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
234
Franklin, B. 1997. Newszak and news media. London: Arnold. 
Franklin. B., 2003, McJournalism: The McDonaldisation Thesis & Junk Journalism, In: 
Allan, S ed. Journalism: Critical Issues, Open University Press, 137-150
Franklin. B., 2004. Packaging politics: political communications in Britain's media 
democracy. 2nd ed. London: Arnold.
Franklin. B., 2008, Pulling newspapers apart: analysing print journalism. London: 
Routledge.
Fraser, N., 1990, Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually 
existing democracy. Social Text, 25/26. pp.56-80.
Fraser. N., 1992. Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually 
existing democracy. In: Calhoun, C. ed. Habermas and the public sphere. London: MIT 
Press, 109-142. 
Friemel, T. N., 2016, The digital divide has grown old: Determinants of a digital divide 
among seniors. New Media & Society, 18(2), 313–331.
Fox. J & Park. B., 2006, The ‘I’ of embedded reporting: an analysis of CNN coverage of 
the ‘Shock and Awe’ campaign. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 50(1): 36–
51.
Fung. K., 2014, CNN's Jeff Zucker Promises In Memo To Continue 'Broadening The 
Definition Of News', Huffington Post, Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/26/jeff-zucker-memo-cnn-
changes_n_4503570.html, [Last accessed: 19/01/20]
Gal, N., Shifman, L & Kampf, Z., 2016, “It Gets Better”: Internet memes and the 
construction of collective identity. New Media & Society, 18(8), 1698–1714.
Galtung. J & Ruge. M. H., 1965, The Structure of Foreign News, Journal of Peace 
Research, 1, 64–91
Garcia Canclini, N., 2008, ‘Interview for the 9th Spanish sociology conference,
2007’, trans. Toby Miller’, Social Identities, 14(3):389-394.
235
García Avilés. J et al., 2009, Newsroom Integration In Austria, Spain And Germany, 
Journalism Practice, 3(3), 285-303
Garrett, R. K., 2009a, Politically motivated reinforcement seeking: Reframing the 
selective exposure debate. Journal of Communication, 59: 676-699.
Garrett, R. K., 2009b, Echo chambers online? Politically motivated selective exposure 
among Internet news users. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 14: 265-
285
Gamson. W., 1989, News as Framing, American Behavioural Scientist, 33(2), 157-161
Gamson. W., 1992, Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gan. F, Teo. J.L & Dentenber. B.H, 2005, Newspapers' Coverage of the 2000 United 
States Presidential Election Framing the Battle for the White House: A Comparison of 
Two National, International Communication Gazette, 67(5): 441-467 
Gans. H., 2004, Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly 
News, Newsweek, and Time, Northwestern University Press
Gaynor. N & O’BrienIrish. A., 2017, Community radio, democratic participation and the 
public sphere Journal of Sociology, 25(1), 29 - 47 
Gearhart. S & Kang. S., 2014, Social Media in Television News: The Effects of Twitter 
and Facebook Comments on Journalism, Electronic News, 8(4), 243-259
Geiger. A., 2019, Key findings about the online news landscape in America, Pew 
Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/11/key-
findings-about-the-online-news-landscape-in-america/ 
Gerbner. G., Gross. L., Morgan. M. & Signorielli. N., 1982, Charting the Mainstream: 
Television’s Contributions to Political Orientations, Journal of Communication, 3(3): 10-
29.
Gentzkow. M & Shapiro. J. M., 2006, Media Bias and Reputation, Journal of Political 
Economy 114(2):  280–316
Gibson, A., 2019, Free Speech and Safe Spaces: How Moderation Policies Shape 
Online Discussion Spaces. Social Media + Society.
236
Gilboa. E., 2005, The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of 
International Relations, Political Communication, 22, 27-44
Gitlin. T, 1980, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking 
of the New Left. Berkeley: University of California Press
Goode. L & McKee. A., 2013, Conflict and seduction in the public sphere, Media, 
Culture & Society, 35(1) 113–120
Google., 2019, Privacy Policy, When you share your information. Available at: 
https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en#infosharing
Graafland. J., 2018, New technologies and 21st century children: RECENT TRENDS 
AND OUTCOMES. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)
Grabe. M & Zhou. S, 2003, News as Aristotelian drama: The case of 60 minutes. Mass 
Communication and Society, (6)3: 313–36.
Graber.D., 1994, The Infotainment Quotient in Routine Television News: A Director's 
Perspective, Discourse & Society, (5)4: 483-508.
Graber. D, 1988, Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide, New 
York, Longman
Greenwald. G., 2013, On whistleblowers and government threats of investigation, 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/07/whistleblowers-
and-leak-investigations [Last accessed: 13/08/2018]
Greene, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., Graham, W. F., 1989, Toward a conceptual framework 
for mixed-method evaluation designs. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 11: 
255-274
Gripsrud. J., 2007, Television and the European Public Sphere, European Journal of 
Communication, 22(4): 479–492.
Groeling. T., 2008, Who's the fairest of them all? An empirical test for partisan bias on 
ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox News. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 38, 631–657
237
Groseclose. T & Milyo. M., 2005, A Measure of Media Bias, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 120: 1191-1237
Groshek. J., 2008, Homogenous Agendas, Disparate Frames: CNN and CNN 
International Coverage Online, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 52(1), 52-68
Gruenfeld. L., 1996, Objective News Reporting; Available at: 
www.leegruenfeld.com/essays/objectivenews.htm [Last accessed: 13/08/2015)
Guerrazzi. D., Grant. A & Wilkinson. J., 2016, Format appears to matter less than story 
salience, Newspaper Research Journal, 1-13
Güneş. T et al, 2016, YouTube as a source of information on varicose veins, 
Phlebology, 31(7), 501-505
Gunther. M., 1999, The Transformation of Network News: How Profitability Has Moved 
Networks Out of Hard News, Nieman Reports, Special Issue 1999, Available at: 
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102153/The-Transformation-of-Network-
News.aspx [Last accessed: 27/08/2014]
Guetterman, T. C., Babchuk, W. A., Howell Smith, M. C., & Stevens, J, 2019,
Contemporary Approaches to Mixed Methods–Grounded Theory Research: A Field-
Based Analysis. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 13(2): 179–195
Habermas. J., 1989, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society, Polity Press, Cambridge
Habermas. J., 1997. The Public Sphere, in Contemporary Political Philosophy, edited by 
Goodin, R. E., Petit., P. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 105 – 08
Hackett. R., 1984, Decline of a paradigm? Bias and objectivity in news media studies. 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1(3): 229–59.
Hackett, R., 2005, Is there a democratic deficit in US and UK journalism? In: Allan, S. 
ed. Journalism: critical issues. Maidenhead: Open University Press, pp.85-97.
Hafez, K., 2002 ‘Journalism Ethics Revisited: A Comparison of Ethics Codes in
Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Muslim Asia’, Political Communication
19(2): 225–50.
238
Haigh. M & Bruce. M., 2017, A comparison of the visual and story frames Al Jazeera
English and CNN employed during the 2011 Egyptian revolution, International 
Communication Gazette, 79(4), 419-433 
Hall, S., 1982, ‘The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’: Return of the Repressed in Media 
Studies’, in Storey, J. (2006) Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, Third 
Edition. London: Pearson.   
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J & Roberts, B., 1978, Policing the crisis: 
mugging, the state, and law and order. London: MacMillan Education.
Hallin. DC., 1999, Newszak and news media, European Journal Of Communication, 
14(2), 265-267
Harbers. F & Broersma. M., 2014, Between engagement and ironic ambiguity: 
Mediating subjectivity in narrative journalism, Journalism, 15(5): 639 –654
Harcup. T. & O’Neill. D., 2001, What is news? Galtung and Ruge revisited, Journalism
Studies, 2(1),.261-280  
Harcup. T. & O’Neill. D., 2017, What is News?, Journalism Studies, 18(12), 1470-1488,
Hanson. G, Haridakis. P & Sharma. R., 2011, Differing Uses of YouTube During the 
2008 U.S. Presidential Primary Election, Electronic News, 5(1), 1-19
Hamilton. J., 2004, All the News That’s Fit to Sell: How the Market Transforms 
Information into News, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Heltai. G., 2016, What Millennials’ YouTube Usage Tells Us about the Future of Video 
Viewership, ComScore. Available at: https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Blog/What-
Millennials-YouTube-Usage-Tells-Us-about-the-Future-of-Video-Viewership [Last 
accessed: 15/08/2018]
Hermida. A., 2009, The Blogging BBC, Journalism Practice, 3(3), 268-284
Hetherington. M. J., 2001, Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization, 
American Political Science Review, 95: 619–31
Henderson. L., 2014, ‘News for Everyone? Perspectives of Young People and 
Journalists on Political Reporting in UK Television’, Young, 22(2), 135-152
239
Hestres, L. E., 2014, Preaching to the choir: Internet-mediated advocacy, issue public 
mobilization, and climate change. New Media & Society, 16(2), 323–339
Heusner. C, Bryant. N, Guo. H, Hari. K & Deng. K, 2019, Content Analysis for 
Typographic Choices in YouTube Video Thumbnails for Voice Assistants, Rochester 
Institute of Technology. Available at: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cf53758311fdd00016e8dc7/t/5dea9c4afb27433
01f36a127/1575656522401/FINALPAPERTYPERESEARCH.pdf
Heyvaert, M., Hannes, K., Maes, B., & Onghena, P., 2013, Critical Appraisal of Mixed 
Methods Studies. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 7(4): 302–327.
Himelboim, I., 2011, Civil Society and Online Political Discourse: The Network Structure 
of Unrestricted Discussions. Communication Research, 38(5), 634–659.
Hoffman. L et al., 2013, Does my comment count? Perceptions of political participation 
in an online environment, Computers in Human Behavior, 29(6), 2248-2256
Holbert. R. L., Garrett, R. K., & Gleason, L. S, 2010, A new era of minimal effects? A 
response to Bennett and Iyengar. Journal of Communication, 60(1): 15-34
Holbert. R. L., Hmielowski. J. D., & Weeks. B. E., 2012, Clarifying Relationships 
Between Ideology and Ideologically Oriented Cable TV News Use: A Case of 
Suppression, Communication Research, 39(2): 194–216
Holcomb. J., 2014, 5 Facts about Fox News, Pew Research Center, Available at: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/14/five-facts-about-fox-news/, [Last 
accessed: 11/09/2014]
Holcomb. J. & Mitchell. A., 2013, Cable: By the Numbers, The State of the News Media 
2013, Pew Research Center, Available at: http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/cable-a-
growing-medium-reaching-its-ceiling/cable-by-the-numbers/, [Last Accessed: 
09/09/2014]
Hooghe. M., 2002, Watching Television and Civic Engagement, The International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 7(2), 84 - 104
Horton. D & Wohl. R., 1956, Mass Communication and Para-Social Interaction, 
Psychiatry, 19(3), 215-22
240
Hurst. W et al, 2011, Size Matters! How Thumbnail Number, Size, and Motion Influence 
Mobile Video Retrieval, International Conference on Multimedia Modeling, Advances in 
Multimedia Modeling pp 230-240
International Journalists' Network, 2013, Part One: Guiding Ethical Principles for 
Journalists, http://ijnet.org/ethics-journalism/part-one-guiding-ethical-principles-
journalists [Last Accessed: 09/09/2014]
Iyengar. S & Kinder. D., 1989, News That Matters: Television and American Opinion, 
Public Opinion Quarterly, 53(2), 277–278,
Iyengar. S, 1991, Television news and citizen's explanations of national affairs, 
American Political Science Review, 81, 815-831
Izard. C. E, 2010, The many meanings/aspects of emotion: Definitions, functions, 
activation, and regulation. Emotion Review, 2, 363–370.
Izard. C. E & Malatesta. C. Z., 1987, Perspectives on emotional development: 
Differential Emotions Theory of early emotional development. In JD Osofsky (ed.), 
Handbook of Infant Development (2nd ed.), 494-540, New York: J. Wiley.
Jacobson. G. C., 2004, Partisan and Ideological Polarization in the California Electorate, 
State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 4: 113-139
Jacobson. G. C., 2005, Polarized Politics and the 2004 Congressional and Presidential 
Elections, Political Science Quarterly, 120: 199-218
Jain P., Rodrigues T., Magno G., Kumaraguru P., Almeida V., 2013, Cross-pollination of 
information in online social media: A case study on popular social networks, 2011, IEEE 
Third Int'l Conference on Social Computing, arXiv:1301.6932
Jamieson. K., 1992, Dirty Politics, New York: Oxford University Press
Jamieson. K. H. & Cappella. J. N., 2008, Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the 
conservative media establishment. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
Jenkins, H., 2004, The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence. International Journal of 
Cultural Studies, 7(1): 33–43.
241
Jin. D., 2013, De-Convergence of Global Media Industries, Taylor & Francis Group, 
ProQuest Ebook Central
Jin. D & Yoon. K., 2016, The social mediascape of transnational Korean pop culture: 
Hallyu 2.0 as spreadable media practice. New Media & Society, 18(7), 1277–1292.
Johnson. J., 2012, Comments Are Bad Business For Online Media, Available at: 
http://animalnewyork.com/2012/comments-are-bad-business-for-online-media/ [Last 
Accessed: 15/08/2018]
Johnson. T., Braima. M & Sothirajah. J., 1999, Doing the Traditional Media Sidestep: 
Comparing the Effects of the Internet and Other Nontraditional Media with Traditional 
Media in the 1996 Presidential Campaign, Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly, 76(1), 99-123 
Jones, C., Trott, V., & Wright, S., 2019, Sluts and soyboys: MGTOW and the production 
of misogynistic online harassment. New Media & Society
Jones. D., 2001, Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock, Political Research 
Quarterly, 54: 125-141
Jones. J., 2012, Fox News and the Performance of Ideology, Cinema Journal, 51(4): 
178–185. 
Jones. J., 2005, Entertaining Politics. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Jones. J & Himelboim. I, 2010, Just a guy in pajamas? Framing the blogs in mainstream 
US newspaper coverage (1999−−2005), New Media & Society, 12(2): 271-288 
Jones. J., 2012, The ‘New’ News as No ‘News’: Us Cable News Channels as Branded 
Political Entertainment Television, Media International Australia, 144(1), 146-155.
Joye. S., Heinrich. A. & Wöhlert. R., 2016, 50 years of Galtung and Ruge: Reflections 
on their model of news values and its relevance for the study of journalism and 
communication today, Communication and Media 11(36): 5–28
Judis. J., 2013, Glenn Greenwald and Bill Keller Are Wrong About Objectivity in 
Journalism, Available at: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115500/glenn-greenwald-
objectivity-journalism-hes-wrong [Last Accessed: 15/08/2018]
242
Jurkowitz. M., 2014, The Growth in Digital Reporting, Available at: 
http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/the-growth-in-digital-reporting/, [Last accessed: 
14/09/2014]
Jurkowitz. M., Hitlin. P.,  Mitchell. A., Santhanam. L., Adams. S., Anderson. M, and 
Vogt. N., 2013, The Changing TV News Landscape, Pew Research Center, Available 
at: http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/special-reports-landing-page/the-changing-tv-news-
landscape/, [Last Accessed: 11/09/2014]
Kalogeropoulos. A, Cherubini. F & Newman. N., 2016, The Future Of Online
News Video, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/research/files/The%2520Future
%2520of%2520Online%2520News%2520Video.pdf 
Kalogeropoulos. A & Newman. N., 2017, ‘I Saw the News on Facebook’ Brand 
Attribution when Accessing News from Distributed Environments, Digital New Project, 
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism
Kalogeropoulos. A & Fletcher. R., 2018, In the U.S., the left trusts the mainstream 
media more than the right, and the gap is growing, NiemanLab. Available at: 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/06/in-the-u-s-the-left-trusts-the-mainstream-media-
more-than-the-right-and-the-gap-is-growing/ [Last Accessed: 11/08/2018]
Karlsen. R. & Enjolras. B., 2016, Styles of Social Media Campaigning and Influence in a 
Hybrid Political Communication System: Linking Candidate Survey Data with Twitter 
Data. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 21(3), 338–357.
Kasakowskij. R et al., 2018, Anonymous and Non-anonymous User Behavior on Social 
Media: A Case Study of Jodel and Instagram, Journal of information science theory and 
practice, 6(3), 25-36
Katz. A., 2017a, Q2 2017 Ratings: Fox News is the Most-Watched Cable News Network 
for 62 Straight Quarters, TVNewser. Available at: http://www.adweek.com/tvnewser/q2-
2017-ratings-fox-news-is-the-most-watched-cable-news-network-for-62nd-straight-
quarters/333380 [Last Accessed: 11/08/2018]
Katz. A., 2017b, Q2 2017 Ratings: CNN Has Its Most-Watched 2nd Quarter Ever 
Across Total Day, TVNewser. Available at: http://www.adweek.com/tvnewser/q2-2017-
ratings-cnn-has-its-most-watched-2nd-quarter-ever-across-total-day/333374 [Last 
Accessed: 11/08/2018]
243
Katz. J & Rice, R., 2002, Social Consequences of Internet Use: Access, Involvement 
and Interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kay. K., 2016, US election: How Trump defied all predictions, BBC. Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-36200591 [Last Accessed: 15/08/2018]
Keller. M., 2018, The Flourishing Business of Fake YouTube Views, The New York 
Times. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/11/technology/youtube-fake-view-
sellers.html [Last Accessed: 11/08/2018]
Kenix. L., 2008, Nonprofit Organizations’ Perceptions and Uses of the Internet, 
Television & New Media, 9(5): 407-428
Kepplinger. H & Knirsch. K., 2001, The Relevance of Weberian Ethics for Contemporary 
Journalism, European Journal of Communication 16(1) 5-23 
Khamis, S., Gold, P. B., Vaughn, K., 2012, “Beyond Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution’ and 
Syria’s ‘YouTube Uprising’: Comparing Political Contexts, Actors and Communication 
Strategies.” Arab Media and Society 15.
Kietzmann. J. et al., 2011, Social media? Get serious! Understanding the functional 
building blocks of social media, Business Horizons, 54(3), 241-251
Kilby. A., 2014, Satire for Sanity: An examination of media representation and audience 
engagement with The Daily Show’s Rally to Restore Sanity, PhD, University of Cardiff  
Kim. J., 2012, The institutionalization of YouTube: From user-generated content to 
professionally generated content, Media Culture Society, 34(1), 53-67
Kim. M., Newth. D., Christen. P., 2014, Trends of news diffusion in social media based 
on crowd phenomena, In Proceedings of the Companion Publication of the 23rd 
International Conference on World Wide Web Companion, 753–758
Kiritchenko. S & Mohammad. S., 2018, Examining Gender and Race Bias in Two 
Hundred Sentiment Analysis Systems, In Proceedings of the 7th Joint Conference on 
Lexical and Computational Semantics (*SEM), New Orleans, USA.
Kitch. C, 2000, ‘A news of feeling as well as fact’: Mourning and memorial in American 
244
newsmagazines. Journalism 1(2): 175–195.
Kitch. C, 2003, ‘Mourning in America’: Ritual, redemption and recovery in news 
narrative after September 11. Journalism Studies 4(2): 213–224.
Kitis. E & Milapedes. M, 1997, Read it and believe it: How metaphor constructs ideology 
in news discourse. Journal of Pragmatics, 28(5): 557–590.
Knobloch-Westerwick. S & Meng, J., 2009, Looking the other way: Selective exposure 
to attitude-consistent and counterattitudinal political information. Communication 
Research, 36: 426-448.
Knox. J., 2009, Punctuating the home page: image as language in an online 
newspaper, Discourse & Communication, 3(2): 145–172
Kormelink. T & Meijer. I., 2017, What clicks actually mean: Exploring digital news user 
practices, Journalism, 1-16
Kosoff. M., 2015, This is the first YouTube video ever uploaded — it was posted 10 
years ago today, Business Insider UK, Tech. Available at: 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/first-youtube-video-2015-4?r=US&IR=T [Last Accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Kovach. B & Rosenstiel. T., 2001, The Elements of Journalism. New York: Crown
Publishers.
Kramer. M., 2016, 50 ways to measure your analytics (with apologies to Paul Simon), 
Poynter. Available at: https://www.poynter.org/news/50-ways-measure-your-analytics-
apologies-paul-simon [Last Accessed: 15/08/2018]
Kreiss, D., 2016, ‘Seizing the moment: The presidential campaigns’ use of Twitter 
during the 2012 electoral cycle’, New Media & Society, 18(8): 1473–1490
Krippendorff, K., 1989, Content analysis. In E. Barnouw, G. Gerbner, W. Schramm, T. L. 
Worth, & L. Gross (Eds.), International encyclopedia of communication, 1: 403-407, 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press
Krippendorff K., 1993, ‘The Past of Communication’s Hoped-for Future’, Journal of 
Communication 43(3): 34–44.
245
Krippendorff. K., 2004, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, USA, 
Sage 
Ksiazek. T. et al., 2014, User engagement with online news: Conceptualizing 
interactivity and exploring the relationship between online news videos and user 
comments, New Media & Society, 18(3), 502–520
Kuklinski. J. H. & Sigelman. L., 1992, When Objectivity Is Not Objective: Network 
Television News Coverage of U.S. Senators and the ‘Paradox of Objectivity,’ Journal of 
Politics, 54: 810–33.
Kumpel. A & Hass. A., 2015, Framing Gaming: The Effects of Media Frames on 
Perceptions of Game(r)s, Games and Culture
Kupchick. A and Bracy. L., 2009, The News Media on School Crime and Violence: 
Constructing Dangerousness and Fueling Fear, Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, 
7(2), 136-155
Laclau E & Mouffe C, 1985, Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical 
democratic politics. London: Verso.
Lane, R. E., 1955, Political personality and electoral choice. American Political Science 
Review, 49: 173-190.
Larsson. A.O., 2011, Interactive to me—interactive to you? A study of use and 
appreciation of interactivity on Swedish newspaper websites. New Media & Society 
13(7), 1180–1197 
Laster. K & O’Malley. P, 1996, Sensitive new-age laws: The reassertion of emotionality 
in law. International Journal of the Sociology of Law 24(4): 21–40.
Layman. G. C, Carsey. T. M, Green. J. C, Herrera. C & Cooperman. R., 2010, Party 
Polarization, Party Commitment, and Conflict Extension among American Party 
Activists, American Political Science Review, 104(2): 324–46.
Lee. M., 2007, Bootlegging: Romanticism and Copyright in the Music Industry, Media 
International Australia, 124(1) 189-190
Lee. J., 2009, News Values, Media Coverage, And Audience Attention: An Analysis Of 
Direct And Mediated Causal Relationships, J&MC Quarterly, 86(1): 175-190
246
Lehman-Wilzig. S & Seletzky. M., 2010, Hard news, soft news, ‘general’ news: The 
necessity and utility of an intermediate classification, Journalism, 11: 37-56
Lewis. B., 2019, All YouTube, Not Just the Algorithm, is a Far-Right Propaganda 
Machine, FFWD. Available at: https://ffwd.medium.com/all-of-youtube-not-just-the-
algorithm-is-a-far-right-propaganda-machine-29b07b12430
Lewis. J, Williams. A & Franklin. B., 2008, Four Rumours And An Explanation, 
Journalism Practice, 2(1): 27-45
Lewis. S, 2012, The tension between professional control and open participation: 
Journalism and its boundaries. Information, Communication & Society 15(6): 836–866
Lichter. S. R., S. Rothman, & L. S. Lichter., 1986, The Media Elite, Bethesda, MD: Adler 
and Adler
Lindvall, H., 2014, YouTube's monopolistic behaviour is hurting indie music labels. The 
Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/media/media-
blog/2014/may/29/youtube-indie-music-labels-royalty-rates-video-streaming-audio 
Limor. Y & Mann. R., 1997, Itona’ut [Journalism]. Tel Aviv: Open University.
Lippmann. W., 1982, A Preface to Morals,  Transaction Publishers 
Livingstone, S & Lunt, P. (1994) The mass media, democracy and the public sphere. In 
Talk on Television: Audience participation and public debate, London: Routledge: 9-35 
Lockyer. S & Attwood. F., 2009, “The Sickest TelevisionShow Ever:” Paedogeddon and 
the British Press, Popular Communication, 7(1): 49-60
Loomis. K., 2009, A Comparison of Broadcast World News Web Pages: Al Jazeera 
English, BBC, CBS, and CNN, Electronic News, 3(3), 143–160
Lott. J. R. Jr., & Hassett. K. A., 2004, Is Newspaper Coverage of Economic Events 
Politically Biased? manuscript, American Enterprise Institute
Lowood. H., 2006, Storyline, Dance/Music, or PvP?Game Movies and Community 
Players in World of Warcraft, Games and Culture, 1(4): 362-382
247
Loyn. D., 2007, Local heroes: risk-taking in Iraq, British Journalism Review, 18(2), 21-25
Lukin. A, 2013, Journalism, ideology and linguistics: The paradox of Chomsky’s 
linguistic legacy and his ‘propaganda model’, Journalism,14(1): 96 –110
Lule. J, 2001, Daily News, Eternal Stories: The Mythological Role of Journalism. 
London: Guilford Press
Lupton. D, 1997, Consumerism, reflexivity, and the medical encounter. Social Science & 
Medicine 45(3): 373–81.
Luyendijk. J., 2006, Het zijn net mensen. Beelden uit het Midden-Oosten [They’re just 
like human beings. Images from the Middle East]. Amsterdam: Podium.
Lyng. S, 1990, Edgework: A social psychological analysis of risk-taking. American 
Journal of Sociology 95: 887–92.
Lyotard. J., 1984, The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.
MacGregor. P., 2007, Tracking the online audience: metric data start a subtle 
revolution, Journalism Studies, 8(2), 280–298.  
Maccise. D & Marai. M, 2018, Producing Video for Social Platforms, Al Jazeera Media 
Institute. Available at: 
https://institute.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/2018/Producing%20Video%20for%20Soc
ial%20Platforms.pdf [Last Accessed: 19/01/2020]
Macnamara. J., 2011. Media content analysis: Its uses; benefits and best practice 
methodology, Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal, 6(1), 1–34. 
Madlena. C., 2010, Cenk Uygur on the success of The Young Turks, The Guardian. 
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/apr/26/cenk-uygur-young-turks 
[Last Accessed: 15/08/2018]
Marchart. O., 2012, Laclau: A Critical Reader, Routledge
Marchi. R., 2012, With Facebook, Blogs, and Fake News, Teens Reject Journalistic 
“Objectivity”, Journal of Communication Inquiry, 36(3), 246–262
248
Machill, M., Köhler, S. & Waldhauser, M., 2007, ‘The Use of Narrative Structures in 
Television News: An Experiment in Innovative Forms of Journalistic Presentation’, 
European Journal of Communication, 22(2): 185–205
Machin. D. & Niblock. S., 2006, News Production: Theory and Practice.London/New 
York: Routledge.
Massanari, A., 2015, #Gamergate and The Fappening: How Reddit’s algorithm, 
governance, and culture support toxic technocultures. New Media & Society, 19(3), 
329–346.
Matsa. K., 2017, Cable News Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center, June 2017. Available 
at: http://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/cable-news/ [Last Accessed: 29/08/2018]
Matsa. K & Lu. K., 2016, 10 facts about the changing digital news landscape, Pew 
Research Centre, September 2016. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/09/14/facts-about-the-changing-digital-news-landscape/ [Last Accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Matsakis. L., 2017, Inside the Strange World of YouTube Thumbnails, Vice. Available 
at: https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zme97a/inside-the-strange-world-of-youtube-
thumbnails 
Matsumoto. D, 1992, More evidence for the universality of a contempt expression, 
Motivation and Emotion,  Springer Netherlands. 16(4)
Mawdsley. C., 2017, What I learned from YouTube’s viewers research, YouTube 
Cultural Impact Study 2017, The Drum. Available at: 
https://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2017/11/15/what-i-learned-youtube-s-viewers-
research [Last Accessed: 15/08/2018]
May. A., 2010, Who Tube? How YouTube’s News and Politics Space Is Going 
Mainstream, International Journal of Press/Politics, 15(4), 499–511
Maxwell. R & Miller. T., 2011, Old, New And Middle-aged Media
Convergence, Cultural Studies, 25(4-5): 585-603,
McAndrew. F & De Jonge. C., 2011, Electronic Person Perception: What Do We Infer 
About People From the Style of Their E-mail Messages?, Social Psychological and 
Personality Science, 2(4), 403-407
249
McChesney. R., 2003, The Problem of Journalism: a political economic contribution to 
an explanation of the crisis in contemporary US Journalism, In Journalism Studies, 4(3): 
299-329. 
McCluskey. M & Kim. Y. M., 2012, Moderatism or Polarization? Representation of 
Advocacy Groups’ Ideology in Newspapers, Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly, 89(4): 565–584
McGregor. J., 2002, July. Restating news values: Contemporary criteria for selecting the 
news. In Refereed articles from the Proceedings of the ANZCA 2002 Conference, 
Coolangatta. Communication: Reconstructed for the 21st Century.
McKim, C. A., 2017, The Value of Mixed Methods Research: A Mixed Methods Study. 
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 11(2), 202–222.
McNair, B.,  2011. An Introduction to Political Communication. 5th Edition. London: 
Routledge.
McQuail, D., 2010, McQuail's mass communication theory. 6th ed. London: Sage. 
Meadows. M., 2012, Putting the citizen back into journalism, Journalism, 14(1), 43 - 60
Melkote. S., 2009, NEWS FRAMING DURING A TIME OF IMPENDING WAR: An 
Examination of Coverage in The New York Times prior to the 2003 Iraq War, 
International Communication Gazette, 71(7), 547-559
Memmott. M., 2004, Fox newspeople say allegations of bias unfounded, USA Today,  
Available at: 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-09-01-fox-
news_x.htm, [Last accessed: 09/09/2014]
Meroywitz. J., 1987, No Sense of Place, the impact of electronic media on social 
behaviour, USA, Oxford University Press 
Miller. A & Roberts. S., 2010, Visual Agenda-Setting & Proximity after Hurricane 
Katrina: A Study of Those Closest to the Event, Visual Communication Quarterly, 17(1): 
31-46
250
Mirkinson. P., 2014, Al Jazeera America’s Ratings Can Be Seen In A Million Different 
Ways, Huffington Post. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/18/al-
jazeera-america-ratings_n_4297591.html  [Last accessed: 05/08/2018]
Mina, A., 2014, Batman, Pandaman and the Blind Man: A Case Study in Social Change 
Memes and Internet Censorship in China. Journal of Visual Culture, 13(3), 359–375.
Mindich. D, 1998, Just the facts: How objectivity came to define American journalism. 
New York, New York University Press
Mitchell. A., Stocking. G., Matsta. K., 2016, Long-Form Reading Shows Signs of Life in 
Our Mobile News World, Pew Research Center. Available at: 
http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/05/long-form-reading-shows-signs-of-life-in-our-
mobile-news-world/ [Last accessed: 05/08/2018]
Molek-Kozakowska. K, 2013, Towards a pragma-linguistic framework for the study of 
sensationalism in news headlines, Discourse & Communication, 7(2): 173 –197
Molek-Kozakowska. K, 2016, Stylistic analysis of headlines in science journalism: A 
case study of New Scientist, Public Understanding of Science, 26(8): 894-907
Monck. A, 2008, Journalism’s functions in a democracy, Adrian Monck's Blog, Available 
at: http://adrianmonck.com/2008/10/journalisms-functions-in-a-democracy/ [Last 
accessed: 05/08/2018]
Moore. M., 2006, In news we trust, British Journalism Review, 17(4): 45-51
Mortensen, M., 2015, Conflictual Media Events, Eyewitness Images, and the Boston 
Marathon Bombing (2013), Journalism Practice, 9(4): 536-551
Morozov. E., 2009, Foreign Policy: Brave New World Of Slacktivism, NPR. Available at: 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104302141 [Last accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Morris. J. S., 2005, The Fox News Factor, Press/Politics 10(3): 56-79
Morris. J. S., 2009, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Audience Attitude Change 
During the 2004 Party Conventions, Political Behaviour, 31(1): 79-102
251
Morris. J. S., & Francia. P. L., 2010, Cable News, Public Opinion, and the 2004 Party 
Conventions, Political Research Quarterly, 63(4): 834–849
Monica. P., 2009, Inside Rupert's Brain, Penguin, London 
Montgomery. M. & Feng, D., 2016, ‘‘Coming up next’: The discourse of television news 
headlines’, Discourse & Communication, 10(5): 500–520.
Mundorf. N, Drew. D, Zillmann. & Weaver. J, 1990, Effects of distributing news on recall 
of subsequently presented news, Communication Research, 17: 601-615
Murphy. T., 2017, The Young Turks Really, Really Don’t Want You to Compare Them to 
Breitbart, Mother Jones. Available at: 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/03/young-turks-becoming-breitbart-left/ [Last 
accessed: 29/08/2018]
Mutz, D. C., 2006, Hearing the other side: Deliberative versus participatory democracy. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Myers S. A., Zhu C., Leskovec J., 2012, Information diffusion and external influence in 
networks, KDD '12 Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on 
Knowledge discovery and data mining, 33-41 
Myrick. K., 2015, Emotion regulation, procrastination, and watching cat videos online: 
Who watches Internet cats, why, and to what effect?, Computers in Human Behavior, 
52, 168-176
Naim. M., 2009, The YouTube Effect, Foreign Policy. Available at: 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/the-youtube-effect/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Nagar. N., 2011, The loud public: the case of user comments in online news media. 
PhD Dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY.
Negroponte. N., 1996, Being digital. New York: Vintage.
Newman. N., Dutton. W. H., & Blank. G., 2012, Social media in the changing ecology of 
news: The fourth and fifth estates in Britain, International Journal of Internet Science, 7: 
6–22.
252
Newman. N, Fletcher. R, Kalogeropoulos. A & Nielsen. R., 2019. Reuters Institute 
Digital News Report 2019, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism
Neuendorf. K., 2002, The Content Analysis Guidebook, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Ng. Y-L & Zhao. X., 2018, The Human Alarm System for Sensational News, Online 
News Headlines, and Associated Generic Digital Footprints: A Uses and Gratifications 
Approach, Communication Research: 1–25
Nguyen. A., 2012, The Effect Of Soft News On Public Attachment To The News, 
Journalism Studies, 13(5-6): 706-717
Niblock. S & Machin. D., 2007, News values for consumer groups The case of 
Independent Radio News, London, UK, Journalism, 8(2): 184–204
Nicas. J., 2017, YouTube Tops 1 Billion Hours of Video a Day, on Pace to Eclipse TV, 
The Wall Street Journal. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/youtube-tops-1-
billion-hours-of-video-a-day-on-pace-to-eclipse-tv-1488220851 [Last accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Niven. D., 2003, Objective Evidence on Media Bias: Newspaper Coverage of 
Congressional Party Switchers, Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 80: 311-
326
Oates. S., 2008, Introduction to Media & Politics. London: Sage.
OFCOM, 2019, News Consumption in the UK: 2019, Jigsaw Research
Oliver. M. et al., 2012, The Effect of Narrative News Format on Empathy for Stigmatized 
Groups, Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 89(2), 205-224 
Olmstead. K., Mitchell. A., Holcomb. J. & Vogt. N., 2014, The Audience for Digital News 
Videos, Pew Research Center, Available at: http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/the-
audience-for-digital-news-videos/, [Last accessed: 14/09/2014]
O’Neill. D., 2012, No cause for celebration: the rise of celebrity news values in the 
British quality press, Journalism Education. 1(2): 26-44 
253
O’Neill. D. & Harcup. T., 2008, ‘News values and selectivity’. In K. Wahl- Jorgensen and 
T. Hanitzsch (Eds.). Handbook of Journalism Studies, 161– 174. London/ New York: 
Routledge.
Owen. B., 1999, The Internet challenge to television. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Palmer. P., 2012, “iReporting” an Uprising, Television & New Media, 14(5), 367-385
Pang. B., 2002, Thumbs up? Sentiment Classification using Machine Learning 
Techniques,. Proceedings of the Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language 
Processing (EMNLP): 79–86.
Pang. B & Lee. L., 2008, Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis, Foundations and 
Trends in Information Retrieval, 2(1–2),1–135, 
Pantti. M., 2010, The value of emotion: An examination of television journalists’ notions 
on emotionality, European Journal of Communication, 25(2): 168–181
Papacharissi. Z., 2002, The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere, new media 
& society, 4(1): 9–27
Parkin. M., 2009, Taking Late Night Comedy Seriously, Political Research Quarterly, 
63(1), 3 - 15 
Parks. P., 2019a, Textbook News Values: Stable Concepts, Changing Choices, 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 2019, 96(3): 784–810
Parks. P., 2019b, An unnatural split: how ‘human interest’ sucks the life from significant 
news, Media, Culture & Society, 41(8): 1228–1244
Patterson. T., 1993, Out of order, New York: Knopf
Patterson T. E., 2000, Doing Well and Doing Good: How Soft News and Critical 
Journalism are Shrinking the News Audience and Weakening Democracy – and What 
News Outlets Can Do about It. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP01–001. 
Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Available 
at: http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=667 
[Last accessed: 18/08/2018]
254
Pauly. J. J., 2003, Recovering Journalism as a Democratic Art, In: Harper. J & Yantek. 
T ed,  Media, Profit, and Politics: Competing Priorities in an Open Society, Kent State 
University Press
Peattie. S., 2007, The Internet as a Medium for Communicating with Teenagers, Social 
Marketing Quarterly, 13(2), 21-46
Peddinti. S., Ross. K & Cappos. J., 2014, On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog: 
A Twitter case study of anonymity in social networks. In Proceedings of the Second 
ACM Conference on Online Social Networks, pp. 83-94.
Pellizzaro. K & Gimbal. A., 2018, Parasocial Interaction and YouTube: Extending the 
Effect to Online Users, Conference paper, Jung-Sook Lee Competition 
Pence. H., 2007, Preparing For The Real Web Generation, Educational Technology 
Systems, 35(3): 347-356
Pengnate. S., 2019, Shocking secret you won’t believe! Emotional arousal in clickbait 
headlines, Online Information Review, 43(7): pp.1136-1150
Pendersen. E., 2019, “My Videos are at the Mercy of the YouTube Algorithm": How 
Content Creators Craft Algorithmic Personas and Perceive the Algorithm that Dictates 
their Work, Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences University of California at 
Berkeley, Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2019-48
Petley. J., 2012, The Leveson Inquiry: Journalism ethics and press freedom, Journalism 
3(4), 529-538 
Peters. C., 2011, Emotion aside or emotional side? Crafting an ‘experience of 
involvement’ in the news, Journalism, 12(3): 297-316 
Pew Research Center, 2008, The Changing Newsroom,  Available at: 
http://www.journalism.org/2008/07/21/the-changing-newsroom/, [Last accessed: 
15/09/2014]
Pew Research Center, 2009, Fox News Viewed as Most Ideological Network, Available 
at http://www.people-press.org/2009/10/29/fox-news-viewed-as-most-ideological-
network/, [Last accessed: 08/09/2014]
255
Pew Research Center, 2011a, Beyond Red vs. Blue: The Political Typology, Available 
at: http://www.people-press.org/2011/05/04/beyond-red-vs-blue-the-political-typology/, 
[Last accessed: 29/8/2014]
Pew Research Center, 2011b, GUN RIGHTS AND GUN CONTROL, Available at: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/files/old-assets/pdf/gun-control-2011.pdf, [Last accessed: 
29/8/2014]
Pew Research Center, 2012, Trends in News Consumption: 1991-2012, Available at: 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdf/2012%20News%20Consumption%20Report.pdf, [Last accessed: 13/09/2014]
Pew Research, 2012, In Changing News Landscape, Even Television is Vulnerable, 
Pew Research Center. Available at: http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/in-
changing-news-landscape-even-television-is-vulnerable/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Pew Research Center, 2013, The State of the News Media 2013, Digital Developments, 
Available at: http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/overview-5/key-findings/, [Last accessed: 
13/09/2014]
Pew Research Journalism Project, 2013, Principles of Journalism, Available at:  
http://www.journalism.org/resources/principles-of-journalism/ [Last accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Pew Research Center, 2014a, Key Indicators in Media & News, Available at: 
http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/state-of-the-news-media-2014-key-indicators-in-
media-and-news/, [Last accessed: 19/8/2014]
Pew Research Center, 2014b, Political Polarization in the American Public, Available at: 
http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf, 
[Last accessed:01/09/2014 ]
Pew Research Center, 2018, Distinguishing Between Factual and Opinion
Statements in the News. Available at: http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/13/2018/06/18110034/PJ_2018.06.18_fac [Last accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Per Research Center, 2018, The Generation Gap in American Politics. Available at: 
http://www.people-press.org/2018/03/01/the-generation-gap-in-american-politics/ [Last 
accessed: 15/08/2018]
256
Phillips. A., 2015. Journalism in Context. London: Routledge
Plaisance. P, Skewew. A, Hanitzsch. T., 2012, Ethical Orientations of Journalists 
Around the Globe: Implications From a Cross-National Survey, Communication 
Research 39(5) 641– 661
Poell. T & Borra. E., 2011, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr as platforms of alternative 
journalism: The social media account of the 2010 Toronto G20 protests, Journalism, 
13(6), 695–713
Potter. J & Wetherell. M., 1987, Discourse and social psychology. London: Sage.
Poynter, 2013, The New Ethics of Journalism, Available at: 
https://www.poynter.org/news/new-ethics-journalism-about-blog [Last accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Preston. A., 2015, Generational Gaps – UK News Consumption and the Impact of Age,  
Reuters Institute, Digital News Report 2015. Available at: 
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/essays/2015/generational-gaps/ [Last accessed: 
15/08/2018]
Prior. M., 2003, Any Good News in Soft News? The Impact of Soft News Preference on 
Political Knowledge, Political Communication 20: 149–71.
Prior. M., 2013, Media and Political Polarization, The Annual Review of Political 
Science, 16, 101-127
Price. V, Tewksbury. D & Powers. E., 1997, Switching trains of though: The impact of 
news frames on readers' cognitive responses, Communication Research, 24, 481-506
Povich. E., 1996, Partners and Adversaries: The Contentious Connection Between 
Congress and the Media, Arlington, VA: Freedom Forum
Rai. M & Cottle. S., 2007, Global mediations: On the changing ecology of satellite 
television news Global Media and Communication, 3(1): 51–78
Rassmusen Reports, 2012, 51% Expect Most Reporters To Help Obama; 9% Predict 
Most Will Help Romney, Available at: 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/august_2012/
257
51_expect_most_reporters_to_help_obama_9_predict_most_will_help_romney, [Last 
accessed: 04/09/2014] 
Rattan. A & Ambady. N., 2014, How “It Gets Better”: Effectively Communicating Support 
to Targets of Prejudice, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(5), 555–566
Rauchfleisch. A & Kovic. M., 2016, The Internet and Generalized Functions of the 
Public Sphere: Transformative Potentials From a Comparative Perspective, Social 
Media + Society, First Published April 26, 2016
Reese. S., 1990, The News Paradigm and the Ideology of Objectivity: A Socialist at the
Wall Street Journal, Critical Studies in Mass Communication 7(4): 390–409.
Reese. S & Lewis. S., 2009, Framing the War on Terror: The internalization of policy in 
the US press, Journalism, 10(6): 777-797 
Reinemann. C et al., 2012, 'Hard and soft news: A review of concepts, 
operationalizations and key findings', Journalism, 13(2), 221-239
Richards. B & Brown. J, 2001, The therapeutic culture hypothesis. In: Johansson T and 
Sernhede O (eds) Lifestyle, Desire, Politics. Goteborg: Daidalos, 97–114
Richardson, J. E., 2007, Analysing newspapers: an approach from critical discourse 
analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Riffe. D & Freitag. A., 1997, A content analysis of content analyses: twenty-five years of
Journalism Quarterly. Journalism and Mass communication Quarterly, 74, 873–882. 
Rihi. A & Wegener. C., 2017, YouTube celebrities and parasocial interaction: Using 
feedback channels in mediatized relationships, Convergence: The International Journal 
of Research into New Media Technologies, 1–13
Robinson. P., 2002, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and 
Intervention, Routledge.
Robinson. M., 2007, Two Decades of American News Preferences, Pew Research 
Center. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/2007/08/22/two-decades-of-american-
news-preferences-2/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
258
Rogers. T., 2013, Six Reasons Why Objectivity in Journalism is a Good Thing, Available 
at: http://journalism.about.com/od/reporting/a/Six-Reasons-Why-Objectivity-In-
Journalism-Is-A-Good-Thing.htm
Rost. K., Stahel. L & Frey. B., 2016, Digital Social Norm Enforcement: Online 
Firestorms, Social Media, PLoS ONE, 11(6)
Ruggiero. T., 2000, Uses and gratifications theory in the 21st century, Mass 
Communication and Society, 3: 3-37
Ruiz, C. et al., 2011, ‘Public Sphere 2.0? The Democratic Qualities of Citizen Debates 
in Online Newspapers’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 16(4): 463–487.
Rutenberg. J., 2003, War or No,News on Cable Already Provides the Drama, New York 
Times, Jan. 15.
Saad. L., 2014, U.S. Still Split on Abortion: 47% Pro-Choice, 46% Pro-Life, Gallup 
Politics, Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/170249/split-abortion-pro-choice-pro-
life.aspx, [Last accessed: 29/8/2014]
Saks. J., 2014, NY Times’ Blog Purchase Leads to Significant Changes, Newspaper 
Research Journal, 35(3), 94-106
Sambrook. R., 2017, Taking the bait: The quest for instant gratification online is 
seriously compromising news reporting, Index on Censorship, 46(1): 16-17 
Sampaio-Dias. S & Dennis. J., 2017, Not just swearing and loathing on the internet: 
analysing BuzzFeed and VICE during #GE2017,  Election Analysis 2017. Available at: 
http://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-analysis-2017/section-3-news-and-
journalism/not-just-swearing-and-loathing-on-the-internet-analysing-buzzfeed-and-vice-
during-ge2017/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Sampson A., 1999, The crisis at the heart of our media. In: Tumber H (ed.) News: A 
Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201–8.
Sassen S., 2006, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Scherer. K., 2005, What are emotions? And how can they be measured?, Social 
Science Information, 44(4), 695-729
259
Schiffer. A., 2002, Explaining Policy Coverage of U.S. Senators, paper, Midwest 
Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago
Schmidt. J. H., 2014, Twitter and the rise of personal publics. In: Weller K, Bruns A, 
Burgess J, et al. (eds), Twitter and Society. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 3–14.
Schwab. F & Schwender. C., 2011, The descent of emotions in media, In Katrin. Dm 
Scheve. C, Konijn (Eds) The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass Media, 15-37, 
Routledge
Schudson. M., 1992, Was there ever a public sphere? If so, when?: reflections on the 
American case. In: Calhoun, C. ed. Habermas and the public sphere. London: MIT 
Press: 143-163
Schudson. M., 2001, The objectivity norm in American Journalism. Journalism, 2(2): 
149–70.
Schudson. M., 2008, Why Democracies Need an Unlovable Press, Polity Press
Schultz. I., 2007. The Journalistic Gut Feeling, Journalism Practice, 1(2): 190–207.
Scholfield. P., 1995, Quantifying language, Multilingual Matters
Seidman. R., 2013, List of How Many Homes Each Cable Networks Is In - Cable 
Network Coverage Estimates As Of August 2013, Available at: 
http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2013/08/23/list-of-how-many-homes-each-cable-
networks-is-in-cable-network-coverage-estimates-as-of-august-2013/199072/, [Last 
accessed: 09/09/2014]
Secko. D et al., 2011, The unfinished science story: Journalist–audience interactions 
from the Globe and Mail’s online health and science sections, Journalism, 12(7), 814 -
831  
Seib. G., 2015, Why the 2016 Election Is Different, The Wall Street Journal. Available 
at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-2016-election-is-different-1451412444 [Last 
accessed: 17/08/2018]
Seib. P., 2001, Going live, getting the news right in a real-time, online world. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield
260
Shapiro. M & Park. H., 2015, More than entertainment: YouTube and public responses 
to the science of global warming and climate change, Social Science Information, 54(1), 
115-145
Shaw. C., 2003, TV news: why more is less, British Journalism Review, 14(2): 58-64 
Sherman, G., 2010, ‘Chasing Fox’, New York Magazine, 3 October, 
http://nymag.com/news/media/68717 [Last accessed: 17/08/2018]
Sherwood. M. et al., 2017, ‘Newswork, News Values, and Audience Considerations: 
Factors That Facilitate Media Coverage of Women’s Sports’, Communication & Sport, 
5(6): 647–66
Shifman. L., 2011, An anatomy of a YouTube meme, New Media & Society, 14(2), 187 -
203   
Shoemaker. P, Danielian. L, & Brendlinger. N., 1991, Deviant Acts, Risky Business and 
U.S. Interests: The Newsworthiness of World Events, Journalism Quarterly, 68(4): 781-
795
Shoemaker. P., 1996, ”Hard-Wired for News: Using Biological and Cultural Evolution to 
Explain the News,” Journal of Communication, 46: 32-47
Shoemaker. P., 2006, 'News and newsworthiness: A commentary', Communications. 
Volume 31, Issue 1, Pages 105–111 
Shoemaker. P & Cohen. A., 2005,. News Around the World: Content, Practitioners, and 
the Public. News Around the World: Content, Practitioners, and the Public. Routledge
Shoemaker. P & Rees. S., 1996, Mediating the message: Theories of Influence on 
Mass Media Content (2nd Edition), White Plains, New York: Longman
Shoemaker. P & Reese. S., 2013, Mediating the message in the 21st century: a media
sociology perspective. London: Routledge. 
Shoemaker. P. & Vos. T. P., 2009, Gatekeeping theory. Abingdon, England: Routledge.
Siegle. D., 2007, Podcasts and Blogs: Learning Opportunities on the Information 
Highway, Gifted Child Today, 30(3), 14-19
261
Sinclair. D, 2019, Twitter [Online], 29 June. Available from: 
https://twitter.com/_danielsinclair/status/1145039792926801925 [Last Accessed: 
19/01/2020]
Singer. J., 2009, Quality Control: Perceived effects of user-generated content on 
newsroom norms, values and routines, Journalism Practice, 4(2), 127-142
Sjøvaag. H., 2010, The Reciprocity of Journalism’s Social Contract, Journalism Studies, 
11(6), 874-888
Slefo. G., 2020, Youtube Lowers Default Streaming Quality In Europe To Ease 
Pressure On Networks, AdAge. Available at: https://adage.com/article/digital/youtube-
lowers-default-streaming-quality-europe-ease-pressure-networks/2245441
Slevin. J, 2000, The Internet and Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Smith. G., 2020, Fox News Streaming Service Seeks Broader Audience With Hunting 
and True-Crime Shows, Bloomberg. Available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-14/fox-news-streaming-service-
seeks-broader-audience-with-hunting-and-true-crime-shows [Last Accessed: 
19/01/2020]
Smith. G & Searles. K., 2013, Fair and Balanced News or a Difference of Opinion? Why 
Opinion Shows Matter for Media Effects, Political Research Quarterly, 66(3): 671–684 
Snelson, C. L., 2016 ‘Qualitative and Mixed Methods Social Media Research: A Review 
of the Literature’, International Journal of Qualitative Methods
Sobieraj. S & Berry. J., 2011. From Incivility to Outrage: Political Discourse in Blogs, 
Talk Radio, and Cable News. Political Communication - POLIT COMMUN, 28, 19-41.
SocialBlade, 2018, The Young Turks. Available at: 
https://socialblade.com/youtube/user/theyoungturks [Last accessed: 24/08/2018]
Soffer. O., 2009, The competing ideals of objectivity and dialogue in American 
journalism, Journalism, 10(4), 473-491 
262
Soloman. F., 2017, YouTube Could Be About to Overtake TV as America’s Most 
Watched Platform, Fortune. Available at: http://fortune.com/2017/02/28/youtube-1-
billion-hours-television/  [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Soroka. S, Young. L & Baimas. M., 2015, Bad News or Mad News? Sentiment Scoring 
of Negativity, Fear, and Anger in News Content, The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 659(1): 108 - 121 
Sparrow. B., 1999, Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Stafford. T., 2014, Psychology: Why bad news dominates the headlines, BBC Future. 
Available at: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20140728-why-is-all-the-news-bad
Steinberg. B., 2017, CBS, Cable Networks Start to Sell Advertising in TV’s Upfront 
Market (EXCLUSIVE), Variety. Available at: http://variety.com/2017/tv/news/cbs-upfront-
2017-tv-advertising-cable-1202460489/ [Last accessed: 24/08/2018]
Stephansen. H. C., 2019, Conceptualizing a distributed, multi-scalar global public 
sphere through activist communication practices in the World Social Forum, Global 
Media and Communication, 15(3), 345–360
Stelter. B., 2011, Al Jazeera English Finds an Audience, New York Times. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/middleeast/01jazeera.html?_r=1&src=me 
[Last accessed: 24/08/2018]
Stokel-Walker. C., 2019, YouTube’s Deradicalization Argument Is Really a Fight About 
Transparency, FFWD. Available at: https://ffwd.medium.com/youtubes-deradicalization-
argument-is-really-a-fight-about-transparency-fe27af2f3963 [Last Accessed: 
19/01/2020]
Street, J., 2011, Mass media, politics, and democracy. 2nd ed. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Stroud, N. J., 2007, Media effects, selective exposure, and Fahrenheit 9/11. Political 
Communication, 24: 415-432.
Stroud, N. J., 2008, Media use and political predispositions: Revisiting the concept of 
selective exposure. Political Behavior, 30: 341-366
263
Stroud. N., Muddiman. A & Scacco. J., 2016, Like, recommend, or respect? Altering 
political behavior in news comment sections, New Media & Society, 1-17
Suler. J., 2005, The online disinhibition effect. International Journal of Applied 
Psychoanalytic Studies, 2(2): 184- 188
Sussman. G & Galizio. L., 2003, The Global Reproduction of American Politics, Political 
Communication,.20(3): 309-328
Szalai. G., 2011, Al Jazeera English Newscasts Rise 135% in Ratings on LA's KCET, 
Hollywood Reporter. Available at: http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/al-
jazeera-english-newscasts-rise-203305 [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Taflinger. R., 1996, The Myth of Objectivity in Journalism: A Commentary, available at: 
http://public.wsu.edu/~taflinge/mythobj.html [Last accessed: 29/08/2018]
Tenenboim. O & Cohen. A., What prompts users to click and comment: A longitudinal 
study of online news, Journalism, 16(2), 198 - 217
Thelwall. M., 2017, Social media analytics for YouTube comments: potential and 
limitations, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 21(3): 303-316
Thelwall. M., Buckley, K., & Paltoglou, G., 2011, Sentiment in Twitter events, Journal of 
the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 62(2), 406-418.
Thompson, J. B.,1990, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in
the Era of Mass Communication. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Thurman. N., 2008, Forums for citizen journalists? Adoption of user generated content 
initiatives by online news media, New Media & Society, 10(1), 139-157
Thurman. N., 2011, Making 'The Daily Me': Technology, economics and habit in the 
mainstream assimilation of personalized news, Journalism, 12: 395-415
Thurman. N & Lupton.B.,  2008, Convergence Calls: multimedia storytelling at British 
news websites. Convergence, 14(4), 2–34.
Thussu. D., 2007, News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment, SAGE 
Publications
264
Toepfl. F., 2011, Managing public outrage: Power, scandal, and new media in 
contemporary Russia, New Media & Society, 13(8), 1301–1319
Towner. T & Dulio. D., 2011, An experiment of campaign effects during the YouTube 
election, New Media & Society, 13(4), 626 - 644
Trevisan. F & Reilly. P., 2014, Ethical dilemmas in researching sensitive issues online: 
lessons from the study of British disability dissent networks, Information, 
Communication & Society, 17(9): 1131-1146,
Trussler. M & Soroka. S., 2014, Consumer Demand for Cynical and Negative News 
Frames, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 19(3), 360-379
Tsuriel, K., Dvir Gvirsman, S., Ziv, L., Afriat-Aviv, H., & Ivan, L., 2019, Servant of two 
masters: How social media editors balance between mass media logic and social media 
logic. Journalism.
Tuchman. G.,1972, Objectivity as a Strategic Ritual, American Journal of Sociology 77: 
660–79.
Tudor. A., 2010, Why Horror? The Peculiar Pleasures Of A Popular Genre, Cultural 
Studies, 11(3), 443-463
Tumber. H & Prentoulis. M., 2003, Journalists under fire: Subcultures, objectivity and 
emotional literacy. In D. Thussu, & D. Freedman (Eds.), War and the media: Reporting 
conflict 24/7, 215-231,  London: SAGE Publications
Turney. P., 2002, Thumbs Up or Thumbs Down? Semantic Orientation Applied to 
Unsupervised Classification of Reviews, Proceedings of the Association for 
Computational Linguistics: 417–424
Tunstall. J.,1971, Journalists At Work. London: Constable. 
Uribe. R & Gunter. T., 2007, Are ‘Sensational’ News Stories More Likely to Trigger 
Viewers’ Emotions than Non-Sensational News Stories? A Content Analysis of British 
TV News, European Journal of Communication, 22(2), 207-228
Uygur. C., 2016, 2016 TV Year in Review: Cenk Uygur, Founder and CEO, The Young 
Turks, The Drum. Available at: http://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2016/12/19/2016-tv-
year-review-cenk-uygur-founder-and-ceo-the-young-turks [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
265
Valkenburg, P.M, Semetko, H.A & de Vreese. C.H, 1999, The Effects of News Frames 
on Readers’ Thoughts and Recall, Communication Research 26(5): 550–69.
Variety, 2015, The Young Turks: No. 7 in #Famechangers Digital Star Ranking. 
Available at: http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/the-young-turks-youtuber-
famechangers-digital-star-ranking-1201544796/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Vettehen. P., Nuijten. K., Beentjes. J., 2005, News in an Age of Competition: The Case 
of Sensationalism in Dutch Television News, 1995–2001, Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media, 49(3), 282-295
VidStatsX, 2016, YouTube Top 100 Most Subscribed News & Politics Channels List -
Top by Subscribers. Available at: http://vidstatsx.com/youtube-top-100-most-
subscribed-news-politics-channels  [Last accessed on 29/04/16]
Volkmer. I., 2014, The Global Public Sphere : Public Communication in the Age of 
Reflective Interdependence. Hoboken: Polity
Vu. H. T., 2014, The online audience as gatekeeper: The influence of reader metrics on 
news editorial selection. Journalism, 15(8): 1094–1110.
Wahl-Jorgensen, K., 2007, Journalists & the Public: Newsroom Culture, Letters to the 
Editor, and Democracy. Hampton Press Inc: United States.
Wahl-Jorgensen. K., 2013, The strategic ritual of emotionality: A case study of Pulitzer 
Prize-winning articles, Journalism, 14(1) 129 –145
Wahl-Jorgensen, K., 2019, ‘Questioning the Ideal of the Public Sphere: The Emotional 
Turn’, Social Media + Society
Wahl-Jorgensen. K; Williams. A & Wardle, C., 2010, Audience views on user-generated 
content, Intellect Publishing, 8: 177-194
Wakabayashi. D & Goldmacher.S., 2019, Google Policy Change Upends Online Plans 
for 2020 Campaigns, New York Times. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/technology/google-political-ads-targeting.html
266
Waldron. J., 2012, YouTube, fanvids, forums, vlogs and blogs: Informal music learning 
in a convergent on and offline music community, International Journal of Music 
Education, 31(1), 91-105
Wallace, S., 2013, The complexities of convergence: Multiskilled journalists working in 
BBC regional multimedia newsrooms. International Communication Gazette, 75(1): 99–
117.
Walma Van Der Molen. J. H & Van Der Voort. T. H. A., 2009, Children’s and Adult’s 
Recall of Television and Print News in Children’s and Adult News Format, 
Communication Research 27(2), 132-160 
Wardle. C & Williams. A., 2010, Beyond user-generated content: a production study 
examining the ways in which UGC is used at the BBC, Media Culture Society, 32(5), 
781-799
Ward. S., 1991, PRAGMATIC NEWS OBJECTIVITY: Objectivity With a Human Face, 
The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard 
University. Available at: http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/d37_ward.pdf [Last accessed on 29/08/18]
Watts. M, et al., 1999, Elite Cues and Media Bias in Presidential Campaigns: Explaining 
Public Perceptions of a Liberal Press, Communication Research, 26(2), 144 - 175
Wang, C., 2014, The effects of party fractionalization and party polarization on 
democracy, Party Politics, 20: 687-699 
Weatherly. J. N., Petros. T. V., Christopherson. K. M & Haugen. E. N., 2007, 
Perceptions of Political Bias in the Headlines of Two Major News Organisations, The 
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 12: 91
Weber. R., 1990a, Basic content analysis (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Weber,.R., 1990b, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences: Basic content 
analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications
Weber. P., 2013, Discussions in the comments section: Factors influencing participation 
and interactivity in online newspapers’ reader comments, New Media & Society, 16(6), 
941 - 957   
267
Wei, L, Hindman, D., 2011, Does the digital divide matter more? Comparing the effects 
of new media and old media use on the education-based knowledge gap. Mass 
Communication and Society 14(2): 216–235.
Welbourne. D & Grant .W., 2015, Science communication on YouTube: Factors that 
affect channel and video popularity, Public Understanding of Science, 25(6), 706 - 718
Welbers. K & Opgenhaffen. M., 2019, Presenting News on Social Media, Digital 
Journalism, 7(1): 45-62
Weprin. A., 2010, This Is Where CNN Makes Its Money, Available at: 
http://www.mediabistro.com/tvnewser/this-is-where-cnn-makes-its-money_b24388 [Last 
accessed: 27/8/2014]
Whetmore. E. J., 1987, Mediamerica: Form, Content and Consequence of Mass 
Communication, 3rd edn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Whitaker. J., Orman. E., Yarbrough. C., 2014, Characteristics of “Music Education” 
Videos Posted on Youtube, Applications of Research in Music Education, 33(1), 49-56
Wilson.T., Wiebe. J., Hoffmann. P., 2005, Recognizing Contextual Polarity in Phrase-
Level Sentiment Analysis, Proceedings of Human Language Technology Conference 
and Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (HLT/EMNLP), 
347–354
Woodruff. J., 2015, Judy Woodruff to aspiring journalists: ‘You need to care about the 
world around you’, PBS. Available at: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/judy-
woodruff-you-need-care-world-around-you [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
Yale. L & Gilly. M., 1988, Trends in advertising research: a look at the content of 
marketing orientated journals from 1976 to 1985. Journal of Advertising, 17(1), 12–22. 
Yang. G & Cannon. D., 2017, Proximity prominent news value for online publication, 
Newspaper Research Journal, 38(2): 259–270
Yin. R. K., 2013, ‘Validity and generalization in future case study evaluations’, 
Evaluation, 19(3): 321–332
YouTube, 2016, About YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/en-
GB/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
268
YouTube, 2018, YouTube for Press. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-
GB/yt/about/press/ [Last accessed: 15/08/2018]
YouTube, 2019, The Four Rs of Responsibility, Part 2: Raising authoritative content and 
reducing borderline content and harmful misinformation. Available at: 
https://youtube.googleblog.com/2019/12/the-four-rs-of-responsibility-raise-and-
reduce.html [Last Accessed: 19/01/2020]
Yu. R., 2016, Cenk Uygur’s ‘Young Turks’ succeeds with personal, visceral news 
approach, USA Today. Available at: 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/07/03/q-cenk-uygurs-tyt-media-seeks-tv-
deals-popularity-soars-online/86531376/ [Last accessed: 29/08/2018]
Zannettou. S, Chatzis. S, Papadamou. K & Sirivianos. M., The Good, the Bad and the 
Bait: Detecting and Characterizing Clickbait on YouTube, 2018 IEEE Security and 
Privacy Workshops (SPW), San Francisco, CA, 63-69.
Zhang. D., Shoemaker. P & Wang. W., 2013, Reality and newsworthiness: Press 
coverage of International Terrorism by China and the United States, Asian
Journal of Communication, 23(5): 449-471
Zhang. K & Kizilcec. R., 2014, Anonymity in social media: Effects of content 
controversiality and social endorsement on sharing behavior. In International AAAI 
Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM) (pp. 643-646)
Zillman. D et al., 2004, Effects of Lead Framing on Selective Exposure to Internet News 
Reports,  Communication Research, 31(1), 58-81
Zimbardo, P. G., 1969, The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus 
deindividuation, impulse, and chaos. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 17: 237- 307
269
